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Abstract
In the vision of ubiquitous computing, the activities of daily life are supported
by a multitude of heterogeneous, loosely coupled computing devices. The
support of seamless collaboration between users, as well as between their
devices, can be seen as one of the key challenges for this vision to come true.
This thesis provides a trust based approach to supporting the selection
of trustworthy interaction partners. The goal of this approach is to estimate
an entity’s trustworthiness as accurately as possible in order to improve the
average quality of the entity’s interactions.
In this thesis, the trustworthiness of an entity is derived from evidence
gained during past interactions. To this end, current Bayesian trust models
are extended and improved regarding the following aspects: (i) better inte-
gration of the characteristics of the application context, (ii) more intuitive
access to the trust model, and (iii) better integration of recommendations by
third parties. The last aspect is important as there are numerous situations
in which direct evidence between entities is rare. The proposed approach
provides means for the robust integration of recommendations provided by
third parties, especially considering attacks by entities intentionally providing
misleading recommendations.
Scientific Contribution: The scientific contribution of this thesis is sum-
marized as follows:
• The trust model that is provided in this thesis extends Bayesian trust
models in order to improve the integration of context-dependent param-
eters, such as dispositional trust and aging of evidence. Furthermore,
a parameter called maximum number of evidence units allows the user
to define the number of evidence that is expected to be sufficient for
being representative for an entity’s behavior within a certain application
context. In the proposed model, the dispositional trust can be assessed
according to the preference of the user; alternatively, a new approach
for deriving the dispositional trust from the behavior of previously
encountered entities is provided.
• The proposed interrelation between the aging and the maximum number
of expected evidence units allows the limitations of current Bayesian
trust models to be overcome. The thesis shows that in those models,
v
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aging either does not have an impact on the expectation value in the
absence of evidence, or it narrows the range of the expectation value.
• A second representation of trust - called the Human Trust Interface
(HTI) - is proposed providing for an easier access to the model by human
users. This representation is based on a simple set of parameters. These
parameters are also the basis for a graphical representation allowing
users to interpret and adjust the trust values of other entities intuitively.
• As the model supports two different representations a mapping between
both representations is required in order to switch between both repre-
sentations. The provided mapping allows users and developers of trust
models to benefit from the advantages of both representations.
• The distributed computational model that is proposed for the aggrega-
tion of direct evidence and recommendations has been designed to be
especially robust to so-called Sybil attacks, which occur when a single
party tries to multiply the influence of its recommendations by creating
a high number of seemingly independent entities. This is achieved using
the accuracy of a recommender’s past recommendations as well as the
rank of the recommender in order to limit a recommender’s influence.
Especially, considering the rank of a recommender, i.e., its position in
the group of recommenders, provides a means for limiting the influence
of a potentially infinite number of malicious recommenders under certain
circumstances.
Evaluation: The trust model has been evaluated in two user studies which
support that users feel comfortable with the proposed graphical representation.
Furthermore, in the simulation of collaboration in an opportunistic network,
the model shows a good performance regarding the estimation of an entity’s
trustworthiness and regarding the average quality of interactions when using
the trust model to find the best interaction partner. This results from the
comparison to a state-of-the-art approach, as well as from a comparison
to an artificial model that is initialized with the system variables of the
simulation model, and therefore serves as perfect selection strategy. The
simulation shows the results of the different approaches over a set of 15
populations, which have been canonically derived from the system model,
modeling entities with different typical behaviors.
Zusammenfassung
Motivation: In der Vision des allgegenwa¨rtigen Rechnens (engl. ubiquitous
computing) wird der Mensch bei nahezu allen Ta¨tigkeiten durch eine Vielzahl
von Computern unterstu¨tzt. Hierfu¨r ist eine nahtlose Zusammenarbeit
aller Gera¨te der intelligenten Rechenumgebung no¨tig, welche auch neue
Mechanismen zur Auswahl vertrauenswu¨rdiger Interaktionspartner erfordert.
Ziel: In dieser Arbeit wird ein neuer Ansatz vorgestellt, um Entita¨ten,
bspw. Nutzer oder deren Endgera¨te, bei der Auswahl vertrauenswu¨rdiger
Interaktionspartner zu unterstu¨tzen. Das Ziel dieses Ansatzes ist es, die Ver-
trauenswu¨rdigkeit potentieller Interaktionspartner mo¨glichst gut zu scha¨tzen.
Durch die Auswahl vertrauenswu¨rdiger Interaktionspartner soll die Zahl
zufriedenstellender Interaktionen einer Entita¨t erho¨ht werden.
Ansatz: In dieser Arbeit wird das Vertrauen in einen Interaktionspartner vor
allem aus den bisherigen Erfahrungen aus vorangegangen Interaktionen, bzw.
genauer gesagt, aus den davon abgeleiteten Hinweisen, ermittelt. Hierzu
wird auf sogenannten Bayes’schen Vertrauensmodellen aufgebaut, die aus der
Literatur bekannt sind. Diese werden in mehrerlei Hinsicht erweitert: (i) um
die Charakteristika des Anwendungskontextes, d.h. der Interaktionsdoma¨ne,
besser im Modell abzubilden; (ii) um den Nutzern einen intuitiveren Zugang
zum Modell zu ermo¨glichen; und (iii) um Wissen Dritter besser einzubeziehen.
Der letztgenannte Punkt ist wesentlich, da in vielen Situationen kein oder
nur unzureichendes Wissen u¨ber potentielle Interaktionspartner vorliegt,
welches direkt aus den Erfahrungen aus vorangegangenen Interaktionen
abgleitet werden kann. Im vorgestellten Ansatz werden neue Mechanismen
entwickelt, um Wissen Dritter - sogenannte Empfehlungen - robust, d.h.
unter Beru¨cksichtigung mo¨glicher Angriffe, zu integrieren.
Wissenschaftlicher Beitrag: Der wissenschaftliche Beitrag dieser Arbeit
kann wie folgt zusammengefasst werden:
• Der entwickelte Ansatz erweitert Bayes’sche Vertrauensmodelle, um
anwendungskontextabha¨ngige Parameter wie bspw. das Grundvertrauen
und das Altern von Hinweisen besser zu beru¨cksichtigen. Insbeson-
dere erlaubt es der Parameter maximale Anzahl erwarteter Hinweise
festzulegen, wie viele Hinweise erwartet werden, um sie als repra¨senta-
tiv fu¨r das Verhalten eines Interaktionspartners innerhalb des vorher
vii
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festgelegten Anwendungskontextes anzusehen. Dies ist ermo¨glicht das
Beru¨cksichtigen von Nutzerpra¨ferenzen, wie auch eine Wahl dieses Pa-
rameters in Abha¨ngigkeit vom Altern von Hinweisen. Daru¨berhinaus
kann im entwickelten Modell das Grundvertrauen in Abha¨ngigkeit von
den Pra¨ferenzen des Nutzers gewa¨hlt oder aus dem Verhalten fru¨herer
Interaktionspartner innerhalb des betrachteten Anwendungskontextes
abgeleitet werden.
• Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird zudem gezeigt, dass mit dem vorgestellten
Ansatz Beschra¨nkungen gegenwa¨rtiger Vertrauensmodelle u¨berwunden
werden ko¨nnen, die sich bei der Beru¨cksichtigung des Alters der gesam-
melten Hinweise ergeben. Es wird u.a. gezeigt, dass in bisherigen
Arbeiten die Beru¨cksichtigung des Alters von Hinweisen dazu fu¨hrt,
dass entweder der Vertrauenswert einer Entita¨t bei Nichtaufkommen
weiterer Hinweise unvera¨ndert bleibt oder der tatsa¨chlich erreichbare
Wertebereich des Vertrauenswertes eingeschra¨nkt wird.
• Eine zweite, vereinfachte Repra¨sentation wird eingefu¨hrt, um die we-
sentlichen Modellparameter dem Nutzer intuitiver darzustellen, als dies
im Rahmen bekannter Bayes’scher Vertrauensmodelle mo¨glich ist. Diese
Repra¨sentation ist auch die Grundlage fu¨r eine neue graphisch Darstel-
lung, welche dem Nutzer die Interpretation der Vertrauenswerte und die
Anpassung einstellbarer Parameter erleichtert.
• Da das entwickelte Modell zwei Repra¨sentationen der Vertrauenswu¨rdig-
keit einer Entita¨t besitzt, wird eine Abbildung zwischen beiden definiert.
Erst diese Abbildung macht es mo¨glich, dass Nutzer und Entwickler von
Vertrauensmodellen die Vorzu¨ge beider Darstellungen simultan nutzen
ko¨nnen.
• Fu¨r die Aggregation von direkten Hinweisen sowie Empfehlungen wird
ein neuer Ansatz vorgeschlagen, welcher insbesondere die Robustheit
gegenu¨ber sogenannten Sybil-Angriffen (engl. Sybil attacks) verbessert.
Dabei versucht der Angreifer, durch Aufbieten einer Vielzahl scheinbar
unabha¨ngiger Entita¨ten, gezielt die Auswahl eines Interaktionspartners
zu beeinflussen. Die Verbesserung wird erreicht, indem bei der Gewich-
tung von Empfehlungen nicht nur die Richtigkeit fru¨herer Empfehlungen,
sondern auch der sogenannte Rang des Empfehlenden, d.h. dessen
Einordnung in der Gruppe der Empfehlenden, beru¨cksichtigt wird.
Dies ermo¨glicht es unter bestimmten Bedingungen, den maximalen
Einfluss einer potentiell unendlich großen Gruppe von Empfehlenden zu
beschra¨nken.
Evaluation: Das entwickelte Vertrauensmodell wurde einerseits in zwei
Nutzerstudien evaluiert, welche die Hypothese unterstu¨tzen, dass Nutzer in-
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tuitiv mit der entwickelten graphischen Darstellung umgehen ko¨nnen. Ander-
erseits zeigt die Evaluation des Vertrauensmodelles in einer Simulation, dass
sich mit dem Vertrauensmodell gute Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Scha¨tzung
der Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit einer Entita¨t und hinsichtlich der erreichten durch-
schnittlichen Qualita¨t der Interaktionen erzielen lassen. Dies ergibt sich aus
dem Vergleich zu konkurrierenden Ansa¨tzen wie auch im Vergleich zum einem
ku¨nstlichen Modell, welches die Systemvariablen der Simulationsumgebung
kennt, und deshalb als sogenanntes perfektes Modell dient. Die Simulation
zeigt die Ergebnisse der verschiedenen Ansa¨tze fu¨r 15 Populationen, welche
kanonisch aus dem Systemmodel abgeleitet wurden und sich hinsichtlich des
typischen Verhaltens ihrer Entita¨ten unterscheiden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Trust is a well-known concept in everyday life. In real life, trust can serve as
the basis for decisions subject to risk and uncertainty. For the introduction of
the common meaning of the concept, one may refer to the Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary. Among other statements, one find the following: trust is
the“assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or
something”, and the “dependence on something future or contingent” [MW09].
In [BLRW04], Bhargava et al. point out that “trust [...] is pervasive in social
systems” and that “socially based paradigms will play a big role in pervasive-
computing environments”. This idea serves as the starting point for this
thesis.
1.1 Motivation
The goal of ubiquitous computing is to support the users in their daily
life. Supporting users anytime, anywhere requires giving up the desktop
computer paradigm. Instead of using desktop computers, the user will
be surrounded by a large number of loosely coupled, networked devices.
Collaboration in ubiquitous computing environments can be predicted to
increase substantially. Three major reasons for this trend can be given. First,
due to increased integration of wireless technologies in mobile devices (e.g.,
most mobile phones are capable of exchanging data via Bluetooth or WiFi),
the opportunities for spontaneous interaction increase. This brings about new
paradigms for collaboration between users, the most prominent example being
’Opportunistic Networks’ [Hei07]. Second, as ubiquitous computing devices
will be heterogeneous and, hence, often limited regarding their capabilities,
the collaboration between those devices will be indispensable to unfold the
power of ubiquitous computing. Third, since everyday life will be more and
more supported by or dependent on IT, users will want or will have to use
more and more IT based services on the go. This may lead to a manifold
set of applications where users are in the position to select their interaction
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partners, e.g., service vendors or service providers, from a set of known and
unknown interaction partners, which may depend on the time and location
of the service request.
The success of collaboration is based on the selection of reliable partners.
Relying only on traditional certificate based approaches does not seem to be
appropriate as they have several shortcomings. First, an unmanaged domain,
like ubiquitous computing, may lack a central authority [SH08], which is
necessary for issuing and revoking certificates. Second, certificates providing
only information about the identity of an entity may not be sufficient, as
a unique identifier or pseudonym does not convey information about the
behavior of this entity per se [CSG+03].
1.2 Goal
The goal of this thesis is the development of new techniques supporting
entities, i.e., users or their devices, in selecting trustworthy interaction
partners for making collaboration successful. In an unmanaged domain, such
as ubiquitous computing, the challenges arise from the uncertainty about the
identity and goals of the potential interaction partners.
According to the basic idea of ubiquitous computing, the solution needs
to be non-intrusive and human-centered. The integration of these conflicting
aspects can be achieved by a solution that is able to autonomously integrate
relevant evidence about the trustworthiness of interaction partners collected
within the system, as well as evidence available to the users based on “real
world” experience.
1.3 Object of Research
The approach followed in this thesis is to improve the overall quality of
interactions by using trust as a well-founded basis for the selection of an
appropriate interaction partner. Trust between entities can be established
based on direct evidence from past interactions and on recommendations
from other entities (indirect evidence).
Representing trust based on evidence requires the definition of a rela-
tionship between trust and evidence. This relationship may depend on the
application context the trust model is applied to, e.g., information exchange
or recommendation of movies, and it needs to consider the age of the evi-
dence, as well as the typical behavior of entities. Furthermore, an intuitive
representation of trust is crucial, as the ease-of-use and the feeling of being in
control are important aspects for gaining user acceptance. The provision of
means that enable the users to control and to manipulate the trust assigned
to other entities is especially important, as it allows for integration of “real
world” experience and the intervention in the selection process by the user.
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An expressive model needs to represent the level of the expected trust-
worthiness of an interaction partner, as well as the associated level of (un-
)certainty. The latter can be expressed by reflecting the relation between
the number of evidence units the expectation is based on and the number of
evidence units that is assumed to be sufficient for a well-founded decision.
In order to support ubiquitous computing in a non-intrusive and human-
centered way, the model of trust needs to be appropriate to serve as a basis for
autonomous decision making, as well as for an interface which is intuitively
interpretable by humans.
The integration of recommendations is necessary for the establishment of
trust in cases in which direct evidence is rare. As this enables foreign parties
to provide misleading information, a robust integration of recommendations
requires a carefully designed computational model of trust.
1.4 Scientific Contribution and Evaluation
This thesis proposes a new trust model called CertainTrust. It is based on a
modified Bayesian approach for modeling trust. The approach overcomes
limitations of current state-of-the-art approaches with respect to the repre-
sentation of trust (see Figure 1.1) and the computation of trust (see Figure
1.2).
Figure 1.1: Representations of trust
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1.4.1 Contributions
1. Expressive trust model - deriving trust from evidence consid-
ering context-dependent parameters: The model provides means
for deriving trust from evidence from past interactions. It allows
trust to be interpreted as a subjective probability and to consider the
following context-dependent parameters:
First, the dispositional trust of an entity in an application context is
expressed using two parameters. The base trust f specifies the trust
value for unknown entities. It can be dynamically updated based on
the experience with the encountered entities. The weight w of the base
trust influences how quickly the trust value shifts from the base trust
value to the average rating of the past interactions, when evidence is
available.
Second, the maximum number of expected evidence units N is introduced
to define a number of evidence units that is expected to be sufficient
in order to consider the collected evidence as representative for the
behavior of an entity in an application context.
Third, the aging factor a allows more recent evidence to be given
a higher weight. It is proposed to choose the maximum number of
expected evidence units based on the aging factor in order to take into
account that aging may limit the number of evidence units that is used
to derive the trust value.
2. Extension to Bayesian trust models - overcoming limitations
of aging: Trust is modeled as a subjective probability and derived
from evidence from past interactions, therefore, the model is based
on state-of-the-art Bayesian trust models [JI02, Jøs01,WJI05,TPJL06,
BLB04,MMH02a]. However, the introduction of the context-dependent
parameters above required a modification to the state-of-the-art trust
models. The integration of these parameters is achieved by a dynamic
adaptation of the prior knowledge. Besides the introduction of disposi-
tional trust, the proposed approach overcomes limitations of current
approaches regarding the effects of introducing the aging of evidence.
This thesis shows that in current Bayesian trust models, aging either
does not have an impact on the expectation value in absence of evi-
dence [BLB04], or aging narrows the range of the expectation value,
e.g., [JI02,WJI05].
3. Representation of trust supporting human users - providing
a simple set of parameters and an intuitive graphical repre-
sentation: Supporting the user with an intuitive representation of
trust that provides easy manipulation and interpretation of the trust
information collected by the system requires an interface that is tailored
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to the needs of human users. This issue is addressed by introducing
a representation - called Human Trust Interface (HTI) - that derives
the trust value of another entity based on two independent parameters
(which in turn partly depend on the context-dependent parameters).
The average rating expresses the average outcome of past interactions.
The certainty increases with the number of collected evidence units. It
defines the influence of the average rating on the trust value in relation
to the base trust value. In the HTI, the trustworthiness of an entity is
derived based on a simple formula that integrates the average rating,
the certainty, and the base trust. The basic idea is that with increasing
certainty, i.e., with an increasing number of collected evidence units,
the final trust value shifts from the base trust value to the value of
the average rating. The simple set of parameters is the basis for the
graphical representation that has been designed in order to support
human users when interpreting and adjusting trust values.
4. Mapping between the proposed representations - to benefit
from the advantages of each representation: In order to benefit
from the advantages of the Bayesian representation and the HTI, a
mapping between both representations is provided. The challenge
herein is to define this mapping in such a way that the derived trust
values are independent from the representation, i.e., the expectation
value in the Bayesian representation and the trustworthiness in the
HTI are required to be equal. This is considered when deriving the
representation dependent parameters from evidence and the context-
dependent parameters.
5. Robust computational model - limiting the impact of Sybil
attacks: The computational model allows for the aggregation of direct
evidence and recommendations. The operators for the aggregation take
their cues from the operators for discounting and consensus introduced
in [Jøs01,JI02]. The discounting (weighting) of the recommendations
is based on the trustworthiness of the recommenders. It is estimated
according to the accuracy of a recommender’s past recommendations.
The consensus operator is extended to reduce the influence of recom-
menders based on the rank of their trustworthiness. Furthermore, the
influence of recommenders is limited by considering only a maximum
amount of evidence per recommender and the amount of direct evidence
and recommendations available. Using the property of the convergence
of a geometric series provides for limiting the maximum impact of
an arbitrary high number of recommenders, as long as their trustwor-
thiness is below a certain threshold ts. This is especially important
when facing Sybil attacks. Hereby, a single party can try to multiply
the influence of its recommendations by creating a high number of
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seemingly independent entities.
Figure 1.2: Aggregation of direct evidence and recommendations
1.4.2 Evaluation
The evaluation shows the improvements of the modified Bayesian approach in
the face of aging and the enhancements of the model’s robustness regarding
attacks by entities providing misleading recommendations, especially with
respect to Sybil attacks.
The impact of the trust model on the quality of interactions and the error
in estimating the trustworthiness of an entity is based on simulations. The
scenario for the simulation is a mobile file sharing scenario in an opportunistic
network using user traces from the Reality Mining Project [EP06]. The results
show how the model copes with different population mixes, regarding the
distribution of a typical user’s behavior and its stability.
The evaluation of the usability of the representation of trust for human
users (HTI) is evaluated based on a user study with an online movie rec-
ommendation platform which was developed for this purpose. Furthermore,
another user study was performed comparing the time users take for selecting
the best interaction partner in the HTI, the Opinion Triangle [Jøs01], and
an Amazon-like stars interface.
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1.5 Publications
Parts of this thesis have been published in book chapters and in proceed-
ings of international conferences and workshops. The state-of-the-art and
challenges for modeling trust have been addressed in [Rie06,RKM06,Rie08a,
Rie08b,ARSB+08]. The basic concepts for the proposed trust model and its
evaluation have been published in [Rie07,RKM07,RH08,RS08,Rie09,RA09].
Furthermore, the collaboration in the related field of privacy led to an
additional publication [WRH07].
1.6 Thesis Structure
The main part of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides
background information about the concept of trust in general, and how trust
can be established and used to support decisions in computer or network
mediated interactions.
In Chapter 3, state-of-the-art trust models for deriving trust from evi-
dence are introduced. In addition to introducing two commercial reputation
or recommendation systems, the trust models are classified based on the
semantics of their trust values. Afterwards, there is an analysis of the features
of current trust models revealing the first issues which need to be tackled
when developing a trust model for ubiquitous computing.
Chapter 4 introduces the basic concepts that are necessary for specifying
a trust model. The chapter contains the definition of the system model and
the basic assumptions that need to be fulfilled in order to apply an evidence
based trust model. It shows that applications in the field of ubiquitous
computing, open service platforms, and Web 2.0 can fulfill these assumptions.
Based on the assumptions, the design goals for the new trust model are
provided in the conclusions of the chapter.
Chapter 5 presents the developed trust model. This chapter shows
how the trust model represents and computes trust values. It provides an
extension to Bayesian trust models and it introduces a novel representation
of trust for users. The computational model presents an extension to current
trust models in order to improve the models robustness to Sybil attacks.
Furthermore, mechanisms for assessing trust in recommenders based on a
recommender’s past recommendations are introduced.
In Chapter 6, the evaluation of the trust model is provided. The chapter
presents the evaluation of the trust model in a simulated opportunistic
network, as well as two user studies on the usage of the trust model.
Chapter 7 provides the conclusions recalling the major results of this
thesis and an outlook.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In order to avoid confusion about the terminology used in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, a short introduction of the most important terms is provided:
• Entity : An entity is an abstract concept that may refer to a user,
an abstract service provider or interaction partner, a software agent
or autonomous software component, a peer, or a computing device.
Entities can establish trust between each other, and they are assumed
to have a behavior. For example, an entity that shares files with others
may provide good files, or it may provide corrupt files; entities that share
information may offer accurate or misleading information. Entities
offering accurate information can be considered to be trustworthy.
• Interaction: Interaction between entities is an abstract concept that is
the basis for collaboration. An interaction can be information sharing,
file sharing, or usage of a provided service, etc.
• Trust and reputation: In this thesis trust and reputation are introduced
as two similar but distinct concepts; the definition for both terms are
introduced at the beginning of Chapter 2. Yet, as in the current
literature the terms trust and reputation as well as trust model and
reputation model are partly used as synonyms and partly with different
meanings, the distinction of these terms is not strictly maintained
throughout this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
The goal of this thesis is to support the selection of trustworthy interaction
partners. In ubiquitous computing, as in real life, trust can serve as a
basis for risky engagements in the presence of uncertainty. As successful
collaboration depends on the selection of a trustworthy interaction partner, it
is an interesting challenge to evaluate the trustworthiness of the entities that
surround users in ubiquitous computing environments. If an entity is able
to identify trustworthy interaction partners, it profits from the capabilities
and services they offer. Thus, it takes advantage of the power of ubiquitous
computing and avoids disappointments.
Ubiquitous computing is the application area that is the focus of this
thesis. According to [SH08], ubiquitous computing may be an unmanaged
domain. This means that in there are scenarios in which anybody and any
device can participate in the ubiquitous computing environment. This leads
to the threat that there are not only benevolent interaction partners that offer
their services in order to contribute to the ubiquitous computing environment,
but also malicious interaction partners that try to make others interact with
them. For example, they might be interested in maximizing their profits by
offering a low quality service for a high price or in distributing viruses and
malware.
Trust and reputation systems have already been successfully applied
in order to support users in finding trustworthy interaction partners in
centralized and managed settings, e.g., on the auction platform eBay [eBa09b].
Yet, those approaches cannot be directly transferred to a distributed and
potentially unmanaged domain.
In order to disburden the user and support autonomous decision making
in the presence of risk, a trust model needs to provide measures for the
trustworthiness of an interaction partner, i.e., a trust value, and for reason-
ing about the confidence or the certainty associated with this trust value.
Furthermore, it needs to be suitable for integration in the decision making
process of an autonomous software component or agent. In addition, as there
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are cases in which the user wants to interact with the system, a trust model
needs to provide an intuitive interface for human users. This need can arise,
when a user has “real world” knowledge about the trustworthiness of another
entity, e.g., if the user knows another entity from work or from school, then
they might want to manually assess its trust value for this entity.
Furthermore, a trust model needs to provide parameters that can be
adapted to the characteristics of the application context, i.e., the application
area, it is used in. Here, e.g., aging provides a means for considering changes
in an entity’s behavior. Furthermore, a user’s dispositional trust, that is
their general attitude to trust in other entities, is an important factor that
may vary from context to context.
Finally, another challenge arises when recommendations by other entities
are considered. This is especially important in order to establish trust in
cases when direct experience is rare. In unmanaged domains, this needs to
be done quite carefully as it allows foreign parties, benevolent as well as
malicious ones, to influence one’s decision making process.
The following provides an example showing how a trust model can support
users in an opportunistic network scenario. The scenario is presented, as
it has been presented to the participants of a user study that has been
conducted as part of this thesis (see Section 6.2):
“You and your friends are on your way to a soccer match in the
stadium in Frankfurt. As usual, you take your personal device -
a next-generation mobile phone - with you. The week before, you
informed your personal device that you are looking for a certain
song (mp3) and that you want to buy an mp3 player. While
moving through the crowd in front of the stadium, your device
searches (wirelessly) for potential interaction partners who offer
the song or the mp3 player. Shortly before passing the security
check, one of your friends meets some of his colleagues. Your
personal device discovers that a member of this group (Dirk)
offers the song you are looking for. To reduce the risk of getting
a file that is damaged or contains a virus, your personal device
collects recommendations from the mobile devices of your friends,
who either know Dirk or have had a number of interactions with
him. As the recommendations are positive, your personal device
downloads the song from Dirk’s device. Afterwards, it checks
the file for noise and viruses. As the file is clean, your personal
device generates a profile for Dirk, and notes that there has been
a positive interaction in the context of mp3-exchange. All this
has been done without your interaction; only after the successful
exchange, a short vibration of your personal device indicates the
positive interaction. In this scenario, the personal device made
all decisions by itself. But in the case that your personal device
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would have only collected a small number of evidence units, not
sufficient for an autonomous decision, it could have notified you.
Then, it would have been your choice whether to interact or not.
In this example, the risk associated with the interaction is limited.
However, in the case that someone offers a used mp3-player for
10 EUR, one will probably be glad about any evidence about the
trustworthiness of this potential interaction partner.”
In the following parts of this chapter, first, a general notion of trust is
introduced. Besides providing definitions for trust, the section introduces
properties that are usually associated with trust and it introduces the main
categories that are relevant for trust establishment. Second, it is shown
how trust can be established in computer or network mediated interactions.
Third, an approach for integrating trust in decision making is shown.
2.1 Trust - A Social Concept
Trust is a well-known concept in everyday life that simplifies many complex
processes. On the one hand, trust in the social environment allows humans
to delegate tasks and decisions to an appropriate person. On the other
hand, trust facilitates an efficient rating of the quality of the information
presented by a trusted party. There is much work on trust, not only in
computer science, but also in other academic fields, e.g., sociology, economics
[JIB07,GS00,AG07,WV07].
2.1.1 Definitions of Trust
Although trust is a well-known concept in everyday life and despite the
fact that there is a set of properties of trust (see Section 2.1.3), on which
most researchers agree, it is hard to define trust. Apart from the definition
in the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary stated in Chapter 1, there are
a couple of definitions with different focuses [Mar94, AR04]. A definition,
which is shared or at least adopted by many researchers [JIB07, ARH00,
MMH02a,KR03,TPJL06], is the definition provided by the sociologist Diego
Gambetta [Gam00,Gam90]:
“trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another
agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his ca-
pacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it
affects his own action.”
The most important points in this definition are: Trust is subjective,
and it includes an element of prediction or expectation. Furthermore, trust
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is tied to the performance of another agent which affects the action of the
trusting agent.
In [JKD05], the term trust is differentiated in reliability trust - which
may also be referred to as evaluation trust - and decision trust.
Reliability trust is defined as:
“Trust is the subjective probability by which an individual, A,
expects that another individual, B, performs a given action on
which its welfare depends.”
Decision trust is defined:
“Trust is the extent to which a given party is willing to depend
on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of
relative security, even though negative consequences are possible.”
The definition of reliability trust is close to the definition trust provided by
Gambetta. The definition of decision trust extends the previous definitions
by implicitly introducing notions of utility, environmental factors and risk
attitude [JKD05]. Furthermore, it states that trust is situation dependent.
Assuming that the context of trust describes the field or the application area
in which one entity assesses the trustworthiness of another one, e.g., splinting
a fracture or providing a service for online banking, situation dependence is
a step beyond context-dependence. For example, a person might not trust
their ear, nose and throat doctor to splint a fracture (context), but make an
exception in the situation of an emergency.
The definition provided in [MMA+01] also clearly states the idea that
trust is a subjective expectation. Additionally, it introduces the information
about how trust is established.
“Trust: a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s
future behavior based on the history of their encounters.”
In this thesis, the definition of reliability trust provided by Jøsang et
al. [JKD05] will also serve as basis for the definition of trust. The (final)
definition will be provided in Chapter 4 together with the definition of
the other elements of the proposed model. The aspects introduced in the
definition of decision trust will only be taken into account in the face of
decision making (see Section 2.3), but not in the face of evaluating the trust in
another entity. The issue of trust establishment will be addressed separately
in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 Definition of Reputation
A concept that is often mentioned together with trust is reputation. In
order to avoid confusion, this section provides a definition for reputation and
explains its relation to trust.
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In [JIB07], there is the following definition for reputation:
“Reputation is what is generally said or believed about a person’s
or thing’s character or standing.”
Although the definition only introduces an abstract notion of reputation,
it allows one to easily differentiate between trust and reputation.
Trust describes a subjective relation between an entity and another entity
(or group of entities). Reputation is what is generally said about an entity.
Thus, the reputation of an entity is based on the opinions provided by all en-
tities. Trust may be used to determine the reputation of an entity. The other
way around, reputation may also be used to determine the trustworthiness
of an entity [JIB07].
2.1.3 Properties of Trust
The following properties are usually assigned to trust [ARH00,Mar94] and
relevant when transferring the concept to computer or network mediated
interactions. Trust is subjective, i.e., the trust of an entity A in an entity
C does not need to be the same as the trust of any other entity B in C.
Furthermore, one cannot expect the trust of A towards C to be the same as
the trust of C towards A, thus trust is asymmetric. Trust is context-dependent
and situation-dependent. Obviously, there is a difference in trusting in another
entity as provider of music files or as provider of an online banking service. It
also is a difference in trusting in someone as service provider or as provider of
recommendations. If A trusts B in the context of providing recommendations
about a good service provider, e.g., for file-storing, this does not necessarily
imply that A trusts in B as a good peer to store files at, and vice versa.
Trust is dynamic and non-monotonic, i.e., experience can increase as well
as decrease trust. Thus, it is necessary to model both positive and negative
evidence. Trust is not transitive in a mathematical sense, but the concept of
recommendations is very important. Particularly, as recommendations are
necessary to establish trust in entities about which any or only little direct
experience is available.
2.1.4 Categories and Qualities Relevant for Trust
The following provides an introduction of different categories of trust and
qualities a trusted entity is considered to have. Both issues are important in
order to establish trust.
McKnight and Chervany state in [MC96] that there are three principle
categories of trust: personal / interpersonal trust, impersonal / structural
trust, and dispositional trust. Personal (interpersonal) trust describes trust
between two persons (groups of people) in a specific situation. Structural
trust is not bound to a person but rises from the social or the organizational
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situation. Dispositional trust can be explained as a person’s general attitude
towards the world or towards other people. It is cross-personal and cross-
situational.
Furthermore, McKnight et al. introduce a concept called Trusting Beliefs,
which“means the extent to which one believes (and feels confident in believing)
that the other person is trustworthy in the situation” [MC96]. This is close to
the definitions of trust introduced above. They found that Trusting Beliefs in
another person usually means to expect the person to be benevolent (willing
to serve another’s interest), honest (proving the willingness by making and
fulfilling agreements to do so), competent (able to serve another’s interests)
or/and predictable (one’s willingness and ability to serve another’s interests
does not vary or change over time). If it is possible to find a person with
these qualities, interaction with this person would be expected to have a
positive outcome.
2.2 Trust Establishment in Computer Mediated
Interactions
As introduced above, the concept of trust may be used for estimating the
future behavior of an entity. In order to transfer this concept to computer or
network mediated interactions, especially in the field of ubiquitous computing
the following questions arise:
1. How to establish trust between entities in ubiquitous computing envi-
ronments?
2. How to make trust based decisions in the face of interactions associated
with risk?
In “real life”, trust can be established based on various cues. It may
be based on personal encounters with another person or service provider.
The appearance, the clothing, or the role in an organization allows one to
estimate the competence, the honesty, the benevolence, or the predictability
of a person or service provider regarding its future behavior.
In computer or network mediated interactions, these cues might not be
available. Entities one may interact with, might be known only by their
digital identifier. This can be a website or solely a unique pseudonym. While
a website still might provide some cues that allow one to reason about the
trustworthiness of an entity, e.g., based on the contact address, a simple
pseudonym does not necessarily convey any information about the real world
identity of the interaction partner. Thus, it might be impossible to directly
evaluate the four qualities (see Section 2.1.4) of trust based on “real world”
knowledge about the interaction partner. Therefore, computer mediated
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interactions require new concepts that allow entities to establish trust and
to reason about the trustworthiness of other entities.
Finally, in the case when a user A has “real world” knowledge about their
interaction partner B, e.g., assume A and B are friends, there is the need for
providing means that allow the user to make this information available to
an autonomous software component or agent that is to make autonomous
decisions on the behalf of its owner.
2.2.1 Establishment of Personal Trust
At first, the transfer of personal trust is considered. As shown in [AR04],
much work is done on transferring this category of trust to computer sciences,
whereas there is little work supporting the other categories. According
to [AG07, BDOS05], there are currently two approaches to establish trust
between entities in computer science.
In [BDOS05], the approaches have been referred to as “policy-based
trust management” (relying on objective “strong security” mechanisms) and
“reputation-based trust management” (based on direct experience and feed-
back provided by others). In order to not mix the semantics of the terms
reputation and trust, the term “reputation-based trust management” is
replaced by “evidence-based trust management” within this thesis.
2.2.1.1 Policy-based Trust Management
In this approach trust is stated implicitly in the form of credentials. A
typical scenario is that an entity A wants to access the resources of another
entity B. Entity B will only grant access rights to entity A, if entity A can
provide the necessary credentials. Policies are used to state which credentials
are necessary. The credentials are usually certificates, which have been
signed by a trusted third party. The credentials may state information about
the identity of the owner [ITU97] or information about the rights of the
owner [BFL96]. The act of trust establishment, i.e., the evaluation whether
an entity should obtain certain credentials - e.g., based on the evaluating the
benevolence, competence, honesty, and predictability - is done by the party
issuing the certificates. It is an external process.
In [BFIK99,BFL96], trust management is defined as
“a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security policies,
credentials and relationships that allow direct authorization of
security-critical actions.”
This definition is in the sense of policy-based trust management. It
describes what can be considered to be a traditional approach to trust
management, i.e., trust is only treated implicitly and in a rather static
manner [CSG+03,Gra03].
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Well-known examples of this approach are presented in [BFL96,BFK98].
A main drawback of both systems is that they treat trust as monotonic, i.e.,
additional credentials can only increase granted permissions.
Another shortcoming of the policy-based trust management is that it
usually relies on a trusted third party that issues the certificate, stating that
an entity is considered to be trustworthy. Thus, the process of trust establish-
ment is external to policy-based trust management. Furthermore, certificate
based approaches, e.g., [ITU97], that rely on a public key infrastructure
require further means for the distribution, verification, and revocation of
keys.
2.2.1.2 Evidence-based Trust Management
The second approach tries to establish trust without the need for an external
source of trust. The trust is established based on evidence derived from past
interactions. As direct evidence between entities may be rare, most evidence
based approaches consider the exchange of recommendations between entities,
i.e., an entity provides another entity with information about its previous
experience. In case entity A (trusting entity) is to evaluate the trustworthiness
of an entity B (trustee), a trust model provides a means for evaluating evidence
about the trustworthiness entity B. In online communities, e.g., on auction
platforms like eBay [eBa09b], the evidence is information about the quality
of past interactions rated by former interaction partners of entity B. Like in
policy-based trust management, the trusting entity does not directly evaluate
the qualities (benevolence, competence, honesty, and predictability) of the
trustee. Here, when an entity provides a sufficient number of interactions
with positive outcome, it is assumed to have these qualities, and therefore it
is assumed to be trustworthy.
The advantage of this approach is that it poses very little requirements
to the environment it is applied to. The interaction between entities can
be assumed to be the intrinsic purpose of the application, which requires
the evaluation of the trustworthiness of the potential interaction partner.
Furthermore, it can be expected that entities are capable of creating evidence
that state the quality of an interaction, e.g., by providing ratings. After
an interaction, this information can be used to update and re-evaluate the
trustworthiness of the interaction partner. Finally, ubiquitous computing
environments naturally provide capabilities for communication. These are
necessary in order to find potential interaction partners and to exchange
recommendations.
Thus, the evidence which is used to evaluate the trustworthiness of an
entity is created by the participants of the system and distributed within the
system. The approach does not require additional infrastructure or trusted
third parties.
Yet, the approach has also obvious shortcomings. The approach provides
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only evidence about the trustworthiness, but it does not directly state whether
an entity is trustworthy or not. It is also necessary to adapt the trust value
of an entity when its behavior changes. Furthermore, there is the need for a
mechanism for aggregating one’s direct experience with recommendations
provided by others. This mechanism especially needs to be able to cope with
misleading recommendations.
Another drawback is that the approach is implicitly based on the as-
sumption that there has been interaction between at least some entities. The
bootstrapping of an evidence based trust model may need some external
information about trustworthiness of entities. The bootstrapping may be
especially difficult in contexts in which the risk is too high to interact with
unknown entities.
2.2.2 Establishment of Structural and Dispositional Trust
Besides personal trust, there are the categories containing structural trust
and dispositional trust (see Section 2.1.4).
Structural trust rises from the social or the organizational situation. This
requires that there is a community knowing each other (social situation)
or having well-known rules for interaction with each other (organizational
situation). Thus, this kind of trust may be hard to transfer to an unmanaged
domain. Therefore, it is not considered in the following. Yet, there are
several approaches that try to consider the establishment of trust based on
the social relationship between agents or the owners, e.g., [SS02a,HJS06].
Dispositional trust is a person’s general attitude towards the world. Thus,
one way to initialize the dispositional trust would be to ask the user of the
trust model. As dispositional trust has been introduced to be cross-personal
and cross-situational, it should also be a rational approach to derive the
dispositional trust from the behavior of all entities that have been encountered
so far. This would only require the provision of a working mechanism for
establishing personal trust.
2.3 Trust Based Decision Making
As motivated above, a trust based decision depends on the situation. Besides
the trust in the interaction partner, an important aspect is the risk associated
with an interaction. Up to the point of decision making, the information
about trust and risk can be managed in arbitrarily representational structures.
For the task of decision making, it is necessary to resolve all information
provided in order to make a decision whether to interact or not.
In the case of trust based on certificates, the interaction is supported if the
necessary credentials have been collected based on policies [BFL96,BFK98].
In other cases [Mar94,CSG+03,JHF03,Jøs99b], the decision making is
done threshold based, i.e., there is a minimum value of trust (threshold) that
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is required for the interaction.
The presence of uncertainty and contradicting evidence complicates deci-
sion making. A possible solution could be to integrate the user into a decision
making process providing a preliminary decision and asking for commitment.
Although this can lead to higher acceptance of trust-aided decision support
by the user, it takes away the benefit of automation, and will not comply
with the principles of a calm technology.
A well-founded approach of threshold based decision making in the face of
risk is to calculate the expected utility of an interaction (according to [QH07]
based on [Ber54,NM44,Sav54]).
Assume for an interaction a with possible outcomes o1, ..., on the utility
of each outcome is given as Ui(a), and the probability of oi is given by Ei(a).
Then, the expected utility EU(a) is defined as:
EU(a) =
n∑
i=1
Ui(a) · Ei(a) (2.1)
For an interaction with binary outcome, this can be further simplified.
Let U+(a) denote the utility of a positive outcome (benefit) – occurring with
probability E+(a) – and U−(a) the utility of a negative outcome (costs) –
occurring with probability E−(a). Then, the expected utility EU(a) can be
calculated as:
EU(a) = E+(a) · U+(a) + E−(a) · U−(a) (2.2)
The interaction takes place only if the expected utility EU(a) is greater
than a predefined threshold t. For rational entities the threshold is t = 0
[Jøs99b].
It is important to note that this approach requires that the trust model
models the trustworthiness of an entity as a probability in order to use it in
the equations above.
2.4 Conclusions
This section provided a basic introduction of the concept of trust and how
trust establishment can be achieved in computer or network mediated in-
teractions. As policy-based trust management may require a trusted third
party in order to issue certificates and to introduce entities as trustworthy,
and as the pure knowledge about the identity of an entity does not convey
information about the behavior of the entity per se [CSG+03], this thesis
focuses on deriving the trustworthiness of an entity based on evidence derived
from past interactions.
Chapter 3
State-of-the-Art: Models of
Trust
In the following, an overview of state-of-the-art trust models is provided. In
current research, there is a large number of trust models. Trust models may
be developed for an application area - e.g., electronic commerce [eBa09b],
P2P [KSGM03,BLB04,AD01], web search [PBMW98], movie recommenda-
tions [GH06], public key authentication [Zim94], service-oriented comput-
ing [BHOC07] - or more generally for distributed environments like ubiqui-
tous computing, virtual organizations, and agent societies [PTJL05,TPJL06,
ARH00,YS02,SS02a,Sab03,Mar94,JI02,MMH02a,AMCG04,CSG+03].
The focus of this chapter is on models that evaluate the trustworthiness
of an entity based on an entity’s direct evidence or recommendations or both.
After a short introduction of the general functionality of a trust model, and
a side-look to commercial feedback or recommender systems, a selected set
of trust models is introduced based on a classification of their trust values.
Then, an analysis of the introduced models shows aspects with which current
models deal.
3.1 Representation and Computation of Trust
In the following, it is proposed to make a separation between two aspects
of trust models, namely between their representational model and their
computational model.
The representational model defines how trust is represented and estab-
lished, and the computational model defines how different sources of evidence
are aggregated.
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3.1.1 Aspects of the Computational Model
The computational model defines how the different sources of trust, i.e.,
direct evidence and recommendations, are integrated. Here, it is important
to consider whether a trust value is supposed to be a subjective trust value,
i.e., trust depends on the entity which evaluates its trust in another entity,
as introduced in Section 2.1.1, or whether it is a global trust value, i.e., a
reputation value according to the definition in Section 2.1.2.
According to [ZL04], the approaches in [KSGM03, PBMW98, RAD03]
are characterized as follows: (1) they take into account all entities and trust
links between them and (2) the calculated value is independent from the
entity that evaluates the trust value. Thus, those models can be considered
to compute global trust value.
In contrast, in trust models that provide means for the computation of
subjective trust values, an entity usually only considers recommendations
from a subset of all entities, and it may use subjective measures to define the
impact of the collected recommendations [QHC06,TPJL06,BLB04,HJS06]. If
a recommender does not have any knowledge about the interaction partner, it
can either forward the request to other entities [Gol05,HJS06], or it may report
that it does not have any experience [BLB04,TPJL06]. Finally, the models
propose different mechanisms to filter and weight the recommendations before
calculating the trust value.
The following shows a simple example illustrating how a subjective trust
value can be derived given a network of entities providing recommendations.
A simple trust network might look as shown in Figure 3.1 or 3.2.
In both examples, entity A wants to evaluate the trustworthiness of entity
C based on its direct evidence and the recommendations provided by its
neighbors (entities R1, R2, R3, and R4). As the recommenders forward their
recommendations along the edges of the graph, this is also called chain-based
trust evaluation in this thesis.
In Figure 3.1, the recommendations by R1 and R2 are based on their
direct evidence. In Figure 3.2, R1 and R2 do not have direct evidence but
may forward the information received from R3. Furthermore, R2 can also ask
R4 for recommendations. When receiving the recommendations, the entity
A has to aggregate the direct evidence and the evidence provided by the
recommenders in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of the C.
Having introduced the basic functionality of the computational model
at a very high level of abstraction, the functionality of the representational
model will be introduced next. Further details on the computational model,
i.e., which mechanisms are applied in order to enhance a trust model’s
robustness in the face of misleading recommendations, are introduced with
the description of the trust models in Section 3.2 and in Section 3.3.
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Figure 3.1: Trust network (Example 1)
Figure 3.2: Trust network (Example 2)
3.1.2 Aspects of the Representational Model
The representational model of a trust or reputation model defines how trust
is represented and established.
Differences in the representation of trust e.g., can be found in the domain
of the trust value. A binary domain allows only the expression of the two
states “trusted” and “untrusted”. This comes close to certificate or credential-
based access control approaches (like in policy-based trust management),
where a user is trustworthy and access is granted, if and only if the user
presents the necessary credentials. Since trust is assumed to have several
levels [AR04], binary models are considered to be insufficient. Trust can
also be represented by more than two discrete values using either discrete or
continuous numbers or labels. Regarding whether a trust model is designed
for human users or software agents there can be arguments for all of these
three representations. Discrete numbers, e.g., in a set of 1 to 10, and labels,
can easily be assigned and understood by human users, where as continuous
numbers allow the use of well-founded mathematical models.
Furthermore, the representation of trust can differ in the dimension,
i.e., the number of its parameters. One-dimensional representations only
allow the trustworthiness of an entity to be expressed in a single parameter,
e.g., the trustworthiness of an entity is assumed to be “10”. In contrast,
multi-dimensional representations can also express further influencing factors
on the trust value. For example, the trust models presented in [Jøs01,
JI02,MMH02a,SS02a,HJS04b,TPJL06] provide measures that express the
uncertainty, reliability or confidence that is associated with a trust value.
These measures are usually associated with the number of the collected
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evidence units and possibly additional parameters.
Another important aspect is the interpretation or the semantics of a
trust value. The semantics of trust values can be in the following set: rating,
ranking, probability, belief, and fuzzy logic.
• The trust values which are computed in ranking based models, e.g.,
[KSGM03,PBMW98,Lev04,ZL04], are not directly associated with a
meaningful semantics, but only in a relative way, i.e., a higher value
means higher trustworthiness.
• The trust values which are directly linked with a trust related semantics
may be referred to as ratings. For example, on a scale of natural numbers
in the interval [1, 4], 1 can be linked to “very untrusted”,..., and 4 to
“very trusted”. In current trust models [ARH00,Gol05] ratings are used
to represent trust in a way which is easily accessible to humans.
• If trust is modeled as probability, the trust value expresses the prob-
ability that an entity will behave as expected. This comes closest
to the definition introduced in Section 2.1.1. A critical issue when
modeling trust as probability is how to derive trust from the collected
evidence. Besides Bayesian or maximum likelihood based approaches,
one finds mechanisms that propose their own approaches for deriving
a probability from the collected evidence.
• Trust can be expressed using a belief based model. The major ad-
vantage of this approach is that it directly allows for expressing the
uncertainty that is associated to a trust value. Details of this approach
are introduced with the description of subjective logic in Section 3.2.5.1.
• Trust models based on fuzzy logic introduce their own semantics to the
calculated trust values based on membership functions. In contrast
to probabilistic models, trust is formally not treated as the subjective
probability that an agent will behave as expected in the next encounter,
but the interpretation of a fuzzy value like ’very good’ is instead left
up to the user or agent. Since fuzzy values are allowed to overlap, this
also introduces a notion of fuzziness, i.e., an agent can be, for example,
’good’ and ’very good’ at the same time to a certain degree.
An aspect that is closely related with the semantics of the trust values is
the establishment of trust. While label-based approaches are suitable when
trust is directly assessed by human users, evidence based trust models need
to define their own relation between evidence and the derived trust value.
Here, it is also interesting whether the models consider further information,
e.g., context-dependent information, like the user’s dispositional trust, or
the entities’ trustworthiness in a related context. Furthermore, the domain
of the considered evidence may be interesting. A number of trust models,
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e.g., [TPJL06, BLB04, MMH02a, JI02] focus on binary evidence, i.e., the
evidence derived from an interaction is expected to be either positive or
negative. Other approaches allow multinomial evidence [JH07] and continuous
evidence [JLC08] to be considered.
The classification of the trust models by the semantics of their trust value
is used in the next section as the basis for the introduction of a set of trust
models.
3.2 Trust Models by Semantics of the Trust Value
Having introduced the general concepts of the computation and the represen-
tation of trust, the following presents a selected set of current state-of-the-art
trust models. Besides the two commercial feedback or recommender models
of eBay [eBa09b] and Amazon [Ama09], the trust models are sorted according
to the classification of the semantics of their trust value.
3.2.1 Commercial Feedback and Recommender Models
Probably the most well-known rating systems are currently hosted by eBay
[eBa09b] and Amazon [Ama09], although they are simple models regarding
the computation of their scores, and they do not provide a trust value in
the sense of the definitions in Section 2.1.1. They are introduced to show
how evidence from past interactions is currently presented to human users
in online environments. On eBay the feedback score supports users when
they have to find a reliable seller, on Amazon the ratings support users when
evaluating the quality of offered goods, e.g., books.
3.2.1.1 eBay Feedback Forum
The eBay feedback forum [eBa09b] allows users of the auction platform to
overcome the problem of missing traditional cues for assessing the trustwor-
thiness of the seller or the quality of the offered goods - “The key to eBay’s
success is trust” [eBa09a].
The basic idea is simple. After each transaction buyer and seller can give
each other a rating, stating if they were satisfied with the transaction. The
effect of the feedback forum is twofold.
For sellers, a high number of good transactions leads to a high feedback
score or high reputation. Studies by [RZSL06] have shown that a high
feedback score is rewarded, since well established sellers with a high reputation
rating can achieve higher prices than new sellers with a low reputation rating.
Thus, the feedback score helps to achieve accountable behavior of the sellers.
Additionally, it helps buyers to assess the trustworthiness of a seller, as a
seller with a high feedback score can be supposed to deliver its offered goods
according to the announced quality.
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The details of the model (cf. [JIB07,RZ02, eBa]) are simple, too. Buyers
and sellers are allowed to rate each other after each transaction. In general,
this feedback can either be positive (+1), neutral (0) or negative (-1)1.
Furthermore, it may contain some additional free text information. Each user
profile shows a feedback score as the total sum of feedback provided and the
percentage of positive feedback in relation to the total feedback. Interpreting
the sum of feedback alone can lead to misleading interpretations, since 100
positive and 0 negative ratings end in the same sum as 300 positive and 200
negative ratings. The percentage of positive values helps to overcome this
problem. The interpretation of the percentage alone can again be misleading,
as a high percentage not necessarily means a high number of total interactions.
Therefore, the user has always to interpret both value together.
In the end, the decision whether a score of 80 and 99% positive ratings
is trustworthy, or if another seller with a score of 5000 and 84% positive
ratings is to be preferred, is left up to the user. The system does not provide
a representation which integrates both values in a single measure.
In the case a user wants to see more details, they get information about
the ratings in the last month, last 6 months, and last year, as well as short
messages which the raters can provide with their rating. Furthermore, there
are ratings for different aspects in the context of the transaction, e.g., shipping
time.
Besides the feedback score, there are additional possibilities, which may
help to assess the trustworthiness of a seller, e.g., a seller might be marked
as a “power seller” 2
3.2.1.2 Amazon Review Scheme
The review scheme provided by Amazon [Ama09] is not a trust model in the
narrower sense. Like the rating system of eBay, it is well-known and it tries
to support users in their decision making.
The idea is that users share their experience in order to support others,
e.g., when evaluating whether a book is worth reading (and thus buying) or
not. Therefore, users may provide reviews for articles which are sold on the
Amazon website. The review may contain a rating on a range from one to
five stars and additional text information.
Together with each article, its aggregated rating is presented, i.e., the
average of the provided ratings and the number of contributing ratings.
1A seller may only give positive ratings to the buyer.
2A user can become a PowerSeller when they fulfill the following requirements: “con-
sistent sales volume, 98% total positive Feedback, eBay marketplace policy compliance,
an account in good financial standing, and beginning in July 2008, detailed seller rating
(DSRs) of 4.5 or higher in all four DSRs - item as described, communication, shipping
time, and shipping and handling charges. If a seller no longer complies with any one of the
above requirements, they are removed from the program.” [eBa09c]
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Additional information is offered when the user clicks on the average rating
with their mouse.
Like the eBay feedback forum the Amazon rating scheme does not provide
a representation that aggregates the collected information in a single value.
Furthermore, both systems do not calculate personalized ratings.
3.2.2 Ranking Approach
Typical approaches in this category are presented in [KSGM03,PBMW98,
Lev04, ZL04]. As the semantics of ranking based trust values only states
that a higher value is better, the trust value itself does not convey a real
meaning. Thus, although ranking based approaches allow to identify the
entity with the highest trust value, they are not directly applicable when an
entity has to make a decision that is associated to risk, as the ranking does
not allow to state “how good” the best entity is. Furthermore, the approaches
in [KSGM03,PBMW98,Lev04] calculate global trust value, which does not
fit to the proposed definitions of trust. For both reasons, these approaches
are not further evaluated.
3.2.3 Rating Approach
In rating based approaches each trust value is associated with a certainty
semantics, e.g., if 10 is the highest trust value, it can be associated with the
semantics ”high trust” [Gol05]. Thus, rating based approaches try to provide
a simple access to the trust values for human users.
3.2.3.1 TidalTrust
In [Gol05], Golbeck provides a trust model that is based on 10 discrete trust
values in the interval [1, 10]. Golbeck claims that humans are better in
rating on a discrete scale than on a continuous one, e.g., in the real numbers
of [0, 1]. The 10 discrete trust values should be enough to approximate
continuous trust values. The trust model is evaluated in a social network
called FilmTrust [GH06] with about 400 users. In this network, the users
can rate movies. Furthermore, one can rate other users, i.e., friends, in the
sense of “[...] if the person were to have rented a movie to watch, how likely
it is that you would want to see that film” [Gol05].
Recursive trust or rating propagation allows one to infer the rating of
movies by the ratings provided by friends. The following provides the basic
computational model. For a source s in a set of nodes S the rating rsm
inferred by s for the movie m is defined as
rsm =
∑
i∈S tsi · rim∑
i∈S tsi
, (3.1)
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where intermediate nodes are described by i, tsi describes the trust of s
in i, and rim is the rating of movie m assigned by i. To prevent arbitrary long
recommendation chains, the maximum chain length or recursion depth can
be limited. Based on the assumption that the opinions of the most trusted
friends are the most similar to the opinion of the source, it is also possible to
restrict the set of considered ratings to those provided by the most trusted
friends.
Although the recommendation propagation is simple, the evaluation
in [Gol05] shows that it produces a relatively high accuracy, i.e. the ratings
based on recommendation are close to the real ratings of the user. Yet, this
approach does not allow one to state the reliability or the confidence that is
associated with a rating. Furthermore, the approach does not deal with any
form of decision making.
3.2.3.2 Model proposed by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
The trust model presented by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [ARH00] is devel-
oped for use in virtual communities with respect to electronic commerce and
artificial autonomous agents. It deals with a human notion of trust as it is
common in real world societies. The formal definition of trust is based on
Gambetta [Gam90].
The model deals with direct trust and recommender trust. Direct trust
is the trust of an agent in another agent based on direct experience, whereas
recommender trust is the trust of an agent in the ability of another agent
to provide good recommendations. The representation of the trust values
is computed by discretely labeled trust levels, namely “Very Trustworthy”,
“Trustworthy”, “Untrustworthy” and, “Very Untrustworthy” for direct trust,
and “Very Good”, “Good”, “Bad” and, “Very Bad” for recommender trust.
A main aspect of this trust model is to overcome the problem that different
agents may use the same label with a different subjective semantics. For
example, if agent a labels an agent c to be “Trustworthy” based on personal
experience, and a knows that agent b labels the same agent c to be “Very
Trustworthy”. The difference between these two labels can be computed as
“semantic distance”. This “semantic distance” can be used to adjust further
recommendations of b.
Furthermore, the model deals with uncertainty. Uncertainty is introduced
if an agent is not able to determine the direct trust in an agent uniquely, i.e.
if an agent has e.g., as much “good” as “very good” experience with another
agent. But it seems unclear how to take benefit from this introduction of
uncertainty in the further trust computation process. The combination of
recommendations is done as weighted summation. The weights depend on
the recommender trust and are assigned in an ad-hoc manner.
Although the model drops recommendations of unknown agents for the
calculation of the recommended trust value, those agents become known by
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providing recommendations, and their future recommendations will be used
as part of the calculation.
It is important to mention that the direct trust values are only used to
calculate the semantic distance to other agents, but are not used as evidence
which could be combined with the recommendations.
The collection of evidence is only stated for recommendations of agents
which have direct experience with the target agent. Furthermore, the system
does not deal with risk. Decision making seems to be threshold based, but is
not explicitly treated.
3.2.4 Probabilistic Approach
In probabilistic approaches, trust values are represented in the range of
[0, 1], which allows these values to be interpreted as probabilities. Yet, those
approaches still differ in the way the trust values, i.e., the probabilities, are
computed.
3.2.4.1 UniTEC - A Generic Approach
In [KR03,KBR05], Kinateder et al. introduce a generic trust model. This
approach identifies five relevant aspects for modeling trust between entities.
1. Trust measure: It describes the quality of the trust relationship
ranging from complete distrust over neutral to complete trust.
2. Trust certainty: It describes the confidence of the trustor in her
estimation of the trustee, i.e., the trust measure.
3. Trust context: The context in which entity A trusts in entity B, e.g.,
file sharing or online banking.
4. Trust directness: There are direct and indirect trust relationships.
Direct trust refers to the trust in the context of providing a service. Indi-
rect trust refers to trust in a recommender, i.e., in the recommendations
about service providers in a certain context.
5. Trust dynamics: Trust is not static, it may dynamically change when
new evidence is available or over time.
The trust measure is calculated based on an update rule that seems to
be defined in an ad hoc manner. Yet, the trust measure is interpreted as
probability. In [KBR05], it is proposed to calculate the certainty of the
trust measure in similar manner as in ReGreT [SS02a,Sab03], yet, it is not
stated whether and how the certainty parameter is to influence the trust
measure. The approach is capable of considering that an entity’s behavior
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may dynamically change using two concepts called trust aging and trust
fading.
Moreover, the approach allows trust to be transferred between similar con-
texts. This is done based on a “weighted direct trust context graph” [KBR05].
The weights between the different contexts, e.g., ‘cars´ and ‘limousines´,
allow to define how trust and evidence that is collected in one context should
be weighted when transferred to the other one.
Besides the trust model itself, the most interesting issue of the generic
approach is that Kinateder et al. show how the representational models for
trust presented in [ARH00,JI02,Sab03] can be integrated in this general model.
For each model a mapping is provided introducing additional assumptions
when necessary.
Although the inclusion of recommendations in the computation of trust
values has been described, it is not evaluated. The evaluation in [KBR05]
compares the performance of the UniTEC trust measure with others model
only based on direct evidence.
3.2.4.2 Bayesian Trust Models
Bayesian trust or reputation models have been proposed, e.g., in [TPJL06,
BLB04,MMH02a,JI02,QHC06,WJI05]. In the following, first, the represen-
tational model of Bayesian trust models is introduced as a common basis
for these models. Afterwards, the differences regarding the computational
models are described.
Representational Model
In Bayesian trust models, trust is interpreted as a subjective probability.
This means that the expectation value, which is usually used to determine
the trust value of an entity, is not only calculated based on the evidence that
is available about an entity, but it also considers subjective prior knowledge,
i.e., information that is independent from the analyzed data [Bol04]. The
consideration of the prior knowledge provides the user with means to integrate
their dispositional trust in the model, which is considered to be an advantage
over maximum likelihood based trust models as proposed in [DA04,DA05].
For a formal comparison of a maximum likelihood based model to a Bayesian
one see [NKS07].
In Bayesian trust models, the subjective probability for positive outcome
in the next interaction is modeled as a random variable p using a beta
probability density function h. The function is defined by the two parameters
α, β:
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h(p | α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1 − p)β−1,
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0 .
(3.2)
By defining α = r+ r0 and β = s+ r0, it is possible to relate the probability
function directly to the collected evidence, where r and s represent the
number of positive and negative evidence units, and r0 and s0 define the prior
knowledge. The expectation value is defined as E = αα+β . The mathematical
foundations of the Bayesian approach are described, e.g., in [Bol04].
In the approaches proposed in [TPJL06, BLB04, MMH02a, JI02], the
prior information is used to statically initialize the model with a uniform
distribution (r0 = s0 = 1). Although, this may be appropriate for a wide
range of applications, it prevents the user from adjusting these parameters
according to their dispositional trust or from adjusting the prior knowledge
dynamically.
Assuming r0 = s0 = 1, the information of an entity A about the trustwor-
thiness of an entity B can be expressed based on the aggregated positive and
negative evidence. In the following, this is referred to as the opinion of entity
A about (the trustworthiness of) entity B and denoted as oAB = (r, s).
Whenever new evidence is available, it can be integrated by updating the
value of r, if there is new positive evidence, and the value of s in the case of
negative evidence. For example, if oAB = (10, 3) and there is an additional piece
of positive evidence available, the updated opinion is equivalent to oAB = (11, 3).
Thus, it is not necessary to store the evidence per interaction per entity, as an
entity only needs the information about the aggregated numbers of positive
and negative evidence units. This is done in [BLB04,MMH02a,JI02], only
TRAVOS [TPJL06] needs to store the evidence per interaction per entity for
other reasons.
Although the approach is originally designed to only allow for binary
feedback, that is either positive or negative feedback, it has also been shown
how continuous feedback can be integrated in [JI02].
Furthermore, the trust models proposed in [BLB04, WJI05] are also
capable of weighting evidence according to its recentness, which is referred to
as aging of evidence in this thesis - in other work, the corresponding concept
is called forgetting [JI02], or longevity [JHF03,Jøs07,JLC08]. In [JHF03], it
has been shown that the aging of evidence has positive effects in an e-Market
scenario. In contrast to the approach proposed by Buchegger et al. [BLB04],
the approach proposed in [JHF03,WJI05] has the feature that in absence of
evidence the expectation value moves back towards the initial expectation
value that is defined by the prior knowledge. However, the latter group of
models suffers from an effect that may be undesired. The aging as introduced
in [JI02,JHF03,WJI05] can be shown to limit the number of evidence units
r + s that an entity can collect to a finite number. This leads to a narrowing
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of the range of the values of the expectation value (see Section 5.2.3.1). The
concept of a dynamic base rate, which has been proposed in [JLC08] allows
to shift the (narrowed) interval depending on the dynamical base rate, which
may soften the impact of this restriction.
Another disadvantage of current Bayesian trust models can be seen in
the lack of suitable representation for human users. The representation
misses an easily understandable set of parameters, which, e.g., allows for a
simple explanation how the final trust value is influenced by the different
parameters, and graphical representation. Only for the Beta Reputation
System [JI02], which is based on “subjective logic”, a mapping to a more
intuitive representation is presented (see Section 3.2.5).
Computational Models
Although Bayesian trust model have a common representation of trust and
use the same mechanism for deriving trust from evidence, they provide
different means to integrate direct evidence and recommendations, which are
inspected in the following.
• Beta Reputation System [JI02]: The Beta Reputation System has
been proposed as a centralized reputation system, but may also be
applied to distributed environments. The ratings of all entities per
interaction partner are aggregated by a so-called reputation centre. The
model allows different weights to be given to a rating based on the
value of the interaction.
Furthermore, it allows the impact of a rating to be weighted based
on the trustworthiness of the entity that provides the rating. Hereby,
the trustworthiness in providing ratings is assumed to be equal to the
trustworthiness in providing interactions.
Finally, a number of extensions have been proposed: a filtering mecha-
nism for misleading recommendations [WJI05], an extension for multi-
nomial ratings based on the Dirichlet distribution [JH07, Jøs07], an
extension for continuous ratings also based on the Dirichlet distri-
bution and fuzzy set membership functions [JLC08], a community
based update mechanism for the so-called relative atomicity or base
rate [Jøs07,JLC08].
• Mui et al. [MMH02b, MMH02a, MMA+01]: The approach pre-
sented by Mui et al. supports a decentralized computation of trust. It
provides means for deriving trust from recommendations [MMH02a].
However, the proposed method for the aggregation either considers
recommendations only in absence of direct evidence [MMH02b] or it
does not differentiate between direct evidence and recommendations.
In [MMH02b], the authors also introduced an idea of evaluating the
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reputation of groups of agents, which is used to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of an agent in absence of direct evidence. Furthermore, the
approach introduces a measure for the reliability of a trust estimate.
The measure depends on the number of evidence units that is neces-
sary in order to reach a certain level of confidence and the number of
collected evidence units. The parameter is used for weighting recom-
mendations. The evaluation in [MMH02b] shows the performance of
this approach a prisoner’s dilemma game.
• Buchegger et al. [BLB03, BLB04]: Buchegger et al. provide a
distributed trust model for peer-to-peer scenarios and mobile ad hoc
networks. Recommendations by other entities are considered as long as
they are similar to an entity’s direct experience. This is done based on a
so-called “deviation test” that calculates the absolute difference between
the expectation value based on direct experience and the expectation
value of the recommendation, in the case the difference is less than
a pre-defined threshold (d = 0.5 in [BLB03]) the recommendation
is considered. Furthermore, it is possible to reduce the influence of
recommendations using a static weighting factor. The approach allows
the entities to be classified regarding their behavior as interactors, as
well as regarding their behavior as recommenders.
• TRAVOS [TPJL06]: Teacy et al. proposed their trust model for
open dynamic systems. The approach tries to provide means to cope
with inaccurate recommendation sources. Their computational model
allows to weight the recommendations based on the accuracy of the
past recommendations of each recommender. Especially, when an
entity A evaluates the trustworthiness of an entity B, and A considers
the recommendation of an entity C, then, the trustworthiness of C in
the context of providing recommendations is only derived from the
accuracy of C’s previous recommendations about the trustworthiness
of B. The accuracy of C’s recommendations about other entities is
not considered. Therefore, in TRAVOS each entity stores not only the
evidence about the outcome of the past interactions per interactor (as
introduced above), but also the recommendations per recommender per
interaction partner. In an environment with a large number of entities,
this needs to be considered as it increases the required amount of storage.
Furthermore, the approach stops to evaluate further recommendations
when a certain level of confidence is reached based on the direct evidence
and the recommendations.
3.2.5 Belief Approach
In contrast to the probabilistic approach the belief approaches directly
integrate a notion of uncertainty as shown in the following.
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3.2.5.1 Subjective Logic
In [Jøs01], Jøsang presented “subjective logic”. It allows elements of Bayesian
probability theory (referred to as ‘evidence space’) to be combined with a
belief approach (referred to as ‘opinion space’). This approach can be used
to model trust and serves as a basis for the Beta Reputation System [JI02].
In evidence space, which tempts find a simple intuitive representation of
uncertain probabilities, an opinion can be expressed as a triple o = (b, d, u),
where b ∈ [0; 1] represents the belief, d ∈ [0; 1] the disbelief, and u ∈ [0; 1]
the uncertainty about a certain statement [Jøs99a]. The three parameters
are interrelated by the equation b + d + u = 1. The expectation value E(o) of
an opinion o is defined as:
E(o) = E(b, d, u) = b +
u
2
(3.3)
In [Jøs01], a parameter called relative atomicity a has been added. The
expectation value then is calculated using E(b, d, u, a) = b + u · a. Thus, the
relative atomicity allows one to define the expectation value in absence of
belief and disbelief.
Furthermore, Jøsang provides a graphical representation for the be-
lief model (see Fig 3.3). The point A denotes an opinion with (b, d, u) =
(0.2, 0.1, 0.7). The point B denotes an opinion with (b, d, u) = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2).
Figure 3.3: Opinion Triangle
Mapping between ‘opinion space’ and ‘evidence space’
In order to be able to benefit from the advantages of both representations,
Jøsang provides a mapping between the Bayesian approach and the belief
approach by defining the following equations. The opinion o = (r, s) and
o = (b, d, u) are supposed to be equivalent if the following equations are true:
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b =
r
r + s + 2
,
d =
s
r + s + 2
,
u =
2
r + s + 2
where u , 0 .
(3.4)
This mapping allows an opinion to be transferred from the evidence space
to the opinion space, e.g., in order to evaluate its uncertainty. The mapping
can also be used the other way around. The expectation value is invariant to
the representation. The mapping provided in [Jøs01] also takes the relative
atomicity into account. In [JBXC08], it is shown how the mapping between
the evidence space and the opinion space can be defined when considering
multinomial ratings and a flexible choice of the parameters reflecting prior
knowledge.
Operators
So far only the representation of an opinion has been described. In order
to evaluate trust based on recommendations, Jøsang defines operators for
combining opinions (consensus) and weighting recommendations (discounting)
opinions. In contrast to the belief model presented in [YS02] the consensus
operator is not based on Dempster’s rule. The reason is that Dempster’s
rule may lead to counter-intuitive results [Jøs01]. It is worth noting that
the model supports additional operators, e.g., for propositional conjunction,
disjunction and negation. For the interpretation and justification of these
operators see [Jøs97,Jøs01,JI02].
Finally, in [JBXC08] a new operator is introduced that allows an entity A
to derive the trustworthiness of an entity B based on the similarity between
their opinions about another entity C.
Subjective Logic as Basis for Trust and Reputation Models
Subjective logic provides a general basis for modeling trust based on evidence.
It may be used in a wide range of applications. In [Jøs99a] it is shown how
“subjective logic” can be used to model trust in the binding between keys
and their owners in public key infrastructures. Other papers introduce how
to apply it in trust based decision making in electronic commerce [Jøs99b]
and how the approach can be integrated in policy based trust management
[JGA06]. The Beta Reputation System presented in [JI02] is also based on
“subjective logic”.
The approach of modeling trust in the SECURE Project [CSG+03,CNS03]
is based on similar ideas - deriving trust from evidence and describing trust
as belief. Yet, there are major differences in calculating trust. Another belief
based approach to model trust is presented in [YS02].
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3.2.6 Fuzzy Logic Approach
Trust models based on fuzzy logic introduce their own semantics to the calcu-
lated trust values based on membership functions. The final interpretation
of a fuzzy value like ’very good’ is left up to the user or agent.
3.2.6.1 ReGreT
ReGreT models trust for small and mid-size environments in electronic
commerce [SS05]. The system is described in detail in [SS01,SS02a,SS02b,
Sab03]. A main aspect of ReGreT is to include information which is available
from social relations between the interacting parties and their environments.
In the considered environment the relation between agents can be described
as competitive (comp), cooperative (coop), or trading (trd).
The model deals with three dimensions of trust or reputation. The
individual dimension (outcome reputation) is based on self-made experience
of an agent. The trust values are called direct trust or outcome reputation.
The calculation of the trust value considers the age of evidence, giving more
relevance to more recent outcomes. However, in [HJS06], Huynh et al. show
an effect of ReGreT’s aging function that may not be desired.
The social dimension is based on recommendations (witness reputation),
the social relationships between agents (neighborhood reputation), and the
social role of the agents (system reputation). In order to avoid correlated
evidence, it is proposed to select the recommenders based on a domain
dependent sociogram, yet, as stated in [HJS06] it is not clear how the social
network is built. Furthermore, it is proposed to weight recommendations
based on social trust and outcome trust reputation.
Finally, the ontological dimension helps to transfer trust information
between related contexts and aspects [SS01].
The trust model uses trust or reputation values in the range of real
numbers in [−1; 1]. Overlapping subintervals are mapped by membership
functions to fuzzy set values, like “very good”, which implicitly introduce
semantics to the trust values.
Furthermore, for all trust values a measurement of reliability is introduced
that depends on the number of past experience and expected experience
(intimate level of interaction), and the variability of the ratings.
The inference of trustworthiness is supported by intuitively interpretable
fuzzy rules. The trustworthiness assigned by agent a to agent c with respect
to providing information about agent b, e.g., can depend on the relation
between the agents b and c, as shown in the following example. In the
example the social trust of a in information of b about c is “very bad” if the
cooperation between b and c is high.
IF coop(b; c) is high
THEN socialTrust(a; b; c) is very bad.
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Further information concerning risk evaluation and decision making is
not given. The trust model that is proposed in [HJS04b, HJS04a, HJS06]
seems to be similar to ReGreT. It additionally considers certified reputation
information.
3.3 Analysis of the Trust Models
From the presentation of the different trust models one can see that current
approaches address a wide range of aspects. The following provides an
analysis of the different features that are supported by the different trust
models.
3.3.1 Analysis of the Representational Models
As stated before, ranking approaches do not seem to be appropriate for
modeling trust in ubiquitous computing as they do usually not calculate
subjective trust values and it is unclear how they can be applied in the decision
making process when the utility of an interaction needs to be considered.
The rating approaches have the advantage that they are based on simple
trust values that easily can be assessed by human users, but it seems unclear
how additional parameters, like a user’s dispositional trust or the amount of
information on which a trust value is based, can be integrated.
The probabilistic trust models have the advantage that they can easily be
integrated in utility-based decision making as shown in Section 2.3. Within
the probabilistic approach, the trust models that are based on the Bayesian
approach are especially suitable. They allow trust to be calculated as a
subjective probability since the expectation value is based on the collected
evidence as well as on subjective prior knowledge. This goes along with the
definition of trust provided in Section 2.1.1 and allows the integration of a
component of dispositional trust.
The belief approach seems to be an interesting approach, too, as it
allows to express the uncertainty of an opinion. Furthermore, a graphical
representation has been introduced with “subjective logic”. However, this
representation is not very appropriate for intuitive usage by human users (as
shown in the evaluation in Section 6.2).
The fuzzy logic based approaches seem to be close to the probabilistic
approaches. Here, membership functions allows to introduce additional
semantics.
In the following, the focus will be on trust models that follow a Bayesian
approach as
• it allows trust to be modeled as subjective probability.
• it is based on solid mathematical foundations for deriving trust based
on evidence and subjective prior knowledge.
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• it may be easily integrated in utility-based decision making.
Furthermore, there has already been much work on Bayesian trust models
showing how different parameters can be integrated, yet, there are still some
shortcomings:
• The dispositional trust of a user can basically be integrated in the prior
information. A shortcoming of the trust models within the Bayesian
approach is that most trust models [TPJL06,MMH02a,JI02,BLB04]
do not support the user to influences this dispositional trust component
as the prior knowledge is set to r0 = s0 = 1 by the developers of these
models.
• The weighting of evidence according to its recentness, which is referred
to as aging, forgetting, or longevity, is considered in the approaches
presented in [BLB04,JI02,Jøs07,WJI05,SS02a,HJS06]. Yet, they suffer
from the limitation that either in absence of evidence the expectation
value remains constant, or that the range of the expectation value is
limited (see Section 5.2.3.1). The latter restriction can be softened
using the concept of a dynamic base rate [JLC08] that allows the
interval of reachable values to be shifted.
• A parameter that expresses the confidence or the certainty that is
associated with the calculated trust value has already been introduced
in [TPJL06,MMH02a]. In both trust models, this parameter is related
to the number of evidence units which an opinion is based on. The
model proposed in [MMH02a] computes the reliability of an opinion
based on the number of collected evidence units and the number of
evidence units that is necessary in order to reach a certain level of
confidence. Similar measures are introduced in fuzzy logic approaches
presented in [SS02a,HJS06].
Furthermore, an update mechanism of the models dispositional trust
component based on the typical behavior of the entities within a community
has been proposed in [Jøs07].
It has to be stated that although the Bayesian trust models have their
strengths, they also have a major disadvantage. They do not provide an
interface that has been designed for human users. According to Dingledine
et al. [DFM00] it is important that trust models provide intuitive parameters
which allow for an easy interpretation of the trust value by the user. This
is important in order to provide the user with a feeling of being in control
of the system, and it is especially necessary in order to support users in
integrating their “real world” knowledge in the system. Here, it is the goal
of this thesis to provide an intuitive graphical representation of trust for
human users. Graphical representations are only provided using a star based
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interface in [GH06,Ama09] and the belief representation of “subjective logic”.
As the stars interfaces are very simple and the belief representation seems
to be rather complex, it needs to be evaluated whether the advantages of
both approaches could be combined. The aspect that the Bayesian approach
of modeling trust is actually limited to binary evidence, i.e., the outcome
of an interaction is supposed to be either positive or negative, is not seen
as a major disadvantage, as this can be assumed to be sufficient for a wide
range of applications and it reduces the subjective influence when rating
the quality of an interaction. Furthermore, it has been shown in [JI02] how
continuous ratings can be integrated in this approach.
Finally, it needs to be stated that some of the trust models, e.g. [BHOC07,
SS02a,KR03], provide means in order to derive trust also from similar contexts.
In this thesis, it is not considered to transfer trust between contexts, as a
sound model for deriving trust from evidence and the parameters introduced
above within a single context is considered to be an important and challenging
step, which needs to be evaluated before transferring trust between contexts.
3.3.2 Analysis of the Computational Models
Regarding the computational models, the following features seem to be
important for the application in a distributed and unmanaged environment
as ubiquitous computing. In the following, the focus is on Bayesian models
as they provide a solid way for deriving trust from evidence and allow one to
integrate context-dependent parameters as a user’s dispositional trust.
When applying a trust model in a distributed environment, the integration
of direct evidence and recommendations is especially important for two
reasons. First, whenever direct evidence is rare, recommendations can
provide a solid basis for the evaluation of the trustworthiness of an entity.
Second, as recommendations allow foreign parties to take influence on an
entity’s decision making process, the selection of the recommenders and the
weighting of the influence of their recommendations have to be done carefully.
The critical issue with recommendations is that recommenders may in-
tentionally or accidentally provide misleading recommendations. According
to [JIB07,TPJL06] there are two approaches for dealing with recommenda-
tions in order to reduce the impact of misleading recommendations. They are
called endogenous and exogenous filtering or discounting of recommendations.
1. The basic idea of endogenous handling of recommendations is that one
can reduce the impact of misleading recommendations by considering
the provided recommendations independent from the recommenders.
This approach usually assumes that the majority of recommendations
is accurate, and that misleading recommendations can be identified due
to the statistical properties of the provided recommendations [TPJL06].
Approaches that fall in this class are presented in [QHC06, WJI05,
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Del00].
2. Exogenous approaches consider additional information, e.g., the trust-
worthiness of a recommender. The trustworthiness of a recommender
can be calculated based on different assumptions. In [JI02] the trust-
worthiness of a recommender is calculated using the assumption that
an entity’s behavior as recommender is the same as its behavior as
interaction partner. In ReGret [SS02a], the assumption is the same, but
additionally a social trust component may be considered. In [BLB04]
recommendations are only considered if the expectation value of the
recommendation (Bayesian approach) is close to the expectation value
calculated based on the direct evidence.
The assumption that the majority of recommenders is honest may not be
true in many cases. Therefore, it is considered to be not sufficient. Exogenous
filtering of recommendations allows for a wide set of arrangements in order
to reduce the impact of misleading recommendations.
In the exogenous approach the following mechanisms have been identified.
• Filtering - exclusion of bad recommenders: Probably the most simple
variant of limiting the influence of bad recommenders is to exclude
recommenders that are known to provide misleading recommendations.
The approach presented in [BLB04] considers recommendations only if
they are similar to the direct evidence based on a deviation test. Yet, the
value threshold for this deviation test is chosen very tolerant (threshold
d = 0.5 in [BLB03]). In contrast, the approaches presented in [JI02,
SS02a, MMH02b, TPJL06] do not exclude recommendations by bad
recommenders. Usually those approaches consider bad recommenders
giving a low weight to their recommendations.
• Weighting and limiting the influence of each recommender: These
mechanisms allow to limit the influence of a recommender by weighting
the provided recommendations. The weighting of recommendations is
also referred to as discounting. In general, a model has the following
options for the discounting recommendations.
– No discounting: The models do not weight recommendations at
all. This implies that all recommendations have the same weight
as direct experience. This is done in the most basic variant of the
Beta Reputation System [JI02].
– Static discounting: Static discounting means that the recommen-
dations by each recommender are weighted independent from the
recommender. The idea is to give a relatively higher weight to
direct experience than to recommendations. An example can be
found in [BLB04].
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– Dynamic discounting : The intension of dynamic discounting is to
give a higher weight to recommendations which are provided by
recommenders that are considered to be more trustworthy than
others. There are currently two approaches:
∗ Weighting based on the behavior as interactor: This approach
assumes that the behavior of an entity as interaction partner
is the same as the behavior when providing recommendation.
This approach, implemented in [JI02,SS02a], has the short-
coming that the assumption may be wrong, e.g., an entity
that offers a high quality service may interested in providing
bad recommendations about competing service providers.
∗ Weighting based on the behavior as recommender: This
approach weights recommendations according to a recom-
mender’s behavior in the past, giving a high weight to recom-
menders which provided a high number of accurate recommen-
dations in the past, and low weight to recommenders providing
less accurate recommendations, e.g., [TPJL06]. This is what
comes closest to the intention of weighting recommendations.
Yet, the approach comes with the cost of evaluating the accu-
racy of a recommendation and storing this information.
For all approaches of discounting, it is essential that intended effect
cannot simply be circumvented by the recommender by providing a specially
prepared recommendation.
Finally, the direct evidence and recommendations have to be aggregated.
Within the considered approaches, the following mechanisms have been
identified:
• No aggregation: The approach presented in [MMH02a] does not ag-
gregate direct evidence with recommendations. Recommendations are
only considered in complete absence of direct evidence. This seems to
be not sufficient as recommendations are excluded as soon as a single
piece of direct evidence is available.
• Considering recommendations independent from the confidence in the
direct evidence: The approaches presented in [BLB04] provide means
for statically weighting recommenders and for the exclusion of recom-
menders. However, the approach does not provide means for limiting
the impact of recommendations when sufficient direct evidence is avail-
able.
• Considering the confidence in the direct evidence and recommendations:
The approach presented in [SS02a] reduces the impact of recommen-
dations when the reliability of the direct evidence increases. This is a
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good choice, in the face of misleading recommendations and interac-
tion partners possibly showing different behavior to different entities.
TRAVOS [TPJL06] takes recommendations only into account as long
as the aggregated direct evidence and the evidence of the recommenders
considered so far does not reach a predefined level of confidence.
• Considering the trustworthiness and the rank of recommenders: The
basic concept of this approach is to consider the best recommenders first
and limit the influence of each recommender based on its trustworthiness
and the number of recommenders that have been previously considered,
i.e., based on their rank. This approach has not been proposed so far
in Bayesian trust models, to the best of the author’s knowledge; yet, it
seems to be the next step. In combination with the previous steps, this
approach can be shown to cope with so-called Sybil attacks [Dou02]
(see Section 5.3.4). This kind of attack allows an attacker to create an
arbitrary number of seemingly independent entities, which may be used
to multiply the attacker’s influence by creating an arbitrary number
of recommenders providing misleading recommendations. Other trust
models, e.g., the approach by Buchegger et al. [BLB04] try to address
this attack relying on expensive pseudonyms that finally require some
kind of access control, which is external to the trust model.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter presented a survey of state-of-the-art trust models. It introduced
a classification of trust model according to the semantics of their trust
value and proposed to distinguish between the representational and the
computational aspects of a trust model.
Based on the analysis of the representational models the Bayesian based
trust models seem to be very promising as they allow trust to be derived based
on evidence and subjective prior information. They also show how context-
dependent parameters as dispositional trust and aging can be integrated.
Yet, current models do not use the full potentials of this approach. Most
approaches treat the prior information to be static and aging is introduced
with different limitations (see Section 5.2.3.1).
Furthermore, Bayesian approaches do currently not provide a representa-
tion that allows for intuitive use by humans. The belief based representation
provided by “subjective logic” [Jøs01, Jøs99a] would be an approach to over-
come this shortcoming as it also provides a mapping between the Bayesian
representation and the belief representation. Furthermore, it supports a
graphical representation. Yet, the author of this thesis aims to provide a
representation that better fits the needs of the users.
Current computational models that use an exogenous approach for filter-
ing and weighting recommendations provide a good basis for dealing with
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misleading recommendations. Yet, most approaches [JI02, SS02a, BLB04]
either do not weight recommendations or the weighting is based on an en-
tity’s behavior as interaction partner. In contrast, the approach proposed
in [TPJL06] weights recommendations according to the accuracy of the rec-
ommender’s past recommendations. This seems to be a better choice, but the
proposed approach requires to store the recommendations per recommender
and per interaction partner. Finally, an extension of current approaches in
order to consider a recommender’s rank to improve the model’s resistance to
Sybil attacks has been identified as a next step.
42 CHAPTER 3. STATE-OF-THE-ART: MODELS OF TRUST
Chapter 4
Concepts
As introduced in the previous chapter, the development of new techniques
supporting entities in selecting trustworthy interaction partners is in the
focus of this thesis. Based on [DFM00,JIB07], a set of high-level criteria is
provided that will be considered when introducing the concepts of the trust
model.
1. Accurate for long-term performance: The model needs to be
capable of expressing the confidence of the provided trust value. It
must be capable of differentiating between known and unknown entities,
especially between entities that are unknown and those who have a low
trust or reputation value because of bad long term performance.
2. Weighted toward current behavior: The model is capable of re-
flecting recent trends of an entity’s behavior.
3. Robust against attacks: The model should resist attacks on the
manipulation of trust value as much as possible.
4. Smoothness: New evidence should have a limited impact on the
change of the trust value.
5. Understandable: The parameters of the trust model should allow
for easy interpretation. This is important to understand how a system
works.
The following part of this chapter explains the main concepts that are
necessary to use evidence based trust to achieve this goal. At first, a
schematic description of the scenario introduced at the beginning of Chapter
2 is presented. It serves as a motivation for the concepts explained in this
chapter. Second, the system model is presented. It provides the terms of the
main building blocks of the model, the relations between them, and a set of
basic assumptions that need to be fulfilled for the successful application of
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an evidence based approach for trust is presented. Third, the author shows
a selected set of application areas and how they meet these assumptions.
Forth, the conceptual requirements for a trust model are derived. Fifth, in
the conclusions of this chapter, the design goals for the trust model that is
presented in Chapter 5 are summarized.
4.1 Motivating Scenario in a Schematic View
This section introduces a schematic view of the scenario that has been
presented at the beginning of Chapter 2. In this scenario humans with
mobile devices share music in an opportunistic network; it is inspired by
an application called musicClouds [Hei07]. In the following, users and
their mobile devices are referred to as entities. When these entities move
around, they will meet other entities, and have the possibility to interact
with each other, i.e., they exchange music (mp3 files) or information about
the behavior of other entities (recommendations), in a spontaneous manner.
When providing files, the entities may show different behaviors, e.g., providing
mostly good or corrupted files, due to different goals or motivations. The
goal of a typical user when selecting a candidate for an interaction is to select
a trustworthy one, i.e., a candidate from which they expect to receive a good
file (correct file, no viruses, complete song, and expected quality).
It is assumed that a user appreciates the support of a software component
including a trust model, which supports them with information about the
trustworthiness of the candidates available for an interaction, or which even
is capable of making decisions and selecting an appropriate candidate on
its own. This will be especially true, if it allows the quality of a user’s
interactions to increase, i.e., the number of received good files.
As opportunistic networks typically lack a central authority for the
purposes of access control and identification of entities, the trustworthiness
of entities is derived from evidence of past interactions. When users have
knowledge about the capabilities of each other from real-life meetings (e.g.,
friends knowing that they will share files honestly) it is necessary to support
that users can directly add this information to the system. Furthermore, as
direct evidence may be rare, an important aspect is the robust integration of
recommendations of other entities.
After an interaction, the quality of the interaction is determined by
feedback. The generation of the feedback does not necessarily require user
interaction. In some cases this can also be done automatically, e.g., by
scanning the mp3 file for viruses, checking the size, the bit rate, and noise.
This information can be used by the software component, i.e., the trust
model, to create histories with evidence about interactors and recommenders,
which are the basis for deriving the trustworthiness of corresponding entities.
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4.2 System Model
Having introduced a motivating scenario, the next step is to formalize the
basic building blocks of the system.
4.2.1 Entities and Interactions
The participants in the system are called entities. Entities can represent
humans (also called users), their devices, autonomous software components
or agents, an abstract service provider, or a web service.
When referring to a group of participants which take part in the system
in a certain application context the term community is used.
Interactions are actions between entities. On an abstract level, an
interaction can be the usage of a service or a capability that is offered by
one entity to another. Concrete examples are downloading a file or buying
goods offered by an online shop.
The focus of this thesis is on uni-directional interactions. A uni-directional
interaction is an interaction, in which only one entity has an expectation
about the outcome of the interaction. For example, in a file sharing scenario,
only the entity that receives the file has an expectation about the quality
of the expected file, e.g., bit-rate, noise, etc. The sender of the file does not
have any expectations about the interaction. A bi-directional interaction is
an interaction in which both entities have an expectation about the outcome.
For example, entity A sells something to entity B. Here, in general entity A
has an expectation about the provided service by entity B, and entity B has
an expectation about receiving its money in return.
For dealing with bi-directional interactions within the developed model, a
bi-directional interaction should be treated as two uni-directional interactions.
4.2.2 Roles
The next step is to define roles allowing for a description of the relationship
between entities within the model (see Figure 4.1): initiator (I), candidate
(C), and recommender (R). The initiator of an interaction is the entity that
searches for an interaction partner in a certain application context. The
candidates are the entities offering the possibility to interact in this context.
The recommenders are the entities providing recommendations about the
behavior of the candidates in this context.
4.2.3 Process View
The following provides an overview of the process of establishing trust
between entities and selecting entities based on trust (see Figure 4.2). The
process describes the steps the initiator performs when selecting a trustworthy
candidate from a set of candidates and how, after an interaction, the feedback
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Direct trust in candidate
Direct trust in recommender
Figure 4.1: Simple scheme of the system model
on the quality of the interaction can be used to update the trust values of
the interactor and the recommenders.
1. Evaluation of the trustworthiness of the candidates: This step
includes the evaluation of direct evidence and recommendations about
the candidates. The trust model, which is developed as the core of this
thesis, is used to estimate the trustworthiness of each candidate based
on this information.
2. Evaluation of the utility of an interaction: This step evaluates
the utility of an interaction. This can be done by considering the
expected costs and the expected benefits that are associated with the
interaction by the initiator. This step is not considered in this thesis.
3. Decision making: In this step the initiator has to decide whether to
interact at all, and if so, with which candidate. The decision whether
to interact at all can be influenced by the expected utility of the
interaction, the trustworthiness of the candidates and the risk attitude
of the initiator. If those parameters are known they can be integrated
in the decision making as shown in Section 2.3. The selection of an
appropriate candidate may also be based on various strategies. In this
thesis it is assumed that the initiator selects the candidate with the
best trust value.
4. Interaction: When the initiator has decided to interact with the most
trustworthy candidate, the interaction takes place.
5. Evaluation and reporting of the quality of the interaction:
After an interaction, the quality of the interaction, and if necessary,
the domain of the interaction, is evaluated and reported as feedback
from the initiator. The generation of the feedback may require user
interaction. Depending on the interaction, the provision of feedback
may be based either on information by the user or on information
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provided by an external software component capable of evaluating the
quality of the interaction.
6. Update of opinions about the selected candidate and the rec-
ommenders: In the last step, the provided feedback information is
used to derive new evidence describing the behavior of the selected
candidate and the recommenders. The new evidence is added to the
evidence from past interactions, which allows to build a history from
the behavior of an entity. In a distributed trust model, the initiator
manages the histories of all the interactors and recommenders it has
previously encountered by itself. Whenever, new evidence is available,
the trust value of an entity may be updated. Furthermore, the initiator
can use this step to update its expectation about unknown entities
based on its experience with the encountered entities.
Figure 4.2: Main steps in establishing trust between entities and selecting
entities
The steps that are considered in this process focus only on the trust
establishment and the selection of a candidate. Before this process starts,
one may need additional steps like finding candidates, i.e., potential interac-
tion partners. Furthermore, one may specify an additional process for the
distribution of recommendations.
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4.2.4 Definition of Trust
The definition of trust for this thesis is derived from the definition of reliability
trust provided by Jøsang et al. (see Section 2.1.1):
“Trust is the subjective probability by which entity expects that
another entity performs a given action on which its welfare de-
pends.”
It is worth noting that this thesis treats trust in the sense of reliability
trust and not in the sense of decision trust (see Section 2.1.1), therefore the
evaluation of trust is context-dependent, but not situation-dependent, e.g.,
trust is evaluated independent from the utility of an interaction.
Trust in Interactors: When an entity A assesses the trustworthiness of
an entity B as interaction partner, then trust is the subjective probability
with which entity A expects that the outcome of the next interaction in a
certain context with entity B is positive.
Trust in Recommenders: When an entity A assesses the trustworthiness of
an entity B regarding the provision of recommendations trust is the subjective
probability with which entity A expects that the recommendation of entity B
about another entity’s behavior as interactor in a certain context is accurate.
If an entity A receives a recommendation about another entity B, and the
outcome of A’s interaction with entity B equates to the expectation based on
the recommendation, then the recommendation is considered to be accurate.
4.2.5 Trust Establishment
The basis of trust is evidence derived from past interactions. There are
basically two classes of evidence, i.e., direct evidence and recommendations
(also called indirect evidence). Furthermore, parameters that are not directly
assigned to each interaction partner or recommender, but depend on the ap-
plication context (see next subsection) of the interaction or recommendation
need to be considered. Figure 4.3 illustrates these basic influence factors.
If entity A has to estimate the trustworthiness of entity B and entity A has
already interacted with entity B, and entity A remembers the evidence that
it has derived from the outcome of these interactions, then entity A can use
this evidence, called direct evidence, in order to estimate the trustworthiness
of entity B.
Furthermore, an entity A may ask other entities, called recommenders, to
provide information which helps estimate trustworthiness of entity B. This
information is called indirect evidence or recommendation. The recommen-
dation of a honest recommender is assumed to reflect the recommenders
experience with the candidate. For example this is considered to be true, when
the recommendation is equivalent to the direct evidence the recommender
has derived from its previous interactions with the candidate.
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Figure 4.3: Basis of trust
Further sources of information can be the user knowledge from “real
world” meetings and reputation information. The integration of user knowl-
edge can be carried out by adjusting the direct evidence accordingly. The
integration of reputation information can be done modeling the source of
the reputation information as recommender, and the reputation information
itself as recommendation. This allows one to focus on trust derived from
direct evidence and recommendations in the following (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Basis of trust (extended)
4.2.5.1 Application Context
The application context describes the field in which the interaction takes place,
e.g., exchange of mp3 files, selling fruits in an online shope, or provision of a
web service for hotel reservations1. In different application contexts, one has
to deal with different conditions, e.g., regarding insurance, law enforcement,
strength of identity, etc. This may lead to different preferences regarding
how trust should be derived from the evidence from past interactions.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that within each application
context C there are two sub-contexts (see Figure 4.5). The first sub-context
C(I) contains the interactions between entities that are in the focus of the
main context. The second sub-context C(R) contains the provision of recom-
mendations about the behavior of other entities within the corresponding
interaction sub-context. This is important, as the behavior of an entity when
selected as interaction partner in a certain application context can differ for
its behavior as recommender, e.g., as it might be interested in bad-mouthing
other competitors.
1In [JKD05], the term scope is used to refer to the domain or the purpose of the
interaction.
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Finally, it is worth noting that as evidence based trust models derive
trust from evidence from past interactions, they may be assumed to work
best, when the behavior of an entity, which goes along with its capabilities
regarding the qualities of trust - benevolence, competence, honesty, and
predictability - is assumed to be either stable or to change only slowly in
each context.
Figure 4.5: Context and sub-contexts
4.2.5.2 Context-Dependent Parameters
As introduced above, the basic idea of evidence based trust is to derive
the trustworthiness of an entity based on the aggregated evidence from
past interactions and recommendations. However, in different application
contexts (see Section 4.2.5.1), such as sharing music files in an opportunistic
network or buying goods in an online shop, it seems natural to consider
context-dependent aspects that influence the relation between evidence and
the derived level of trust. For example, in a file-sharing scenario, one might
tend to give a high level of trust to unknown entities, but the same might be
not true for online shops. The context-dependent parameters do not depend
on the entity whose trustworthiness is evaluated, but only on the application
context.
Based on the analysis of the state-of-the-art (see 3.3), the following
aspects are addressed:
• Expected behavior of unknown entities: An entity’s dispositional
trust that is the general attitude of an entity to trust in others is used
to express an entity’s opinion on the expected behavior unknown enti-
ties. This opinion may change from application context to application
context, e.g., depending on whether an entity expects that the majority
of interaction partners to be benevolent or not, or depending on the
degree of insurance that is associated with an interaction.
In the proposed model, dispositional trust is modeled using two param-
eters. The base trust value allows the expectation about the behavior
of unknown entities to be defined. The parameter weight allows one to
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influence how strongly new evidence influences the final trust value in
relation to the base trust.
• Dynamical change in an entity’s behavior: An entity’s behavior
can be expected to change over time, however, it may depend on the
application context whether the behavior of the entities one encounters
in this context is assumed to be rather stable or rather varying. For
example, well-established online shops may be expected to show a
rather stable behavior, whereas in a file sharing scenario the behavior
of an entity may be expected to be not as continuous. Furthermore, it
is necessary to consider that an entity, after building trust by providing
a high number of positive interactions over a long time, may start to
exploit the established trust long-lasting, when evidence from inter-
actions far back in time has the same weight as evidence from recent
interactions.
In this thesis, aging is introduced to take care of these aspects. It allows
a higher weight to be given to evidence from more recent interactions
as they may be more representative of an entity’s future behavior and
in order to prevent that an entity may exploit previously established
trust in the long run. Furthermore, it allows one to consider that an
entity’s behavior may change over time, in the absence of interaction,
by reducing the impact of older evidence. Positive effects of considering
aging in trust models have been shown, e.g., in [JHF03].
• Expected number of evidence units: As a trust model is to re-
flect the certainty of its calculated trust values, a context-dependent
parameter is introduced that allows the number of evidence units that
is expected to be representative for an entity’s behavior to be defined.
The certainty of a trust value is to increase with the number of evidence
units on which the trust value is based. When the maximum level of
certainty is reached, the trust value of an entity will no longer depend
on the dispositional trust, but solely on the evidence collected from
past interactions, as it is expected to be representative.
There are two reasons for the introduction of this parameter. First,
a user might decide that for a specific context, a certain number of
evidence units is sufficient to believe that the collected information
is representative for the future behavior of an entity. Second, in the
face of aging, when modeled as presented in [JI02,JHF03,WJI05], one
has to consider that even an infinite amount of observations from past
interactions leads only to a finite amount of collected evidence (see
Section 5.2.3). State-of-the-art approaches described in [JI02,JHF03,
WJI05] do not take this into account (see Section 5.2.3.1).
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4.2.5.3 Evaluation of Trust Chains
This section shows how recommendations will be propagated in given a
network of recommenders (see also 3.1.1).
Figure 4.6 shows a simple example of a trust network. Here, entity A has
direct evidence about the trustworthiness of the candidate C. Furthermore,
entity A knows two recommenders R1 and R2, who may provide recommen-
dations about the trustworthiness of the candidate C based on their direct
evidence. In this case, it is sufficient when entity A is provided with means for
weighting recommendations based on the trustworthiness of the recommender
and for aggregating its direct evidence with the weighted recommendations.
Figure 4.6: Simple trust network
Yet, when given more complex networks, it may be questionable if these
means are sufficient for entity A to evaluate the trustworthiness of candidate
C. Figure 4.7 shows a trust network in which entity A has direct evidence
about the candidate C and knows two recommenders R1 and R2. In this
example, the recommender R1 does not have direct evidence, but R1 may
forward the recommendation provided by R3. Furthermore, R2 has direct
evidence about the trustworthiness of C and may additionally forward the
recommendations by R3 and R4. As in a distributed environment, entity
A does not know the structure of this network per se, this leads to two
fundamental design choices regarding distribution of recommendations:
Figure 4.7: More complex trust network
1. Each recommender R forwards the single pieces of information that it
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has collected and its information about the provider of these pieces of
information.
2. Each recommender R forwards only a single trust value, which aggre-
gates R’s direct evidence with the (weighted) recommendations by R’s
recommenders.
In the first approach, each entity would forward its direct evidence and
the collected recommendations together with the information about the
origin of the recommendations and the information about the trustworthiness
of the origin of recommendations. In the example, this would mean that
the entities R3 and R4 would report their direct evidence about C together
with the information that this is direct evidence. In the next step, the
recommender R2 would forward the recommendations from R3 and R4 to
entity A. Furthermore, entity R2 would forward the information about the
trustworthiness of R3 and R4 and its direct evidence about the trustworthiness
of C. When entity A has collected the information from R1 and R2, it could
reconstruct the trust network and include information about the graph in
its analysis. In this approach, the complete analysis and computation has
to be done by entity A, which may need additional computational power
depending on the manner of analysis. Furthermore, it is not clear how to
prevent an entity from providing an arbitrary amount of bogus information,
which could multiply the complexity of analyzing the graph. Furthermore,
this approach needs means preventing that an entity can deceptively claim
that it forwards recommendations from another recommender in order to
discredit the pretended recommender.
In the second approach, the computation of the trust values is distributed
to all entities that provided information as each entity forwards only an aggre-
gated value. Yet, none of the entities is able to rebuild the complete network,
as none of the entities knows on which information the recommendations by
its recommenders are founded. Additionally, this may lead to situations in
which the information of a single recommender is unintentionally multiplied.
For example, in Figure 4.7 the recommender R3 may forward its trust value
on candidate C to R1 and R2. When R1 and R2 forward their information
to the initiator A, then entity A cannot recognizes that the information
originally provided by R3 is integrated in the recommendation by R2 and in
the recommendation by R3.
In this thesis, it is proposed to follow the second approach in distributed
environments. Thus, the initiator does not know how the trust values of
its recommenders have been calculated. In order to overcome the problem
of unintentionally multiplying the impact of a single recommender, the
assumption is introduced that honest recommenders only distribute trust
information that is based on their direct evidence (Section 6.1). Furthermore,
it is important to note that the recommendations provided by R3 and R4 (in
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Figure 4.7) are not necessarily lost. In the case that R3 and R4 forward their
recommendation about the trustworthiness of the candidate C directly to A,
entity A can consider these recommendations as recommendations provided
by unknown recommenders.
In Section 6.3, the proposed trust model is used in an application for
trust-based movie recommendation in a central setting. In this setting, the
whole network of recommendations is known when evaluating the rating
of a movie (which then is the equivalent to the candidate) based on the
recommendations of known users. This allows to remove edges between
the nodes, which when considered would multiply the impact of a single
recommender. For example, in Figure 4.7, the edge between R2 and R3 could
be removed for this reason. After removing these edges, recommendations
are allowed to include recommendations by other recommenders.
4.2.6 Basic Assumptions
This section introduces a set of basic assumptions that an application context
must fulfill for an evidence based trust model to be successfully applied.
Most of the trust models presented in the last chapter are based on these
assumptions.
1. Distinguishability of entities:
The most fundamental assumption introduced is that entities can be
distinguished. Based on this assumption entities may be recognized
by others, and evidence from previous interactions can be linked to
entities. It is a typical assumption in the field, e.g., [BLB04,QHC06,
TPJL06,JI02].
To achieve the distinguishability of entities, each entity needs a unique
digital representation or digital (re-)identifier, which cannot be easily
forged by another entity. The digital representation of an entity does
not need to reveal the “real world” identity of the entity. Therefore, the
(real-world) identity and goals of an entity may be unknown. An entity
recognition scheme that does not require the enrollment of entities is
described in [SFJ+03,SJ04].
While within the model each entity maps to exactly one digital repre-
sentation (and vice versa), a user or a service provider can be allowed
to be represented by multiple entities. It is important to be aware
of this fact, as unmanaged domains, e.g., ubiquitous computing en-
vironments [SH08], may lack a central authority providing reliable
mechanisms for controlling the participation of entities in the environ-
ment.
Furthermore, this allows users or service providers to re-join the system,
being represented by new entities, whenever they want to.
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2. Interactions between entities:
Entities have an interest and the possibility to interact with others.
This is a very basic assumption, as it is the reason for evaluating trust.
3. Behavior of entities:
An entity has a strategy about the quality of its offered services (e.g.,
[TPJL06, QHC06, JHF03]) - this strategy may be referred to as the
behavior of an entity.
The behavior of an entity may depend on its motivation or its goals.
Besides economical motivations behind a behavior, one can think of
ideological ones. For example, in file sharing communities, there are
entities providing good files for the sake of the community, although it
may be not rational to spend resources for the upload of files. However,
there might be also entities providing corrupt files, because they are
interested in the downfall of the community, which may be ideologically
or economically motivated.
Furthermore, the behavior of an entity can change over time [JHF03,
KBR05]. This might have two reasons. First, an entity may build trust
in order to misuse it later, which may be considered as an attack on a
trust model. Second, a change of an entity’s behavior over time may
occur due to reasons coupled to the process for the provision of the
interactions. For example, a service provider aims to provide a high
quality service, however, the provider may only be able to satisfy 95%
per cent of its customers in average, e.g., as the service may be delayed
or of bad quality when under heavy load.
Besides the entity providing the interaction, the initiator of an interac-
tion also shows a behavior when selecting a candidate. As described
above, the initiator has the choice of either selecting one of the possible
partners or to decide not to interact, based on the information about
the expected trustworthiness, the estimate utility of the interaction,
and the risk attitude. In the case, when selecting an interaction part-
ner, it is assumed that the usual behavior of the initiator is to select
the most trustworthy candidate (cf. [TPJL06]). If the information
about the utility and the risk that is associated to an interaction is
available, this information can be used to decide whether to interact or
not (cf. [Jøs99b,JHF03]).
4. Creation of direct evidence:
It is assumed that after an interaction, the initiator is capable of rating
the quality or the outcome of an interaction, e.g., [JI02,QHC06,BLB04].
This feedback is necessary in order to derive the evidence that is re-used
later as a basis of trust.
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5. Storing evidence:
An entity has the capabilities for storing the evidence that has been
derived from past interactions. In centralized systems, e.g., [JI02], the
data is centrally stored by a so-called reputation centre, in distributed
approaches, e.g., [BLB04], the entity itself stores the information.
When storing evidence naively, i.e., per interaction per interaction
partner, this may quickly lead to a large amount of data, as each
interaction would require extra storage. Therefore, it is proposed to
aggregate evidence from previous interactions per interaction partner
and context as, e.g., presented in [JI02,BLB04], in order to reduce the
amount of storage needed.
6. Opportunity for repeated interaction with the same entity in
the same context:
As introduced above, a trust model provides the capabilities to de-
rive an expectation about the behavior of another entity based on
evidence derived from past interactions. Therefore, it is crucial that
the environment allows for repeated encounters of entities.
Although, this may sound trivial at first glance, there are different
scenarios in which this assumption may be hurt.
First, in a domain without access control or in a domain with cheap
pseudonyms, there is the threat that users re-join the community
whenever their representing entity is associated with a bad trust value
[FC05].
Second, when thinking about spontaneous interaction in opportunistic
networks, a basic requirement is that the persons repeatedly meet each
other in order have a benefit or building histories and trust.
Third, as trust has been introduced to be context-dependent, the con-
cept of estimating the trustworthiness of an entity based on interactions
can only be directly applied in applications in which the interactions
can be treated as belonging to the same context, i.e., the behavior of
an interaction partner is assumed to be homogeneous in this context.
This may not be true for applications in which the interaction partners
provide interactions that require different competence. An online shop,
which sells all kind of goods and services, may provide non-homogeneous
interactions. For example, the competence for providing a three-week
holiday trip differs from the competence of selling fresh fruits.
7. Exchange of recommendations:
It is assumed that entities have capabilities to provide recommenda-
tions about other entities (cf. [BLB04,TPJL06]). A recommendation
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- also referred to as indirect evidence - is information provided by a
recommender about past interactions with another entity.
Entities may be willing to provide recommendations about entities
they already have interacted with. If an entity is not willing to provide
recommendations, it cannot be forced. If an entity is willing to do so, the
recipient of the recommendation cannot be sure about the motivation
of the recommender. Recommenders can be honest (providing evidence
that truly reflects the quality of previous interactions) or malicious
(providing a misleading evidence) [TPJL06].
4.2.7 Basic Attacks
Having introduced the system model and basic assumptions, this section
shows several types of attacks, which are possible within this setting. As the
trust model is to help entities in selecting the most trustworthy partner for
interactions, it should be robust to these attacks as far as possible.
When the trust value of an entity is evaluated, the main factors that
are considered are direct evidence and recommendations (see Section 4.2.5).
This leads to two basic types of attacks. On the one hand, an entity can
attack the model in the role of an interactor, i.e., it starts to build trust in
order to exploit it later. On the other hand, an attacker can try to influence
a trust value in the role of a recommender, i.e., by providing misleading
recommendations.
1. Interactor-based attacks:
• Cash in: An entity shows good behavior in order to establish
trust; later it changes its behavior and misuses the previously
established trust.
• Repeated cash in: An entity establishes and misuses trust
repeatedly.
2. Recommender-based attacks (based on [FC05]):
• False praise: An attacker provides overly positive recommenda-
tions about the trustworthiness of an interaction partner.
• False accusation: An attacker provides overly negative recom-
mendations about the trustworthiness of an interaction partner
• Sybil attack: An attacker creates a group of seemingly inde-
pendent entities that collude (see [Dou02]). In the context of
influencing the selection of a certain entity, an attacker may try
to multiply the influence of its recommendation(s) by creating a
high number of seemingly independent recommenders and provide
either overly positive or overly negative recommendations.
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Furthermore, both kinds of attacks are susceptible to whitewashing [FC05],
i.e., the attacker repeatedly joins the community as new entity in order to
get rid of a bad history. Whitewashing and Sybil attacks need especially to
be considered in domains which not apply access control, e.g., in ubiquitous
computing, or where the barrier for joining is very low, e.g., based on the
provision of an email address.
4.3 Application Areas
In this section, a selected set of application areas (or applications) is presented,
in which users may benefit from a distributed trust model. This also means
that the assumptions that have been introduced in Section 4.2.6 are considered
to be true in these application areas.
4.3.1 Ubiquitous Computing - Opportunistic Networks
In Weiser’s vision of ubiquitous computing, computers, as they are com-
mon today, vanish more and more [Wei91,WB97]. Pervasive or ubiquitous
computing is characterized by a very large number of smart devices, e.g.,
PDAs, mobiles, intelligent clothes, etc., which come with different capabilities
considering communication channels, storage or battery power. Both, the
basic idea of ubiquitous computing and the heterogeneity of these devices
enforce interaction between devices to unfold the complete power of a ubiq-
uitous computing infrastructure. In [BLRW04], Bhargava et al. point out
that ”socially based paradigms will play a big role in pervasive-computing
environments”.
On the one hand, the interactions with devices, which are possessed or
controlled by foreign parties, include uncertainty and risk, since the identity
and the goal of their owners may be unknown. On the other hand, the
interactions with reliable partners are the basis for the services ubiquitous
computing environments can provide.
A set of typical ubiquitous computing settings, namely mobile computing,
ad hoc interaction, smart spaces, and real-time enterprises, is presented
in [SH08]. The authors of [SH08] associate the ad hoc interaction setting
with the following characteristics:
1. Spontaneous interaction: The entities establish temporary, wireless,
and ad hoc communication links between each other, which allow for
spontaneous interaction on the application layer.
2. Lack of an infrastructure provider: There is not any central authority
allowing or restricting participation of entities.
3. Anonymity of users or devices: The entities per se might not have any
information about the real-world identity of their potential interaction
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partners, as they might interact anonymously.
4. A priori, no user groups: Devices can join and leave without restric-
tions.
Although the setting supports anonymity, it is not a requirement for
ad hoc interaction. Basically, the user can decide whether they want to be
anonymous, recognizable by a pseudonym, or even reveal their “real world”
identity.
Example Opportunistic Networks - musicClouds: Within this
setting one can think of a scenario in which mobile users are willing to
exchange information amongst each other (see 4.1). This is known as passive
collaboration in opportunistic networks [SH08,Hei07].
The scenario that has been introduced at the beginning of Chapter
2 and in Section 4.1 is set in this setting of ad hoc interaction. More
specifically, the scenario is an example of collaboration in opportunistic
networks. The basic idea of collaboration in an opportunistic network is that
users may exchange information with users in proximity in a spontaneous
manner [Hei07]. Thus, opportunistic networks do not rely on the presence of
internet connectivity or any other infrastructure. On the one hand, this may
have advantages. In [HCS+05], Hui et al. argue that there are numerous
scenarios in which local connectivity might be preferred over an internet-
based connection, due to bandwidth, latency or costs. On the other hand, it
may also have disadvantages, as traditional identification and authentication
relies on infrastructure, e.g, a public key infrastructure [ITU97].
In [Hei07], Heinemann studied and evaluated the capabilities of informa-
tion dissemination in opportunistic networks with encouraging results. The
evaluation was done based on one-hop routing scheme allowing for anony-
mous communication. Furthermore, Heinemann described an application
called musicClouds [Hei07,HKLM03], which allows autonomous sharing of
information, e.g., music files, in opportunistic networks. This application
focuses on defining filters for specifying the meta-information of the files
of interest, and the exchange of information. Yet, the application does not
consider that users may (intentionally or accidentally) provide corrupted
files, e.g., containing malware or viruses. Here, the application of a trust
model can be the next step in order to support users not only in exchanging
information but in finding reliable partners for the exchange.
A project that currently works on a concept to encourage people to
exchange music in the London underground is called undersound [und09,
BBM06].
Fulfillment of the basic assumptions: In this scenario, it may be
assumed that entities interact with each other. It is also easily possible to
evaluate the quality of an interaction after a file exchange took place. This can
be done either by asking the user for feedback, or by a software component,
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that checks the file for viruses, noise, etc. The behavior of an entity may
depend on different aspects. Entities might be willing to share good files with
other, they might be interested in distributing malware, or entities might
participate without taking care on the quality of the information they share.
Furthermore, this scenario shows that it is desirable to support the user
with an intuitive interface that allows them to check the trustworthiness of
possible interaction partners, but also to adjust trust values based on the
“real world” knowledge of the users. Assuming two persons know each other,
e.g., they are friends or they work together, then they might want to directly
assess the trustworthiness of the each other; without waiting until they have
sufficiently often interacted with each other, so that the system could derive
the trustworthiness based on the outcome of the interactions.
As ubiquitous computing environments may be unmanaged and many
entities may only be locally or spontaneously available, it may be non-trivial
to fulfill the assumption of distinguishability of entities. A solution may be
the entity recognition scheme referred to in [SFJ+03,SJ04]. It does not require
an enrollment of entities, but provides a reliable mechanism to recognize
entities – if they want to be recognized. The authors of [SFJ+03] also provide
the idea that recognition schemes are more suitable approach for representing
entities in ubiquitous computing environments as traditional authentication
schemes as PKI, e.g., [ITU97], or Kerberos [KN93].
Furthermore, the opportunity for repeated interactions with the same
entity depends on the movement of the users carrying the devices. It can
be shown that people tend to move in regular patterns [GHB08,MMC08],
e.g., they work together, or they regularly take the same bus or underground.
The term familiar stranger has been coined for people that meet periodically
but who do not interact with each other [PG04]. The Reality Mining
Project [EP06] collected data on the mobility patterns and spatial proximity
of 100 human users tracking the mobile phones of the users. This data
can be used evaluate whether there usually are opportunities for repeated
interactions, and serve as a basis for mobility patterns in a simulation
environment.
Moreover, one may expect that people are interested in regularly sharing
information with the same people, e.g., their friends, and also to provide
recommendations. They also should be able to rate the quality of their
interactions, e.g., whether they received the correct file or not, and they
should be able to store information about the outcome of their interactions
on their personal devices, e.g., their mobile phone.
4.3.2 Next-Generation Internet - Web Service Selection in
Open SOA Market Places
Besides ubiquitous computing, trust based selection of an interaction partner
may be applied to electronic market places where anybody can offer web
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services. On the technical level the so-called Service Oriented Architecture
(SOA) provides the concepts that are necessary for description of services
(e.g., WSDL), communication (e.g., SOAP), and discovery (e.g., UDDI)
[WV07,Aus08]. In an electronic market place some entities (service providers)
offer services, and other entities (service clients or customer) look for services
providing the functionality they are interested in.
Whenever a customer has a choice between multiple services providing the
same functionality, the quality of the provided services becomes important.
For example, a customer who looks for a service providing a weather forecast,
may select an unreliable service provider, providing a bad quality of service, or
a service provider with high response time. Even if the service providers offers
information about the quality of its service in the service description, the
customer cannot rely on this information, as it is not an obligation [WV07].
According to [WV07] there are three ways to improve the customer’s choice:
1. Service Level Agreement (SLA): Customer and service provider may
negotiate an agreement on the quality of the service (SLA). If the
service provider does not comply to the agreed service level, there may
be a penalty. A service level agreement comes with the cost of time
and expense. Furthermore, it requires a common ontology for quality
of service metrics.
2. Monitoring the quality of services by a trusted third party: This ap-
proach requires a trusted third party, and monitors (or sensors) to
measure the quality of the services, e.g. execution time, which might
be costly and result in a big overhead in a dynamic environment with
many leaving and upcoming services.
3. Customer feedback: Feedback from customers can be collected and
published by a trusted third party or in distributed manner. It is worth
noting, that if there is a trusted third party, this approach disburdens
the trusted third party from monitoring the services itself. Furthermore,
it brings the advantage of quality of service information that cannot
be directly collected by monitors.
The advantages of the last approach may be the reason for the upcoming
research to apply trust and reputation mechanisms to web services. This
approach can be applied to business-to-business (B2B), business-to-consumer
(B2C), and consumer-to-consumer (C2C) environments. According to [WV07]
current research focuses on reputation and trust mechanisms relying on a
trusted third party (central node) to collect and publish the customers’
feedback information. Decentralized systems, in which entities store their
feedback on their own and may provide this information to other on request,
are also applicable in this domain.
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Fulfillment of the basic assumptions: As service providers have
to register and to announce their offered service they are assumed to be
distinguishable entities. For consumers it is not obvious that they need
unique identifiers, yet, in case they want to exchange recommendations these
identifiers are necessary in order to create a history about the accuracy of the
recommendations of a recommender. If the SOA market place requires some
kind of registration of consumers, or if the provision of recommendations
itself is treated as a service, it should be possible to recognize entities that
previously provided recommendations.
Furthermore, one can expect that the entities that join the market place
are willing to interact with each other, and that they are able to create and
store the evidence that describes the outcome of their past interactions. It
may also be assumed that entities have the possibility to repeatedly interact
with each other, e.g., as service providers may gain higher prices when more
trusted.
Service providers can be expected to have a strategy about the quality
of service they offer, e.g., they offer a service with high quality in order to
build long-term customer relationship, or they provide a low quality service
or do not delivery any valuable results at all in order to quickly maximize
their profits.
4.3.3 Web 2.0 - Recommendations on Online Platforms
A growing number of users takes part in Web 2.0 applications on the inter-
net. The term Web 2.0 is associated to wikis and blogs, but also to pop-
ular websites, Flickr (www.flickr.com), Wikipedia (www.en.wikipedia.org),
YouTube (www.youtube.com), MySpace (www.myspace.com), and Facebook
(www.facebook.com) [OL08]. The aspects that users can produce or publish
information user generated content or that they can build social networks,
are vital to these applications.
An upcoming trend is that users are not only encouraged to rate products,
e.g., Amazon (www.amazon.com), hotels, e.g., (www.mytravelguide.com),
or movies, e.g., IMDb (www.imdb.com), but to combine the information
from social networks and user ratings in order to derive personalized recom-
mendations. FilmTrust [Gol05] (trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust) allows users
to rate movies and their friends, if they have joined the network. Rating a
friend means to rate the trust in a friend’s ability to recommend movies, or
more strictly speaking movie ratings. When a user wants to get a recommen-
dation for a film they havenot seen (or rated), yet, the rating is calculated
giving a higher weight to more trusted friends. Another approach that tries
to integrate trust mechanisms in a recommendation system can be found
in [LHC08].
In general, trust based approaches can support the user when they
have to evaluate the value of an information or whether the information
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is correct. Furthermore, the approach can be used to calculate subjective
ratings, e.g., for movies, using the trust mechanism as a basis for weighting
the recommendations (ratings) of different users.
Fulfillment of the basic assumptions: In order to evaluate whether
Web 2.0 applications fulfill the basic assumptions that are necessary to
successfully use a trust based approach, a similar argumentation as for Web
services can be provided. On platforms that are based on social networks
or on which users have to register it may be assumed that entities can be
distinguished. Interaction between users is inherent to Web 2.0 applications,
e.g., on platforms like YouTube and in blogs, users regularly offer content
to others and search for information. Selecting the information of a user
can be considered to be an interaction in this context. Afterwards, the user
can rate whether the interaction, i.e., the information, was satisfying. The
rating can be stored in a user’s profiles and it can also be send to others as
recommendation. The users that provide information have different interests
and competence on different topics. Thus, it can be assumed that they
provide information with different quality, and the trust mechanism may
serve to find high quality information.
4.4 Conclusions
Based on the evaluation of the current state-of-the-art and the concepts that
have been presented in this chapter, the author proposes a new distributed
trust model in the next chapter.
The trust model is especially designed to cover the following aspects that
are addressed by none of the state-of-the-art models in their entirety:
1. Modeling trust as a subjective probability as basis for au-
tonomous decision making: Modeling trust as a subjective proba-
bility directly derives from the definition of trust that has been intro-
duced in Section 4.2.4. If the utility of the outcomes of an interaction
are known this allows the trust value to be applied not only in order
to select an interaction partner, but also to reason about whether it is
a rational choice to interact (see Section 2.3).
2. Deriving trust from evidence considering context-dependent
parameters: As in an unmanaged domain identity and the goals
of interaction partners may be unknown, trust is derived from the
evidence from past interactions. When deriving trust from evidence,
it is important that the relation between trust and evidence considers
context-dependent parameters as introduced in (see Section 4.2.5.2).
Based on the analysis of the state-of-the-art, the following context-
dependent parameters are considered:
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• Dispositional trust: The dispositional trust expresses a users
general attitude to trust in other entities. The dispositional trust
may be assessed by the user, using the parameters base trust
and weight ; in addition, a mechanism to derive the base trust
value from the behavior of the entities that have previously been
encountered will be presented.
• Aging: Aging is introduced as an entity’s behavior may dynami-
cally change. Aging allows more recent interactions to be given
a higher weight and to prevent an entity that established a high
trust value along time ago from misusings the previously estab-
lished trust long-lasting. Furthermore, as an entity’s behavior
may also change over time, aging also allows to reduce the impact
of older evidence in absence of interactions.
• Maximum number of expected evidence units: The maximum num-
ber of expected evidence units allows the user to define how much
evidence is necessary in order to belief that it is representative for
the behavior of an entity.
3. Representation of trust for human users: As motivated in the
scenario at the beginning of Chapter 2 and in Section 4.1, the users
need to be able to control and manipulate the parameters of a trust
model, either to intervene in the decision making process or to ad-
just the trustworthiness of an entity according to their “real world”
knowledge. Therefore, a trust model needs provide a simple set of
parameters that is easily understandable. Since the trust model is to
express not only a trust value, but at least the confidence (or certainty)
associated with this trust value (cf. beginning of Chapter 4), too, a
conflict between simplicity and expressiveness arises. In the following,
it is proposed to integrate the considered parameters in an intuitive
graphical representation.
4. Providing a robust mechanism for the integration of recom-
mendations: Recommendations are an additional source of evidence
that is introduced in order to improve the selection of the interaction
partner. However, this potentially allows other entities to maliciously
influence the selection process. Based on the analysis of the computa-
tional models (see Section 3.3.2), this is addressed by proposing a new
approach for weighting and filtering recommendations. The approach
assesses the trustworthiness of a recommender based on the accuracy
of its past recommendations. The influence of a recommender is not
only limited by its trustworthiness in the context of providing recom-
mendations, but also by its rank, i.e, the maximal influence of the best
recommender is higher than the maximal influence of the second one,
etc. The approach will be introduced in Section5.3.4 can be shown to
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improve the trust model’s robustness to Sybil attacks.
After presenting the proposed model in Chapter 5, the trust model is
evaluated in Chapter 6. The evaluation shows the performance of the trust
model in a distributed setup for a large set of different populations regarding
the typical behavior of an entity. Furthermore, it presents a user study
evaluating the proposed graphical representation, and an application which
shows how the trust model integrates in an online movie recommendation
platform.
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Chapter 5
Trust Model: CertainTrust
The concepts that have been presented in the previous chapters require the
extension of the state-of-the-art trust models. This chapter presents the trust
model that is developed in this thesis.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 provides a short intro-
duction of the basic components of the proposed trust model. The subsequent
sections are devoted to the details of the trust model. The representational
and the computational model are introduced in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3,
respectively. The update mechanisms and a simple strategy for selecting an
interaction partner are presented in Section 5.4. Finally, the conclusions of
the chapter are presented in Section 5.5.
5.1 The Components of CertainTrust
The model can be split into three main components, as shown in Figure 5.1.
• The representational model addresses the issues how trust is derived
from evidence, and how trust is represented.
• The computational model addresses the aggregation of direct and
indirect evidence.
• The component called update mechanisms provides means for deriving
new evidence after an interaction. While the update of the evidence of
the interactor can be done straight-forward, one needs to take care when
updating evidence collected about the trustworthiness of the recom-
menders based on the accuracy of their recommendations. Furthermore,
this component allows the dispositional trust to be updated.
This section presents a short overview of the components, before their
functionality is explained in detail in the subsequent sections.
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Figure 5.1: Components of a trust model
Representational model
The representational model focuses on two crucial issues.
1. How can trust be derived from evidence considering context-dependent
parameters?
2. How can trust be represented to software agents and human users?
In order to address the first issue, a relationship between trust and evidence
is required. Here, a Bayesian approach is chosen, as it provides means for
deriving a subjective probability from prior information and collected evidence
(see Section 3.2.4.2). This goes along with the definition of trust given in
Section 4.2.4. Thus, the approach seems to be a good basis to start from in
order to provide a mapping between trust and evidence.
Yet, there are additional aspects that need to be taken into account
depending on the trust model’s application context (see Section 4.2.5.1).
In different application contexts, one has to deal with different general
conditions, e.g., regarding insurance, law enforcement, strength of identity,
etc. This may lead to different preferences regarding how trust should be
derived from the evidence from past interactions, e.g., whether a few pieces
of evidence are expected to be representative for the future behavior of
an entity. Furthermore, one might have different expectations about the
typical behavior of an entity, i.e., whether the behavior of unknown entities
is assumed to be rather benevolent or rather malicious, and one might have
different expectations about how the behavior of entities changes over time.
For example, one can expect that well-known online shops try to keep their
quality of service rather stable, while in peer-to-peer networks each peer’s
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quality of service may vary over time. These aspects are dealt with in the
proposed model.
Furthermore, when developing a representation of trust, it is necessary to
consider to whom trust is represented. A software component or a software
agent can easily handle mathematical representations of trust. Thus, the
Bayesian representation of trust is appropriate. However, human users
are usually not used to interpreting the parameters of a beta probability
density function or its graphical representation. If the user is given only the
expectation value, they cannot figure out the number of evidence units the
expectation value is based on or the quality of the observed evidence.
Therefore, a new representation of trust designed for human users is
introduced. It provides a simple set of parameters reflecting the amount
of information, the average quality of the collected evidence, and the base
trust (dispositional trust). The trust value of an entity is derived from these
parameters in an easily interpretable way. Finally, these parameters and the
trust value are integrated in an intuitive graphical representation. Users can
use this graphical representation in order to inform themselves about the
trust value of an entity or to manipulate the trust value of an entity.
As this leads to two representations of trust, the Bayesian one and the
one for human users, a mapping between both representations is required.
The evidence from past interactions is a common basis for both representa-
tions. The challenge is to define the mapping between both representations -
within the given constraints - that takes care that the derived trust value
is independent of the representation, i.e., given the same information both
representations are required to calculate the same trust value.
Computational Model
The computational model proposes a new approach for aggregating direct
evidence and recommendations.
In general, recommendations are collected to increase the amount of
information available about the candidates in order to improve the esti-
mate of their trustworthiness. Yet, as recommenders may be interested in
influencing the choice of the interaction partner, they cannot be assumed
to provide recommendations that accurately describe the trustworthiness
of the candidates. Therefore, the recommendations need to be integrated
carefully, in order to really improve the estimate of the trustworthiness of
the candidates. This is called robust integration of recommendations.
In order to achieve this goal, the proposed computational model introduces
a new approach for weighting recommendations. The approach has two main
features. First, it weights recommendations according to the trustworthiness
of the recommender in context of providing recommendations. Second, it
considers a recommender’s rank in the set of the available recommenders,
i.e., it reduces the influence of the recommenders with lower rank. Especially,
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the approach can be shown to limit the impact of Sybil attacks (see Section
5.3.5).
The presentation of the computational model that is proposed in this
thesis starts with an introduction of its basic operators which are based on
operators for consensus and discounting (see Section 3.2.5). Afterwards,
those operators are extended in order to improve the resistance to attacks.
Update mechanisms
The last component, update mechanisms, provides means to update the trust
values after an interaction.
The initiator of the interaction uses the outcome of the interaction to
derive new evidence that contributes to the history of the interactor and
the recommenders. Thus, the outcome of the interaction is the basis for
the update of the initiator’s opinion about the interactor and the initiator’s
opinions about the recommenders.
For the update mechanism it is important to distinguish between the
context of interactions and the context of providing recommendations.
Regarding the update of the opinion about the interactor, it is important
whether outcome of the interaction was positive or negative. The trust value
of the interactor increases if the outcome of the interaction was positive, and
it decreases if the outcome was negative.
Regarding the update of the opinion about the recommenders, the ac-
curacy of the recommendations important. Here, the update mechanism
is designed to increase the trust value of a recommender (in the context
of providing recommendations), when the provided recommendation about
interactor is considered to be accurate (see 4.2).
Besides the update of the opinion about the interactor and the recom-
menders, this component provides means to derive the expectation about
the trustworthiness of unknown entities (dispositional trust) based on the
behavior of the encountered entities.
5.2 Representational Model of Trust
This section presents the representational model of the proposed approach.
It introduces the context-dependent parameters that are integrated in the
trust model and two representations of trust. The first one - the Bayesian
representation - provides a sound mechanism for deriving an estimate from
prior information and collected evidence. Section 5.2.2 shows an extension
of this approach considering context-dependent parameters in a way that
especially allows the limitations of state-of-the-art approaches to be overcome.
The second one - the Human Trust Interface (see Section 5.2.4) - is tailored
for intuitively representing trust to human users. It is based on a simple set
of parameters and it provides a graphical representation of trust. Afterwards,
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Figure 5.2: Representations of trust1
a mapping between both representations is provided (see Section 5.2.6).
It allows one to benefit from the advantages of both representations. For
an overview of the presented representations and their interrelation, see
Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 Context-Dependent Parameters
The context-dependent parameters that are considered in the trust model
have already been presented in Section 4.2.5.2. They do not depend on
the entity whose trustworthiness is evaluated, but only on the application
context.
• The dispositional trust, describing the expectation about the typical
behavior of unknown entities, is modeled using the parameters base
trust and weight.
– The base trust f ∈ [0; 1] expresses the trust assigned to unknown
entities. A higher base trust value means that entities are expected
to be more trustworthy (see Section 5.2.4.1).
– The weight w ∈ R+ of the dispositional trust influences how quickly
the final trust value of an entity shifts from the base trust value
1Although Figure 5.2 introduces the aging factor a as a context-dependent parameter
in its lower part, the aging factor does not appear in the formulas in the upper part. This
is due to the fact that the aging factor is not directly considered in the representational
model, but only indirectly, as it is proposed to choose N = 11−a in Section 5.2.3.2.
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to the relative frequency of positive outcomes when evidence is
available. Its impact is shown in Section 5.2.7.
• The parameter for aging allows one to consider that the behavior of
an entity may dynamically change. The aging factor a ∈ [0; 1[ allows
more recent evidence to be given a higher weight. This is necessary
to prevent entities from misusing high trust values established a long
time ago. Furthermore, aging provides means to reduce the influence
of previously collected evidence in absence of new interactions. The
limit of a→ 1 will lead to not considering aging; the smaller the value
of a, the higher is the influence of recent evidence. Using a = 0 leads to
only considering the evidence from the interaction in the last time slot.
The mechanism for introducing aging is presented in Section 5.2.3.
• The maximum number of expected evidence units N ∈ R+ is introduced
to provide a means for modeling the certainty of a trust value context-
dependent. The parameter allows one to define a (finite) number of
evidence units that is expected to be sufficient in order to consider
the collected evidence as representative for the behavior of an entity.
The higher N the more evidence is necessary for the trust value to be
associated with the maximum level of certainty.
The parameters will influence the Bayesian representation (see Section
5.2.2), and the representation for human users (see Section 5.2.4). Especially,
it is worth noting, that it is proposed to chose the maximum number of
expected evidence units depending on the aging factor a, as in the face of
aging, one has to consider that even an infinite amount of observations from
past interactions leads only to a finite amount of collected evidence (see
Section 5.2.3). State-of-the-art approaches described in [JI02,JHF03,WJI05]
do not take this into account (see Section 5.2.3.1).
5.2.2 Bayesian Representation
The background of the Bayesian approach for deriving trust from evidence has
already been presented in Section 3.2.4.2. This section shortly summarizes the
notation and the concepts necessary for understanding the model provided.
The main parameters used to derive the trustworthiness of an entity
based on evidence are the numbers r of positive and s of negative evidence,
respectively, that have been collected based on direct evidence and recom-
mendations. Within a given application context, the opinion about the
trustworthiness of an entity derived from the past experience is denoted as
o = (r, s)rs. Note that the superscript refers only to the notation. Furthermore,
the parameters r0 and s0 are introduced to reflect the prior knowledge.
For the parameters α and β, the beta probability density function for a
random variable p is given as h(p | α, β) (see Section 3.2.4.2):
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h(p | α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1 − p)β−1
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0
(5.1)
Figure 5.3 shows some examples of beta probability density functions
for different values of α and β. In this thesis, the beta probability density
function h(p | α, β) is referred to as the Bayesian representation of trust.
Figure 5.3: Beta probability density function
The interrelation between the parameters of the beta probability density
function, the collected evidence, and the prior knowledge is given by defining
α = r + r0 and β = s + s0 (see Section 3.2.4.2).
As the approach for utility-based decision making introduced in Section
2.3 does not require the distribution itself, but only a point estimate, the
distribution is summarized using its expectation value. In [Bol04], it is ex-
plained that the mean value of the distribution is a good choice to summarize
the distribution in a point estimate.
The expectation value, i.e., the mean value of the beta distribution
Beta(α, β), is given as:
EBeta(r, s, r0, s0) = EBeta(α, β) =
α
α + β
=
r + r0
r + r0 + s + s0
. (5.2)
In the following,the expectation value is considered to characterize the
trustworthiness of an entity.
5.2.2.1 Evidence based Update
The Bayesian representation provides for an easy integration of new evidence.
After a new interaction, it is assumed that the user or an autonomous
74 CHAPTER 5. TRUST MODEL: CERTAINTRUST
software component (external to the proposed model) rates the outcome of
an interaction. The rating of the outcome needs to be a value v in [−1; 1],
where −1 expresses a negative outcome and 1 a positive outcome. New
evidence rnew and snew is derived from this outcome as introduced in [JI02]
(see Equation 5.3).
An additional parameter g allows different weights to be given to the
evidence derived from an interaction, e.g., the parameter g can be used
to reflect the value of an interaction [JI02]. However, in the following it
is assumed, that all interactions are weighted equally using g = 1, i.e.,
interactions are assumed to be homogeneous within an application context.
rnew = g · 0.5 · (1 + v) ,
snew = g · 0.5 · (1 − v) (5.3)
Assuming the opinion before the interaction is o = (r, s)rs, then the new
opinion after the interaction is given by o = (r + rnew, s + snew)rs.
5.2.2.2 Integration of the Context-Dependent Parameters
In current state-of-the-art approaches [TPJL06,BLB04,MMH02a], the prior
knowledge is usually set to r0 = s0 = 1. Although this leads to a uniform
distribution for the expected behavior of unknown entities, it is just an
assumption introduced by the developers of those models and it prevents
that the user introduces their own preferences. The expectation value as
calculated by these approaches will be referred to as EBetasimple or as simple
approach. It is defined in Equation 5.4.
EBetasimple((r, s)
rs) =
r + 1
r + s + 2
(5.4)
The section shows how the context-dependent parameters for base trust,
weight, and maximum number of expected evidence units, are integrated in
the Bayesian representation. Aging will be introduced separately in next
section.
Integration of Dispositional Trust
In contrast to the approaches proposed in [TPJL06,BLB04,MMH02a], the
proposed approach allows the user to adjust the model according to their
preferences. This section introduces a relation between a users dispositional
trust and parameters r0 and s0 of the prior knowledge of the Bayesian
representation. The parameters r0 and s0 can be assessed independently of
each other. This is also true for the parameters base trust f and weight w that
have been introduce to model a user’s dispositional trust. As dispositional
trust may primarily be used to estimate the trustworthiness of entities in
absence of evidence, the following constraints are defined:
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w =
1
2
(r0 + s0) if r + s = 0
f = EBeta(r, s, r0, s0) if r + s = 0
(5.5)
Given these constraints, one sees that choosing f = 0.5 and w = 2 leads to
r0 = s0 = 1. It is easy to verify that it holds 2 = 12 (1+1) (see Equation 5.5 upper
part); furthermore, the lower equation can be shown to be true: In absence
of evidence, i.e., r = s = 0, it holds EBeta(r, s, r0, s0) = 0+10+0+1+1 = 0.5 = f .
Finally, increasing the value of w increases the influence of the prior
knowledge on the expectation value (see Equation 5.2), as it increases the
value of r0 + s0. For example, f = 0.5 and w = 4 leads to r0 = s0 = 2.
Thus, the w reflects the weight of the dispositional trust, and f defines
the expectation value in absence of evidence.
Integration of the Parameter N
The parameter N is introduced to allow for the definition of a number of
evidence units that is considered to be sufficient to be representative for the
behavior of an entity. Thus, in case of r + s = N, the relative frequency of
positive evidence should be equal to the derived expectation value.
Using EBetasimple((r, s)
rs) (see Equation 5.4), this can only be achieved for
an infinite amount of evidence r + s→ ∞, as the prior knowledge is always
considered in expectation value.
Therefore, it is proposed that the values of r0 and s0 also depend on
the number of collected evidence units r + s in relation to the maximum
number of expected evidence units N. In Definition 5.2.1, a linear fade out
of the prior information with increasing number of collected evidence units
is proposed.
Definition 5.2.1 (Linear fade out of prior knowledge)
Given the context-dependent parameters for base trust f , weight w, and the
maximum number of expected evidence units N, and given the numbers of
positive r and negative s evidence units, the parameters of the prior knowledge
r0 and s0 are defined by Equation 5.6.
r0 = 2 · f · w · (1 − r + sN )
s0 = 2 · (1 − f ) · w · (1 − r + sN )
(5.6)
Thus, r0 and s0 become functions depending on the parameters f , w, N,
r, and s. Furthermore, when calculating r0 and s0 from the values of f and
w using Equation 5.6, the constraints defined in Equation 5.5 are fulfilled.
The proposed mechanism focuses on adjusting the calculated expectation
value in order to reflect the ideas introduced above; it does not consider
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other parameters of the distribution, e.g., the variance. A linear fade out
is proposed as it was the simplest variant fulfilling all previously defined
constraints2.
This also allows for the introduction of a new notation of the expecta-
tion value that refers to the context-dependent parameters, as defined in
Equation 5.7.
EBetaf ,w,N(r, s) = E
Beta(r, s, r0, s0) (5.7)
where r0 and s0 are calculated based on N, f , w, r and s using Equation 5.6.
The expectation value that is calculated for an opinion o = (r, s)rs may also
be denoted as EBetaf ,w,N(o).
Based on these constraints, the expectation value for an unknown entity
is EBetaf ,w,N((0, 0)
rs) = f ; thus, for r + s = N, it holds EBetaf ,w,N((r, s)
rs) = rr+s as
intended.
Example: The example shows how recalculating the values of r0 and s0
depending on f , w, N, r, and s reduces the impact of the prior knowledge
on the expectation value when the number of the collected evidence units
increases (for simplicity aging of evidence is not considered).
Assuming an entity expects that 10 pieces of evidence are sufficient in
order to belief that they are representative for an entity’s behavior (N = 10).
This means, e.g., after this entity has had 10 positive interactions with a
certain interactor (leading to r = 10 and s = 0), it would expect that all
interactions with this interactor will have a positive outcome.
When the expectation value is calculated as EBetasimple((r, s)
rs), i.e., the prior
knowledge is statically set to r0 = s0 = 1, after 10 positive interaction the
expectation value evaluates to EBetasimple((10, 0)
rs) = 10+110+0+2 ≈ 0.92. Here, the
expectation value is not only determined by the collected evidence, but
also by the prior knowledge, as the model is not capable of considering the
parameter N.
In contrast in the proposed approach, the parameters r0 and s0 are
dynamically evaluated using Equation 5.6. From this equation, one can easily
see that in case of r + s = N it holds r0 = s0 = 0, independent from the initial
setup of the prior knowledge. Thus, when setting N = 10 the expectation
value is calculated as 10+010+0+0+0 = 1. Here, the expectation value is equivalent
to the relative frequency of positive outcomes, reflecting that the collected
evidence is expected to be representative.
2The author of this thesis has also proposed alternative mapping together with the
mapping presented above in [Rie09]. The alternative mapping provides a more complex
way for deriving the parameters r0 and s0 that not only considers that the expectation
value approaches the relative frequency when r + s approaches the value of N, but that
additional takes care how the expectation value evolves for 0 < r + s < N. As this approach
does not introduce major difference regarding the design goals introduced in Section 4.4, it
is not presented as a part of this thesis.
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Beyond introducing a context-dependent measure of certainty, the pa-
rameter N can be used to consider that the introduction of aging may reduce
the number of evidence units r + s that is collected based on an infinite
amount of interactions to finite number as shown in the next section. Then,
choosing the parameter N depending on the aging factor a prevents that
aging unintendedly introduces an estimation error.
5.2.3 Aging of Evidence
The core approach for aging, given in Definition 5.2.2, is based on [JI02,
JHF03,WJI05].
Definition 5.2.2 (Aging)
Let the aging factor be denoted by a ∈ [0; 1[. The opinion at time t − 1 is
ot−1 = (rt−1, st−1)rs. The opinion ot = (rt, st)rs at time t is calculated using:
rt = a · rt−1st = a · st−1 (5.8)
In the face of new evidence (rnew, snew) within time slot t, it holds at the
end of time slot t:
rt = a · rt−1 + rnewst = a · st−1 + snew (5.9)
5.2.3.1 Limitations of Aging When Using EBetasimple
Assuming there is no evidence available at time t = 0, and at each point
in time t > 0 there is exactly one interaction with weight g = 1, leading to
either positive or negative evidence, i.e., rnew + snew = 1. Then the sum of the
collected evidence rt + st at time t > 0 can be calculated as a geometric sum.
rt + st =
t−1∑
i=0
ai =
1 − at
1 − a (5.10)
An infinite amount of time and interactions leads to (for a ∈ [0; 1[):
lim
t→∞ rt + st = limt→∞
1 − at
1 − a =
1
1 − a (5.11)
Thus, the described aging limits the amount of evidence derived from an
infinite amount of interactions to a finite number. This is not considered
when calculating the expectation value using EBetasimple((r, s)
rs) = r+1r+s+2 .
Assuming there is no aging of evidence and at each point in time an entity
collects a new positive evidence, then the expectation value derived from the
evidence converges to 1. If there is an infinite number of negative experience,
the expectation value converges to 0. Yet, when introducing aging, this is no
longer true when using EBetasimple as proposed in [JI02,JHF03,WJI05]. Table 5.1
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shows that the minimum Emin and maximum Emax expectation values that
are calculated using EBetasimple depend on the aging factor.
Aging factor a Max. amount of
evidence
Emax Emin
1 ∞ 1 0
0.99 100 0.990196 0.0098039
0.95 20 0.954545 0.0454545
0.9 10 0.916666 0.083333
0.8 5 0.8571428 0.1428571
0.7 3.33... 0.8125 0.1875
0.6 2.5 0.77777 0.2222222
0.5 2 0.75 0.25
0.0 1 0.66666 0.33333
Table 5.1: Relation of aging factor and EBetasimple
Table 5.1 shows that aging narrows the interval [Emin; Emax] for the
possible expectation values. As the basic idea when introducing aging of
evidence was to give more recent evidence a higher weight in relation to older
evidence, the effect that the introduction of aging narrows the range of the
expectation value seems to be unintended. Furthermore, it may lead to an
estimation error. For example, assume there is an aging factor of a = 0.8 and
one has a large (infinite) amount of interactions with an entity providing only
interactions with positive outcome. The derived expectation value based
on these observations is EBetasimple ≈ 0.86. This leads to an estimation error of
about 14% compared to an expectation value based on the same observations
without considering aging.
In contrast, Buchegger et al. [BLB04] introduced a slightly different
approach for aging. They apply aging not only to the collected evidence
but also to the prior knowledge. In their approach, aging does not narrow
the range of the expectation value as presented above. Yet, Section 5.2.7
shows that their approach has another drawback. The expectation value
in their approach does not move back to the initial expectation value in
absence of evidence; instead, in absence of evidence, the expectation value
does not change. Thus, the approach does not properly reflect that an entity’s
behavior may change over time without interaction.
5.2.3.2 Overcoming those Limitations
The reason why aging narrows the range of the expectation value is that the
expectation value EBetasimple requires an infinite number of collected evidence
units in order to approach the relative frequency of positive evidence.
Section 5.2.3.1 shows that depending on the aging factor, the number
of collected evidence units r + s is limited by 1/(1 − a). The introduction of
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the context-dependent parameter N allows this to be considered, choosing
N = 11−a .
Then, it holds that the evidence derived from an infinite amount of
interactions is equal to N (r + s = N). This leads to r0 = s0 = 0 (using
N = 11−a in Equation 5.6) and E
Beta
f ,w,N =
r
r+s (Equation 5.2). This means that
the prior information does no longer influence the expectation value as the
number of collected evidence units is supposed to be representative. Thus,
the expectation value can reach the complete interval [0; 1]. The evaluation
of the modified expectation value EBetaf ,w,N is shown in Section 5.2.7 together
with a comparison to state-of-the-art approaches.
Using the aging factor a → 1 leads to N → ∞, this is equal to not
considering the age of evidence. Although it is proposed to choose N = 11−a ,
the user is free to choose N depending on their preferences. When choosing
N < 11−a , then the maximum level of certainty will be reached after a finite
number of interactions. When choosing N > 11−a , then the maximum level
of certainty cannot be reached. In the latter case, the expectation value is
always influenced by the prior value and does not use the full range of the
interval [0; 1].
5.2.3.3 Normalization as Implicit Aging
The normalization of an opinion is introduced to ensure that the evidence
on which an opinion o = (r, s)rs is based does not exceed the maximum
number of expected evidence units (r + s ≤ N). This may occur for finite
values of N, e.g., when a user decides to choose N ≤ 11−a , when it is possible
to provide ratings with a higher weight than g = 1 (see Section 5.2.2), or
when aggregating evidence from multiple parties (see Section 5.3). Thus,
the normalization is more a technical necessity to ensure that the equations
defined in the previous section are always applicable.
Whenever an opinion o = (r, s)rs of an entity is based on a greater number
of evidence units than the maximum number of expected evidence units, the
collected number of evidence units will be scaled to the allowed maximum
(see Equation 5.12). The normalization preserves the relative frequency of
positive evidence.
norm((r, s)rs) =
(r, s)
rs if r + s ≤ N ,
( Nr+s · r, Nr+s · s)rs else .
(5.12)
Assume the opinion about an entity is given as o = (r, s)rs with r+s = N+δ.
For example, this may occur when setting N = 20 without aging of evidence,
i.e., a→ 1. When collecting the 21th piece of evidence the resulting opinion
will be normalized according to Equation 5.12.
As the normalization may also be denoted as shown in Equation 5.13,
the normalization may be interpreted as an implicit aging of the evidence in
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the case of r + s ≥ N using an aging factor a = NN+δ (see Equation 5.8).
rnorm =
N
N + δ
· r
snorm =
N
N + δ
· s
(5.13)
Note that in the case of setting N < 11−a , normalization of an opinion
should be done after the aging of the evidence in order to avoid unintended
interference.
5.2.4 Human Trust Interface (HTI)
The Human Trust Interface (HTI) is new representation of trust that is
designed to be intuitively interpretable by human users. Like the Bayesian
representation, the HTI is based on the idea that trust between entities can
be established based on past experience. Based on this experience, a user
can associate an average value of the outcomes of those past interactions,
and a value describing a notion of (un-)certainty (certainty in the following).
The latter expresses the user’s estimate of how reliable or representative the
collected information is, in order to derive an expectation about the outcome
of future interactions. Similar to ideas presented in [TPJL06,Jøs01,MMH02a],
in this thesis the certainty is modeled to increase with the number of collected
evidence units.
The main parameters of the HTI are called average rating, certainty,
and trust value. The following introduces only the basic semantics of the
parameters, the formulas are presented in Section 5.2.6.
The average rating t ∈ [0; 1] 3 expresses the average outcome of the past
interactions. It is calculated as the relative frequency of interactions with
positive outcome. This value indicates the past behavior of an entity. The
extreme values can be interpreted as follows:
• average rating = 0: There have been only bad interactions (very
negative)
• average rating = 1: There have been only good interactions (very
positive)
The certainty c ∈ [0; 1] increases with the number of collected evidence
units. Based on the idea that a trust value that is based on a higher number
of evidence units is more representative for an entity, it expresses the influence
of the average rating on the trust value in relation to the base trust value.
The maximum level of certainty (c = 1) is reached if the number of collected
evidence units is equal to the number of expected evidence units N. The
extreme values can be interpreted as follows:
3The average rating was formerly called trust value in [Rie07,RS08,RH08].
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• certainty = 0: There is no evidence available.
• certainty = 1: The collected evidence is considered to be representative.
The context-dependent parameters are also integrated. As before, the
base trust value f expresses the trust value for unknown entities. It influences
the final trust value directly. The weight w of the dispositional trust and the
maximum number of expected evidence units N are integrated in the certainty
parameter (see Equation 5.19).
Finally, the trust value EHTIf ,w,N(t, c) expresses the trust of the owner of the
opinion in another entity. It is derived from the other parameters. Assuming
that an entity has an initial expectation about the trustworthiness of unknown
entities (base trust), when the number of collected evidence units increases,
the expectation about the outcome in the next interaction shifts from this
initial expectation to the average rating. This means that in absence of
evidence (certainty = 0), it holds that the trust value is equal to the base
trust value; in presence of sufficient evidence (certainty = 1), it holds that
the trust value is equivalent to the average rating. This consideration is the
basis for the calculation of the expectation value in the HTI (see Equation
5.14). Thus, the parameters of the HTI and their interrelation are easy to
explain. Furthermore, they are the basis for the graphical representation
shown that is introduced in Section 5.2.5.
It is important to note that the interpretation of the trust value in the
HTI is equal to the interpretation of the expectation value in the Bayesian
representation. Therefore, when based on the same numbers of evidence units
the trust value in the HTI is supposed to be equivalent to the expectation
value in the Bayesian representation.
5.2.4.1 Trust Value and Dispositional Trust
The basic concept that describes how the trust value is derived from the
other parameters has already been explained above. The opinion about
the trustworthiness of an entity is based on information collected from past
interactions. As the trust model is to support users in future interactions
and the certainty of an opinion is to indicate whether the average rating is
expected to be a good prediction or not, both values need to be included in
the expectation value.
According to the naming convention introduced in Section 5.2.2, the
superscript HTI will be used when denoting an opinion o = (t, c)HTI using
the parameters of the HTI. For an opinion o = (t, c)HTI and the base trust
value f , the trust value EHTIf ,w,N(o) is defined as
EHTIf ,w,N(o) = c · t + (1 − c) · f (5.14)
This equation describes the consideration introduced above. The parame-
ter f is used to determine the base trust value in case of complete uncertainty
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and influences the expectation value until complete certainty c = 1 is reached.
Thus, f can be used to express a user’s general attitude (dispositional
trust) or depend on additional knowledge about the distribution of trust-
worthy and untrustworthy entities. The following briefly presents a few
selected values to initialize the base trust value f in order introduce the some
examples for the interpretation of the base trust value. However, the user
is free to choose any other value in the range of [0; 1] depending on their
preferences. In addition, Section 5.4.3 presents an approach for dynamically
deriving the base trust value from the behavior of the encountered entities.
Pessimistic strategy ( f = 0):
The pessimistic strategy is based on the assumption that unknown entities
are expected to provide interactions with negative outcome. According to
this strategy, the trust value is 0, if no evidence has been collected (complete
uncertainty). This reflects a user’s attitude such as “I believe that entities
are untrustworthy, unless I know the opposite with high certainty”.
EHTI0,w,N(o) = t · c (5.15)
Moderate strategy ( f = 0.5):
The moderate strategy is appropriate for binary decisions when entities
providing interactions with positive and negative outcomes occur with the
same probability. According to this strategy, the trust value is 0.5, if no
evidence has been collected (complete uncertainty). This reflects a user’s
attitude such as “I believe that unknown entities to provide interactions with
negative and positive outcomes with equal probabilities.”
EHTI0.5,w,N(o) = t · c + (1 − c) · 0.5 (5.16)
Optimistic strategy ( f = 1):
The optimistic strategy reflects a user’s attitude such as “I believe that
entities are trustworthy, unless I know the opposite with high certainty”.
EHTI1,w,N(o) = t · c + (1 − c) (5.17)
5.2.5 Graphical Representation
Given the probabilistic trust models presented in the state-of-the-art (see
Chapter 3), one can see that the focus often is only on deriving trust from
(direct and indirect) evidence considering context-dependent parameters. A
representation designed for human users is usually beyond the scope of those
approaches. In contrast, the approaches that are designed for human usage
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do usually not consider context-dependent parameters. Furthermore, those
approaches tend to model trust using discrete numbers (e.g., TidalTrust
[Gol05]), or a small set of labels, e.g., [ARH00]. However, as in the proposed
model trust is to be interpreted as probability, it needs to be considered that
continuous values cannot be represented in a small set of labels or numbers
without a loss of information.
Furthermore, the user might not only be interested in the trust value,
but also in the certainty of the trust value, or the average rating of the past
interaction. This requires that the representation integrates these param-
eters. Therefore, this section proposes a new multi-dimensional graphical
representation that is designed for the interpretation and manipulation of
trust values by human users.
Figure 5.4: Graphical representation of the HTI with labels (moderate
strategy f = 0.5)
The representation is based on the parameters introduced in the last
section. The two parameters average rating and certainty are the basis for
the two-dimensional layout of the graphical representation. In the Figure
5.4, the average rating is shown on the x-axis and the certainty on the y-axis.
The parameter trust value is indicated by a red-yellow-green color gradient.
Here, red indicates a low trust value (EHTIf ,w,N(o) = 0), yellow a medium one
(EHTIf ,w,N(o) = 0.5), and green a high one (E
HTI
f ,w,N(o) = 1). In-between these
values, the color gradient is calculated depending on the expectation value
using a linear combination of the colors red, yellow, and green in the RBG
color model.
As the colors red, yellow, green allow for intuitively linked to the semantics
of the trust value, this representation can be used to integrate representations
of trust in applications in order to support a user’s decisions and to allow the
users to express opinions about the trustworthiness of interaction partners.
Thus, the representation allows for an easy manipulation and interpretation
of trust by users. In addition, the user may also be supported with labels
introducing a coarse-grain semantics of the average rating and the certainty
(see Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4 shows the trust information for an entity A. In the example,
the experience with entity A is given as opinion = (10, 3)rs = (0.77, 0.87)HTI.
The context-dependent parameters are N = ∞, w = 2, and f = 0.5. The user
may change the indicated trustworthiness of entity A by moving the spot
marking the trustworthiness to another position.
Figure 5.5: Graphical representation of the HTI with labels using different
base trust values – pessimistic strategy f = 0 (left) and optimistic strategy
f = 1 (right)
Furthermore, Figure 5.5 shows how different values of the base influence
the trust value. In both example, the experience with entity A is given as
opinion = (10, 3)rs = (0.77, 0.87)HTI (as in Figure 5.4); only the values of the
base trust are chosen differently, i.e., f = 0 (left) and f = 1 (right).
In Figures 5.4 and 5.5, entity A’s trust value is not explicitly shown. This
can be overcome by simply displaying the trust value as shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Graphical representation of the HTI displaying the trust value
( f = 0.5)
In addition, for users that prefer to have the trust value shown on a
separate axis, a graphical representation that is based on the trust value and
the certainty parameter has been designed. In Figure 5.8, the x-axis represents
the trust value and the y-axis shows the certainty value. Furthermore, the
value of the average rating is indicated by the color gradient. The areas that
are left white do not represent valid opinions. The representations only differ
in the base trust value f .
The advantage of the latter representation is that its axis are devote to
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Figure 5.8: Alternative graphical representation ( f = 0.8)
the two parameters, which might be the most important one for the decision
making, i.e., the trust value and its certainty. However, users might feel
more comfortable with the rectangular layout of the first proposal of the
representation.
The evaluation of the intuitivity of the representation is presented in
Section 6.2. It is based on a user study comparing the proposed representation
and two graphical representations, namely the one introduced with“subjective
logic” (see Section 3.2.5.1) and an Amazon-like stars interface (see Section
3.2.1.2). The first one is especially interesting as subjective logic provides a
mapping between the “belief space” and the “evidence space” of the Bayesian
approach. The latter one is a much simpler representation. However, it
seems to be a good base line, as it is used in a commercial application.
5.2.6 Mapping between Representations
Having introduced both representations the question arises, how the pa-
rameters that have been defined for the HTI can be set in relation to the
parameters of Bayesian representation within the provided specification.
Here, it is important that the trust value of the HTI is equivalent to the
expectation value in the Bayesian representation as both parameters have
the same interpretation. This section provides a mapping between the pa-
rameters of both representations taking care of these aspects. Thus, it allows
the advantages of both representations to be combined - easily interpretable
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parameters (HTI) and well-founded, evidence based trust establishment
(Bayes).
The mapping is only defined for opinions o = (r, s)rs with 0 ≤ r + s ≤ N.
Opinions that are based on a higher number of evidence units need to be
normalized first (see Section 5.2.3.3).
Based on the introduction of the semantics of parameters of the HTI, the
constraints for the mapping can informally be described as follows:
• The trust value is equivalent to the relative frequency of positive
evidence.
• The certainty parameter is 0 in absence of evidence, and it is 1, if the
collected evidence is supposed to be representative, i.e., it is equal to
the maximum number of expected evidence units.
• The expectation value of the Bayesian representation needs to be
equivalent to the trust value defined in the HTI.
The formal constraints for the mapping are given in Equation 5.18.
t =
r
r + s
if r + s > 0
c =
0 if r + s = 0 ,1 if r + s ≥ N .
EBetaf ,w,N(r, s) = E
HTI
f ,w,N(t, c)
(5.18)
The mapping is defined in Definition 5.2.3.
Definition 5.2.3 (Mapping Bayesian Representation to HTI)
Given the parameters f , w, and N, the constraints given in Equation 5.18,
and the proposed fade out of r0 and s0 in Equation 5.6, the mapping of an
opinion (r, s)rs in the Bayesian representation to an opinion (t, c)HTI in the
HTI is defined Equation 5.19.
t =
0.5 if r + s = 0 ,r
r+s else .
c =
N · (r + s)
2 · w · (N − (r + s)) + N · (r + s)
(5.19)
The mapping fulfills the properties defined in Equation 5.18. As one can
see, it holds t = rr+s if r + s > 0. Furthermore, it holds c = 0 for r + s = 0
and c = 1 for r + s = N. In absence of evidence, it is also easy to see that
it holds EBetaf ,w,N(r, s) = f = E
HTI
f ,w,N(t, c) using the Equations 5.5 and 5.14. As
the fulfillment of the equality of the expectation value and the trust value in
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presence of evidence, i.e., 0 < r + s ≤ N, is not considered to be this trivial, it
is shown in Appendix A. The proof shows the equivalence using only simple
algebraic manipulations.
The inverse mapping from the parameters of the HTI to the Bayesian
representation is defined in Definition 5.2.4.
Definition 5.2.4 (Mapping HTI to Bayesian Representation)
Given the parameters f , w, and N, the constraints given in Equation 5.18, and
the proposed fade out of r0 and s0 in Equation 5.6, the mapping of an opinion
(t, c)HTI in the HTI to an opinion (r, s)rs in the Bayesian representation is
defined in Equation 5.20.
r =
2 · c · w · N · t
2 · c · w + ·N · (1 − c)
s =
2 · c · w · N · (1 − t)
2 · c · w + ·N · (1 − c)
(5.20)
The correctness of the inverse mapping can be verified, when replacing
the values of r and s in Equation 5.19 using Equation 5.20.
5.2.6.1 Integration of EBetaS imple
The extension of the Bayesian representation is considered to be conservative
in the sense that, for finite values of r and s, the expectation value is
equivalent to EBetasimple (see Equation 5.4) when using w = 1, f = 0.5, and
N → ∞. Assuming that r + s is a finite, then it holds for any opinion
o = (r, s)rs with 0 ≤ r + s ≤ N
EBeta0.5,1,∞((r, s)
rs) = EBetasimple((r, s)
rs) (5.21)
The proof is shown in the Appendix A. The proof is carried out straight-
forward using only simple algebraic manipulations and it uses that for a fixed
and finite value of r + s holds limN→∞ r+sN = 0.
5.2.6.2 Integration of the “Opinion Space”
The “opinion space” of subjective logic has already been introduced in Section
3.2.5.1. It is based on the parameters belief b, disbelief d, uncertainty u, and
an additional parameter atomicity a that has an impact similar to the initial
trust value f . The expectation value of a triple (b, d, u) in the opinion space
is defined as E(b, d, u) = b + u/2 (using atomicity a = 12). When the atomicity
may be freely chosen, it holds E(b, d, u, a) = b + u · a.
As the belief space is an interesting and important concept a direct
mapping between the parameters of the opinion space and the parameter
of the HTI is provided. As presented in Section 3.2.5.1, there is a mapping
between the “evidence space”, i.e., the Bayesian representation, and the
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“opinion space” fulfilling E(b, d, u, a) = EBetaS imple(r, s). This is taken into account
when defining the mapping between the “opinion space” and the HTI as
additional constraint, i.e., E(b, d, u, a) = EBetaS imple(r, s) = E
HTI
f ,0.5,∞(t, c).
Definition 5.2.5 (Mapping Opinion Space to HTI)
Given parameters w = 1 and N → ∞, the mapping between the parameters of
the opinion space to the parameters of the HTI is defined in Equation 5.22.
f = a
t =
b
b + d
if b + d , 0
c = 1 − u
(5.22)
The definition is based on the observation that for w = 1, and N → ∞ it
holds:
c = lim
N→∞
N · (r + s)
2 · w · (N − r − s) + N · (r + s)
=
r + s
r + s + 2
(5.23)
The equation for the inverse mapping is given in Definition 5.2.6.
Definition 5.2.6 (Mapping HTI to Opinion Space)
Given parameters w = 1 and N → ∞, the mapping between the parameters of
the HTI to the parameters of the opinion space is defined in Equation 5.22.
a = f
b = t · c
d = (1 − t) · c
u = 1 − c
(5.24)
Both mappings should be easy to verify. Based on these mappings it
is possible to directly switch between the graphical representation of the
opinion space and the one provided with the HTI.
5.2.7 Evaluation of the Impacts of Aging and the Context-
dependent Parameters
This section compares the expectation values calculated by the proposed
approach EBetaf ,w,N and the simple approach E
Beta
S imple.
The two diagrams in Figure 5.9 show the evaluation of the expectation
value for different aging factors, using N = 11−a as proposed in Section 5.2.3.2.
At time t = 0, no evidence is available. For the next 50 steps in time
(1 ≤ t ≤ 50), there is one additional positive evidence per time step. For
(51 ≤ t ≤ 100) there is one additional negative evidence per time step.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the expectation values
The transition from the first interval to second one shows that in both
approaches the aging allows for weighting toward the interactors recent
behavior. It holds the lower the value of a the faster the expectation value
reacts on the change of the behavior.
However, at the end of the first interval (t = 50), one can clearly see that
the maximum of expectation value EBetasimple depends on the aging factor (as
described in Table 5.1), whereas the proposed approach EBetaf ,w,N reaches values
close to 1. This is also true the minimum of the expectation value in in
the second interval (51 ≤ t ≤ 100). The example in Figure 5.9 shows that
the introduction of aging narrows the range of the expectation value EBetasimple
depending on the value of the aging factor a. Therefore, when estimating
the trustworthiness of an entity A that is known to provide only interactions
with positive outcome, i.e., p(“positive interaction”) = 1, the estimation error
would depend on the aging factor a. For example, after an infinite amount
of (positive) interactions using a = 0.8 leads to EBetasimple ≈ 0.86 as shown in
Section 5.2.3.1, i.e., an estimation error of about 14%. In contrast in the
proposed approach, the expectation value would have been assess correctly,
i.e, EBetaf ,w,5 → 1. Thus, the proposed approach allows the limitation of the
simple approach to be overcome.
Figure 5.10: Impact of the maximum number of expected evidence units N
Finally, it is possible to argue that aging is introduced as it is assumed that
the behavior of an entity may change and that the narrowing of the range of
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the expectation value allows this to be considered, as values close to 0 or close
1 cannot be reached anymore. However, in the example above has just been
shown that this may lead to an estimation error. Furthermore, if intended,
this consideration may also be reflected in the proposed approach choosing
1
1−a ≤ N ≤ ∞. When the value of N is chosen in 11−a ≤ N ≤ ∞, the effect of
narrowing the range of the expectation value becomes parameterizable even
for a given value of a as shown in Figure 5.10. This can be explained, as it
holds that EBetasimple = E
Beta
f ,w,∞. Thus, the presented approach is more expressive
than previous ones.
Figure 5.11: Comparison of the certainty parameters
The two diagrams in Figure 5.11 show the evaluation of the certainty
parameter in the HTI and subjective logic. In the latter the certainty
parameter is derived from the uncertainty parameter using c = 1 − u (see
Definition 5.2.5). In both figures, there is no evidence available at time t = 0,
and at each point in time one additional piece of evidence is added. While
the certainty parameter derived from subjective logic depends on the aging
parameter, the certainty in the HTI is (almost) independent of aging.
Figure 5.12: Impact of the parameters the base trust f and the weight w of
the dispositional trust
The diagrams in Figure 5.12 show the impact of the base trust f and
weight w.
In the diagram on the left side, the aging factor is set to a = 0.9. There
is one new positive evidence for each point in time for 0 ≤ t ≤ 100 and no
5.2 REPRESENTATIONAL MODEL OF TRUST 91
evidence for 101 ≤ t ≤ 200. As one can see, for t = 0 the expectation value
is equal to f , then the expectation value shifts towards 1. In absence of
evidence, aging shifts the expectation value to its initial value f .
In the diagram on the right side, the aging factor is set to a = 0.95.
There is one new positive evidence at each point in time. As one can see, the
different values of the parameter weight influence how quickly the expectation
value converges towards the relative frequency.
Thus, both parameters allow the expectation value to be influenced as
intended (see Section 4.2.5.2). Both effects cannot be achieved using EBetaS imple.
Furthermore, the example shows that the expectation value also reacts on
the absence of evidence. When no further evidence is collected and older
evidence is considered to be less representative, the expectation value moves
back to the base trust value. This models that in absence of evidence an
entity again becomes unknown.
Figure 5.13: Comparison of aging
The diagram in Figure 5.13 shows the comparison of the proposed ap-
proach compared to the aging proposed by Buchegger et al. [BLB04]. In
contrast to the aging proposed in Definition 5.2.2, Buchegger et al. apply
aging not only to the collected evidence, but also to the prior information, i.e.,
αt = a ·αt−1 and βt = a ·βt−1. For the comparison, the following parameters are
used: f = 0.5, w = 1, a = 0.95. For 1 ≤ t ≤ 5, there is one positive evidence
at each point in time, for 6 ≤ t ≤ 100 there is no additional evidence; then,
for 101 ≤ t ≤ 105, there is one negative evidence at each point in time, and
for 106 ≤ t ≤ 200 there is again no additional evidence. One can see that the
aging proposed by Buchegger et al. does not influence the expectation value
in absence of evidence; after a period of absence of evidence new evidence
has a very high impact. Thus, this approach does not fulfill function of the
parameters as introduced in Section 4.2.5.2 and Section 4.4. In contrast,
the expectation value shifts towards the base trust value f in absence of
evidence and smoothly integrates new evidence that might become available
afterwards in the proposed approach.
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5.2.8 Summary
The section presented a novel approach for integrating context-dependent
parameters for dispositional trust (base trust f , weight w), a number of
maximum expected evidence units N, and aging a in Bayesian trust models.
The novel model was developed in such a manner that a considerable num-
ber of advantages over the state-of-the-art become possible. The scientific
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• In the proposed trust model, the Bayesian representation is the basis
for deriving trust, as it provides an evidence based update mechanism
and a well-founded way for justifying the derived expectation value.
The proposed approach extends existing Bayesian trust models to allow
for a more flexible, context-dependent derivation of trust. Especially,
it provides means to integrate a context-dependent notion of certainty
by introducing the parameter maximum number of expected evidence
in the expectation value. This has not been proposed in Bayesian trust
models before, at the best of the authors knowledge.
• The proposed approach covers the state-of-the-art Bayesian approach
using the parameters w = 1, f = 0.5, and N → ∞. As the context-
dependent parameters for base trust f , weight w, the number of max-
imum expected evidence units N are integrated in the parameters
reflecting prior knowledge, which are usually treated as static in state-
of-the-art trust models, e.g., in [BLB04,TPJL06,JI02], the proposed
approach should easily be applicable to extend those models.
• The HTI is a novel representation of trust for human users. It allows
for a simple explanation of its parameters and for an intuitive graphical
representation. This may be considered as a major advantage over state-
of-the-art models. Furthermore, the HTI also support the introduced
context-dependent parameters.
• The proposed mapping allows switching between the Bayesian represen-
tation and the HTI. This may provide means for a simpler interpretation
of the concepts - for developers of trust models as well as for users.
Furthermore, it allows developers of trust models to transfer their
knowledge of the Bayesian representation to a more intuitive repre-
sentation, which is more appropriate for the users of a trust model.
The mapping provided in this section has the following property that
the expectation value of an opinion in the Bayesian representation is
equivalent to the trust value of the opinion in the HTI when both
opinions are based on the same number of evidence units.
• The mapping to the “opinion space” of subjective logic above shows
that when using the parameters w = 1, f = 0.5, and N → ∞, the
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representations are interchangeable. Yet, the HTI has the advantage
that it is based on only two main parameters (average rating and
certainty) that can be assigned independent from each other in contrast
to the parameters of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty.
• The evaluation of the impact of aging has also shown that aging in the
proposed approach has the features introduced in Section 4.4. It allows
the consideration that an entities behavior may change by giving a
higher weight to more recent evidence and, in absence of evidence, it
allows the reduction the impact of older evidence on the expectation
value. Especially, both properties are realized without limiting the
range of the expectation value, which may introduce an unintended
estimation error.
5.3 Computational Model of Trust
The computational trust model provides means for aggregating the direct
evidence of the initiator and recommendations by third parties. In this
thesis, this is also referred to as trust propagation. The basic concepts for
trust propagation in the proposed approach have been inspired by work
presented in [Jøs01,JI02] (also see Section 3.2.4.2 and Section 3.2.5.1). For
easier comparison, the operators for the trust propagation are given the same
names. The consensus operator provides a means for aggregating several
opinions to a single one, and the discounting operator allows weighting
recommendations based on the opinion about the recommender.
For the explanation of the trust propagation, a simple network is given
as example (see Figure 5.14). In this example, entity A plays the role of the
initiator of an interaction. As introduced in Section 4.2, the initiator evaluates
the trustworthiness of a set of available candidates. In order to evaluate
the trustworthiness of an arbitrary candidate C (who is part of the before
mentioned set), entity A uses both its direct evidence and recommendations
by third parties. In the example, entity A receives recommendations from
the recommenders R1 and R2.
Figure 5.14: Trust network
As described in Section 4.2.5.1, it is important to distinguish between the
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different application contexts in which an entity gained trust. As introduced
there, within each context C that refers to an application, like file-sharing or
the provision of a certain service, there are two sub-contexts: the sub-context
referring to the interactions C(I) in context C, and the sub-context referring
to the recommendations C(R) in the context C.
An entity gains (or losses) trust in the context C(I) when it interacts with
other entities. Yet, the behavior of an entity when providing interactions does
not necessarily convey information about its behavior as a recommender, and
vice versa. It is important to note that both sub-contexts refer to different
capabilities of an entity. Therefore, trust is derived differently in both sub-
contexts. In the context of interactions, a candidate is trusted based on the
quality of the interactions, and in the context of providing recommendations,
an entity is trusted when providing accurate recommendations. The proposed
approach for considering recommendations weights the recommendations
based on the trustworthiness of the recommender in the context of providing
recommendations.
In order to keep the notation simple, it is assumed that there is a fixed,
but arbitrary context C, e.g., file-sharing. The opinion of an entity A about
an entity B in the context of interactions C(I) is denoted as oAb (lowercase
b), the opinion of an entity A about an entity B in the context of providing
recommendations C(R) is denoted as oAB (uppercase B). Note that the letter A
will usually be used for the initiator of an interaction, the letters B and R (or
Bi and Ri) for recommenders, and the letter C for the candidate. Furthermore,
the expectation value of an opinion is denoted as E(oAbi) or E(o
A
Bi
), respectively,
leaving out the super- and sub-scripts referring to the representation and
the context-dependent parameters that have been introduced in the previous
section.
5.3.1 Basic Operators
The aggregation of direct evidence and recommendations is realized as the
aggregation of
• the evidence reflecting the direct evidence and
• the evidence provided in the recommendations.
The (basic) operators that are used for the aggregation are called dis-
counting and consensus.
5.3.1.1 Discounting
The discounting operator weights the evidence provided by a recommender
according to the trustworthiness of the recommender in the context of
providing recommendations. The weight of the recommendation is given by
the discounting factor in Definition 5.3.1.
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Definition 5.3.1 (Discounting factor - basic)
Let oABi denote the opinion of entity A about the trustworthiness of entity Bi
as a recommender. The (basic) discounting factor d(E(oABi)) is defined as:
d(E(oABi)) = E(o
A
Bi) (5.25)
Thus, the discounting factor d(E(oABi)) is defined to be equivalent to the
expectation value E(oABi), which describes entity A’s trust in entity B in the
context of providing recommendations.
Definition 5.3.1 shows how the discounting factor is used in order to
weight recommendations.
Definition 5.3.2 (Discounting) 5.3.1
Let oABi denote the opinion of entity A about the trustworthiness of entity
Bi as a recommender, and let o
Bi
c denote Bi’s recommendation about entity
C as candidate. Assuming that for all i holds 0 ≤ rBic + sBic ≤ N (otherwise
an opinion will be normalized first using Equation 5.12), the discounting
operator is defined as:
discounting(oABi , o
Bi
c ) = o
A
Bi ⊗ oBic
= d(E(oABi)) · (rBic , sBic )rs
= (d(E(oABi)) · rBic , d(E(oABi)) · sBic )rs
(5.26)
Figure 5.15: Effect of the discounting operator
The discounting operator reduces the number of evidence units of a
recommendation according to the trustworthiness of the recommender. Fur-
thermore, it keeps the value of the average rating. The effect of discounting
is shown in Figure 5.15.
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5.3.1.2 Consensus
The consensus operator provides for the aggregation of different opinions.
The resulting opinion is the one of an entity that collected the evidence
contributing to the consensus itself.
Definition 5.3.3 (Consensus - basic)
The consensus of the opinions oB1c , ..., o
Bn
c is defined as:
consensus(oB1c , ..., o
Bn
c ) =
n∑
i=1
oBic
= oB1c ⊕ ... ⊕ oBnc
= (
n∑
i=1
rBic ,
n∑
i=1
sBic )
rs
(5.27)
If the number of evidence units of the resulting opinion is beyond N, it
will be normalized using Equation 5.12.
In general, if the input of the consensus operator consists of two (or
more) opinions, then the certainty associated with the resulting opinion will
be higher than (or equal to)the certainty of the contributing ones. This is
true, as the resulting opinion will be based on more evidence, in general4.
Furthermore, the average rating of the resulting opinion is not simply the
average of the average rating tBic provided by the recommenders Bi, as the
consensus also considers the number of evidence units of each recommendation.
The effect of the consensus operation is shown in Figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Effect of the consensus operator
4The certainty of the resulting opinion will not exceed the certainty of the contributing
ones, if there is none or only a single opinion with rBic + s
Bi
c > 0, or if there is an opinion
with rBic + s
Bi
c = N.
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5.3.2 Simple Trust Propagation
The aggregated opinion o˜Ac of an entity A about a candidate C aggregates
A’s opinion based on direct experience and the weighted recommendations
that A has received. The (basic) aggregation is defined as follows.
Definition 5.3.4 (Aggregation - basic)
Let oAc denote the direct evidence of entity A for candidate C and let A collect
recommendations from the recommenders B1, ..., Bn. The (basic) aggregated
opinion of A about candidate C denoted as o˜Ac is defined as:
o˜Ac = o
A
c ⊕
n∑
i=1
oABi ⊗ oBic (5.28)
The basic aggregation presented in Definition 5.3.4 is also called simple
trust propagation in this thesis. It has been introduced to provide the basic
ideas for a robust trust propagation, i.e.,
• to weight a recommendation according to the trustworthiness of its
recommender in the context of providing recommendations.
• to use recommendations for increasing the certainty of an opinion.
Furthermore, this variant of the trust propagation limits the influence of
a single recommender as all recommendations are normalized if necessary.
Thus, a recommender can not outweigh the discounting of its provided
recommendation by providing an arbitrary high number of evidence units.
Yet, this variant of trust propagation has some shortcomings:
1. The opinions of recommenders that are known to provide bad recom-
mendations are still considered.
2. All available recommendations are used. Thus, if an attacker can create
an arbitrary high number of entities, the attacker can use these entities
to provide misleading recommendations. As all available recommenda-
tions are considered (expect the ones provided from recommenders Bi
with d(E(oABi)) = 0), the attacker can dominate the aggregated opinion
even if the weight of a single recommendation is very low.
5.3.3 More Robust Trust Propagation - Limiting and Filter-
ing
The more robust variant of the trust propagation provides a few enhancements
to overcome the shortcomings pointed out above. To deal with the first issue,
it seems reasonable that the initiator A only considers recommendations
from recommenders that have provided mostly accurate recommendations in
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the past, i.e., the average rating of oAB is greater than or equal to 0.5. The
approach still considers recommendations of unknown recommenders.
To overcome the second issue, another feature of the trust model is used
to limit the considered recommendations. The recommendations are sorted in
descending order according to their trustworthiness in the context of providing
recommendations. In addition, recommendations are only considered as long
as the certainty of the aggregated opinion is less than or equal to 1. Thus,
this approach only uses the best recommendations, until the sum of direct
evidence and weighted indirect evidence is equal to the maximum number of
expected evidence units.
These arrangements together are supposed to improve the robustness of
the model against misleading recommendations (either false praise or false
accusation), since the approach uses only those recommenders that have
been known to be the best recommenders from their past recommendations.
Furthermore, if there are sufficient direct evidence and recommendations
by highly trusted recommenders, the model is also quite robust to Sybil
attacks (see Section 4.2.7), since it is no longer possible to overtake an opinion
based on sufficient direct evidence and good recommendations by simply
providing an arbitrary huge number of recommendations using specially
created recommenders.
Although this variant of trust propagation overcomes the shortcoming
introduced above, it still may be improved in the following aspects:
1. Unknown entities are always considered.
2. Sybil attacks will still be successful by little trusted recommenders Bi
(average rating greater than or equal to 0.5 (tABi ≥ 0.5) and expectation
value at least slightly greater than 0 (EABi ≥ 0)), when aiming on pushing
the trustworthiness of candidates that are unknown to the rest of the
community.
5.3.4 Sybil Attack-Resistant Trust Propagation
In order to overcome the shortcomings pointed out above, it is necessary to
slightly adapt the operators of consensus and discounting. The goal of the
adaption is described as follows:
1. Prevent that recommenders that are “little trusted”, but considered,
may provide sufficient evidence to boost the certainty of the influenced
opinion to 1.
2. Do not overly reduce the impact of recommendations by highly trusted
recommenders.
3. Do not exclude unknown entities per se.
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The proposed solution is based on the following ideas:
1. Introduce a threshold te that specifies a minimal expectation value
necessary for recommenders to be considered. Recommenders with an
expectation value lower than te are excluded. As the expectation value
of a recommender depends on the accuracy of its past recommenda-
tions as well as on the dispositional trust of the entity evaluating the
recommendations, this allows one to dynamically include or exclude rec-
ommendations of unknown recommenders. Additionally, recommenders
providing mostly bad recommendations are excluded as introduced
above.
2. Increase the influence of the recommendations with the trustworthiness
of the recommender as above. The calculation of the discounting factor
is adjusted in order to prevent an erratic increase of the impact of
recommendations by recommenders that have just crossed the threshold
te.
3. Limit the maximum influence of a single recommender. Therefore,
a new parameter maximum number of recommendable evidence NR
is introduced. The parameter NR defines the maximum number of
evidence units that is considered per recommendation. Whenever a
recommendation is based on a higher number of evidence units, it will
be normalized as proposed in Section 5.2.3.3 before it is considered. It
is proposed to choose NR ≤ N.
4. Limit the maximum influence of a recommendation based on the rank
of its recommender. The steps above only reduce the impact of a single
recommender. This step provides a means for taking control of the
aggregated impact of all recommenders. Therefore, a threshold ts is
introduced. The threshold ts defines the minimal trustworthiness that
is necessary for recommenders to be able to influence the certainty of
an aggregated opinion to reach 1 in absence of other recommenders or
direct evidence.
The discounting is done as in Equation 5.26, but the discounting factor
is redefined in Definition 5.3.5.
Definition 5.3.5 (Discounting factor - extended)
Let oABi denote the opinion of entity A about the trustworthiness of entity Bi as
recommender. Furthermore, let the threshold for the minimal trustworthiness
of a recommender necessary to be considered be given as te. The (extended)
discounting factor d(E(oABi)) is defined as:
d(E(oABi)) =
0 if E(o
A
Bi
) ≤ te ,
1
1−te · (E(oABi) − te) else .
(5.29)
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The influence of Equation 5.3.5 is explained in the following example.
Assuming the value of the threshold is te = 0.5, then the discounting factor
reduces the influence of all recommenders which have a trustworthiness of at
most 0.5 to 0. The relation between the expectation value and the discounting
factor using te = 0.5 is shown in Figure 5.17.
Figure 5.17: Discounting factor
The extension of the consensus operator is more complex. The operator
is extended to limit the impact of a recommendation based on the rank of
the trustworthiness of its recommender.
Definition 5.3.6 (Consensus - extended)
Let the trust for the recommenders B0, ..., Bn be given by the opinions oAB0,
..., oABn. Furthermore, let those recommenders provide the recommendations
oB0c , ..., o
Bn
c . Let 0 ≤ rBic + sBic ≤ NR for any i (recommendations based on a
higher amount of evidence are normalized first, adapting Equation 5.12 using
NR instead of N) and let the ordering of the recommendations be according
to E(oAB j) ≥ E(oABk ) for any j < k. Let ts denote the threshold for Sybil attacks,
then the (extended) consensus operator for these opinions is defined as:
consensusts(o
A
B0 , . . . , o
A
Bn ; o
B0
c , . . . , o
Bn
c ) = [o
A
B0 , o
B0
c ]⊕ˆ...⊕ˆ[oABn , oBnc ]
= (
n∑
i=0
min(d(E(oABi)) · rBic , (1 − ts) · d(E(oABi))
i · NR
rBic + s
Bi
c
· rBic ),
n∑
i=0
min(d(E(oABi)) · sBic , (1 − ts) · d(E(oABi))
i · NR
rBic + s
Bi
c
· sBic ))rs
(5.30)
The influence of the extended consensus operator (see Definition 5.3.6) can
be explained as follows. The first term in the min expression, i.e., d(E(oABi))·r
Bi
c
or d(E(oABi)) · s
Bi
c , respectively, expresses the positive or the negative evidence
that are calculated by the extended discounting operator. The latter term,
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i.e., (1− ts) ·d(E(oABi))
i · NR
rBic +s
Bi
c
· rBic or (1− ts) ·d(E(oABi))
i · NR
rBic +s
Bi
c
· sBic , respectively,
expresses the maximum number of positive or negative evidence that the
recommender is allowed to provide according to its discounting value and its
rank i.
Using the steps proposed for filtering and limiting in Section 5.3.3 and the
extended operators, the aggregation of direct evidence and recommendations
is calculated as defined in Definition 5.3.7.
Definition 5.3.7 (Aggregation - extended)
Let oAc = (r
A
c , s
A
c ) denote the opinion of entity A about the candidate C, whose
trustworthiness is being evaluated. Let R = {R0, ...,Rk} denote the set con-
taining all available recommenders. The recommenders that provided mostly
misleading recommendations to A are excluded; the remaining recommenders
are given as {B0, . . . , Bn} = {Bi | Bi ∈ R ∧ tABi ≥ 0.5}. Furthermore, the elements
in this set are sorted in way that holds E(oAB j) ≥ E(oABk ) for any j < k. Let
M = max{m ∈ {−1, . . . , n} | rˆAc + sˆAc ≤ NR}. The (extended) aggregated opinion
(˜rAc , s˜
A
c )
rs is defined as:
(rˆAc , sˆ
A
c )
rs = (rAc , s
A
c )
rs + consensusts(o
A
B0 , . . . , o
A
BM ; o
B0
c , . . . , o
BM
c ) (5.31)
(˜rAc , s˜
A
c )
rs =

(rˆAc , sˆ
A
c )
rs if rˆAc + sˆ
A
c = NR ∨ M = n ,
(rˆAc +
NR−(rˆAc +sˆAc )
rBM+1c +s
BM+1
c
· rBM+1c ,
sˆAc +
NR−(rˆAc +sˆAc )
rBM+1c +s
BM+1
c
· sBM+1c )rs else .
(5.32)
If the resulting opinion (˜rAc , s˜
A
c )
rs is based on more than N units of evidence,
it is normalized using Equation 5.12.
The influence of the aggregation proposed in Definition 5.3.7 is shown in
an example provided in the next section. The variable M is introduced to
limit the number of recommenders that is considered based on the maximum
number of evidence units recommenders are allowed to provide. In the
proposed approach, it has been decided that all recommenders together may
at maximum provide NR units of evidence. Furthermore, the aggregation
considers the case that the opinion resulting from the aggregation of the
direct evidence and the first M recommendations as input may be based on
less than NR evidence, i.e., rˆAc + sˆ
A
c ≤ NR. In this case, the recommendation
by recommender M + 1 (if M + 1 ≤ n) is normalized and used to fill the gap
(see Equation 5.32).
102 CHAPTER 5. TRUST MODEL: CERTAINTRUST
5.3.5 Evaluation of the Robustness to Sybil Attacks
Let the threshold for Sybil attacks be ts, and the threshold for the expectation
value be te. Assume there is a Sybil attack by an attacker who created a
group of recommenders B0, . . . , Bn that have established little trustworthiness
in the context of providing recommendations to entity A, i.e., d(E(oABi)) < ts.
These recommenders provide arbitrary recommendations oBic = (r
Bi
c , s
Bi
c )rs
about a candidate C.
If the expectation value of the all recommenders Bi is below the threshold
te, i.e., E(oABi) ≤ te, the recommenders are not considered at all. This is also
true if they have provided mostly misleading recommendations.
If entity A has direct evidence from past interactions with candidate C,
i.e., it holds rAc > 0 or s
A
c > 0 for o
A
c = (r
A
c , s
A
c )
rs, or there are recommendations
by higher trusted recommenders, the influence of the recommenders Bi is
reduced, as the direct evidence and the recommendations by more trusted
recommenders are considered first.
Thus, the group of recommenders Bi has the maximum impact on the
aggregated opinion o˜Ac if they are the only entities able to provide evidence
about the candidate C. This case is considered in the following.
Based on these assumptions and Equations 5.30, 5.31, and 5.32, the result
of the extended aggregation of the direct evidence and recommendations
by all recommenders is the result of the consensus of the recommendations
provide by the group of recommenders B0, . . . , Bn. For the evidence of the
aggregated opinion (˜rAc , s˜
A
c ) holds
5:
r˜Ac ≤
n∑
i=0
(1 − ts) · d(E(oABi))
i · r
Bi
c
rBic + s
Bi
c
· NR
<
n∑
i=0
(1 − ts) · tis ·
rBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
· NR
< (1 − ts) · NR ·
n∑
i=0
tis ·
rBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
(5.33)
Analogue for s˜Ac :
5Based on the assumptions introduced before, it holds (rAc , s
A
c )
rs = (0, 0)rs, i.e., no direct
evidence. Thus, the result of the aggregation (Equation 5.31) depends on the extended
consensus operator (Equation 5.30). Here, the minimum operator defines the maximum
outcome for r and s, respectively.
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s˜Ac ≤
n∑
i=0
(1 − ts) · d(E(oABi))
i · s
Bi
c
rBic + s
Bi
c
· NR
<
n∑
i=0
(1 − ts) · tis ·
sBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
· NR
< (1 − ts) · NR ·
n∑
i=0
tis ·
sBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
(5.34)
For the number of positive and negative evidence of the aggregated
opinion (˜rAc , s˜
A
c ) holds:
r˜Ac + s˜
A
c < (1 − ts) · NR · (
n∑
i=0
tis ·
rBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
+
n∑
i=0
tis ·
sBic
rBic + s
Bi
c
)
< (1 − ts) · NR ·
n∑
i=0
tis ·
rBic + sBi
rBic + sBi
< (1 − ts) · NR ·
n∑
i=0
tis
(5.35)
For an arbitrary high number of recommenders (n→ ∞) holds:
lim
n→∞ r˜
A
c + s˜
A
c < limn→∞(1 − ts) · NR ·
n∑
i=0
tis
< (1 − ts) · NR · 11 − ts
< NR
(5.36)
Thus, the resulting opinion is based on less than NR evidence units. As it
has been proposed to chose NR ≤ N, the certainty of this opinion is less than
1. Thus, the final trust value is still influenced by the entity’s base trust and
the group of attackers has only limited influence on the aggregated opinion
oAc (and on the derived trust value).
This means especially, that an attacker cannot arbitrarily increase its
influence on the aggregated opinion by simply increasing the number of
recommenders.
However, if the attacker first manages that its recommenders become
highly trusted by the initiator that will be attacked later, then the attack can
still be successful, as trusted entities are considered to be benevolent. Yet,
when the attacker takes the time or the costs to establish trust, the attack
needs no longer to be carried out as Sybil attack, as trustworthy entities
have a high influence.
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Example
In this example, entity A has to evaluate the trustworthiness of the interactor
C. Entity A has some direct evidence oAc = (3, 1)
rs. Furthermore, entity A
receives recommendations from B0, . . . , B100 (see Figure 5.18).
Figure 5.18: Trust network - Sybil attack
Entity A’s trust in the recommenders in the context of providing recom-
mendations oABi and the recommendations o
Bi
c by each recommender Bi is
given in Table 5.2.
i 0 1 2
oABi (12, 1)
rs (11, 2)rs (10, 3)rs
oBic (6, 1)rs (8, 1)rs (8, 0)rs
E(oABi ) 0.90 0.83 0.76
d(E(oABi )) 0.45 0.66 0.51
X (4.82, 0.80)rs (5.26, 0.66)rs (4.09, 0.00)rs
Y (8.57, 1.43)rs (5.84, 0.73)rs (2.61, 0.00)rs
min(X,Y) (4.82, 0.80)rs (5.26, 0.66)rs (2.61, 0.00)rs
i 3 4 5 ... 100
oABi (1, 0)
rs (1, 0)rs (1, 0)rs ... (1, 0)rs
oBic (0, 20)rs (0, 20)rs (0, 20)rs ... (0, 20)rs
E(oABi ) 0.67 0.67 0.67 ... 0.67
d(E(oABi )) 0.34 0.34 0.34 ... 0.34
X (0.00, 6.90)rs (0.00, 6.90)rs (0.00, 6.90)rs ... (0.00, 6.90)rs
Y (0.00, 0.41)rs (0.00, 0.14)rs (0.00, 0.05)rs ... (0.00, 5.8E − 46)rs
min(X,Y) (0.00, 0.41)rs (0.00, 0.14)rs (0.00, 0.05)rs ... (0.00, 5.8E − 46)rs
Table 5.2: Example: Sybil attack - it holds X := d(E(oABi )) · oBic and
Y := (1 − ts) · d(E(oABi ))
i · NR
rBic +s
Bi
c
· rBic )
In the table, the recommenders have already been sorted according to
their trustworthiness and recommenders that provided mostly misleading
recommendations have already been excluded. The table shows that three
recommenders (B0, B1, and B2) provided a higher number (13) of mostly
accurate recommendations to entity A. Furthermore, it shows an attack on
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the trustworthiness of candidate C. The attacker created 97 Sybils B3, ...,
B100. In the past, each Sybil provided a single accurate recommendation in
order to get considered in the evaluation of the trustworthiness of entity C.
In the attack, each Sybil tries to provide a bad recommendation about entity
C in order to reduce the calculated trust value. The example is based on the
following parameters: N = NR = 20, te = ts = 0.5, f = 0.5, w = 1.
Figure 5.19: Computation of trust: Aggregation of direct evidence and
recommendations
Figure 5.19 visualizes the impact of the extended aggregation mechanism.
In this Figure, the number of positive and negative evidence, which is
provided by each entity, is visualized by the height of the green and red bars,
respectively. In the lower left side of the Figure, one sees the direct evidence
of entity A. Furthermore, the lower part of the diagram shows the numbers
of positive and negative evidence that are provided by the recommenders B0,
B1, B2, B3, ... B100. The row above shows reduced numbers of evidence units
after applying the extended discounting operator on the opinion provided by
each recommender. The light shaded bars show the number of evidence units
that has originally been provided by the recommender, the opaque bars in
the foreground show the number of evidence units that is left after applying
the operator. Here, it is important to note, that the reduced numbers of
evidence units are equal for the recommenders B3, B4, ..., B100. Thus, the
influence of the recommenders B3, B4, ..., B100 would still be equivalent. As
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in the extended mechanism the rank of each recommender is considered, the
influence of the recommenders may be further reduced. This is shown in the
upper row. While the evidence provided by the recommenders B0, B1, and
B2, is not strongly reduced, as they have a high trust value and a high rank,
the influence of the attackers is strongly reduced. Finally, the top left corner
shows the aggregated opinion that is calculated by entity A.
From the table, one can see how the new ranking-based approach re-
duces the impact of recommenders with lower rank. Using the consen-
sus operator directly to aggregate the direct evidence and the discounted
opinions (see the row with the X) would lead to an aggregated opinion
(˜rAc , s˜
A
c )
rs = (17.16, 678.3)rs. This opinion is strongly influence by the lowly
trusted Sybil attackers. Using the extended aggregation mechanism (based
on the row with min(X,Y)) leads to (˜rAc , s˜
A
c )
rs = (15.68, 3.09)rs.
As the trust models proposed in [JI02, BLB04, TPJL06] use the basic
consensus operator that has been defined in Equation 5.27 for the aggregation
of discounted evidence, they are susceptible for this kind of attack based
on the design of their aggregation mechanism. In contrast, in the proposed
approach, the influence of a Sybil attacker is strongly reduced, especially,
the aggregated opinion is not simply dominated when increasing the number
of attackers.
5.3.6 Summary
This section provided a new computational model of trust. The main features
of this model are:
1. The discounting (weighting) of recommendations considers the trustwor-
thiness of recommenders in the context of providing recommendations.
Thus, the discounting is based on the right type of trust.
2. The influence of bad recommenders is reduced based on two mech-
anisms. First, recommendations by recommenders providing mostly
misleading recommendations are excluded. Second, recommendations
by recommenders with an expectation value for providing accurate
recommendations lower than or equal to te are not considered, as the
corresponding discount factor is 0.
3. Recommendations by unknown recommenders are considered if the
base trust value f C(R) of A in the context of recommendations C(R)
in context C is above te. This is important as in contexts in which
one expects the recommendations by unknown entities to be accurate
those recommendations can be included in the aggregated opinion.
Then, in absence of recommendations provided by trusted entities,
recommendations by unknown entities can be a valuable contribution.
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4. The aggregated opinion, which is derived from direct evidence and
collected recommendations, favors direct evidence and the recommen-
dations by the best recommenders. Thus, in the presence of sufficient
direct evidence or recommendations by highly trusted recommenders,
recommendations by less trusted recommenders (potential attackers)
do not have any influence.
5. The aggregation mechanism is robust against Sybil attacks in presence
of sufficient direct evidence or better recommenders. In this case Sybil
attacks have little or no influence as the Sybils might not be considered
at all. Furthermore, the impact of Sybil attacks on candidates that are
mostly unknown is improved. Especially, the aggregation mechanism is
robust to Sybil attacks in the sense that an attacker cannot arbitrarily
increase its influence on the aggregated opinion by simply increasing
the number of recommenders. The novelty of the extended mechanism
for the aggregation of evidence is that the trustworthiness and the
rank of a recommender are considered in order to limit its maximum
influence.
The evaluation of the trust model in Section 6.1 shows that the trust
model improves the estimate of the trustworthiness of entities and the average
quality of interactions in the simulation of a distributed environment.
5.4 Selection of an Interaction Partner and Up-
date of Trust
Having evaluated the trustworthiness of the candidates, the next step is to se-
lect an appropriate candidate and to decide whether the trust in the candidate
is sufficient in order to interact. After the interaction, the trustworthiness of
the candidate as well as the recommenders needs to be updated.
5.4.1 Selection of a Candidate
The selection of a candidate for an interaction of a set of candidates C1, ...,Cn
is done based on their trustworthiness in the context of interactions that is
calculated by the initiator.
If a decision making component does not have information about the
utility of the interaction, i.e., the possible benefit in case of success, or the
loss in case of a failure, one should select the most trustworthy candidate, i.e.,
the entity for which the maximum expectation value for positive outcome in
the next interaction is calculated. In case of equal expectation values, the
one with the higher certainty is selected.
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In the case of presence of information about the utility of the interaction
and possible information on the risk attitude, then the trust values can be
used in the utility-based decision making introduced in Section 2.3.
5.4.2 Update Mechanism
After each interaction, the entity that initiated the interaction updates
the opinions about its interaction partner (selected candidate) and the
recommenders (see Figure 4.2). If the base trust value is based on the
behavior of the encountered entities, the base trust is updated after an
interaction, too. The update is carried out using the feedback f b provided
after an interaction. The feedback may be binary in {−1; 1} or continuous
in [−1; 1]. In both cases, −1 is the worst possible feedback and 1 is the best
one.
5.4.2.1 Updating the Opinion about the Selected Candidate
Let the opinion (direct evidence) of entity A about the selected candidate
C before the interaction be given as oAc = (r
A
cold , s
A
cold )
rs. After the interaction
the feedback f b, which describes the quality of the interaction, is used to
update the evidence collected by A about C. The opinion of entity A about
interactor C after the interaction, including the feedback f b, is denoted as
(rAcnew , s
A
cnew)
rs.
The update of the opinion is computed as introduced in Section 5.2.2.1
and Section 5.2.3. In order to use the update mechanism proposed in
Equation 5.3, it is necessary to define a mapping between f b and v, and
to define the weight of the interaction. As proposed in [JI02], the weight g
could be chosen based on the value of the interaction. However, as stated in
Section 5.2.2.1, a weight of g = 1 is assumed in this thesis.
If the domain of the values of f b and v are both binary or both continuous,
the mapping between f b and v can simply be defined as v := f b. If f b allows
for continuous values and v is supposed to be binary, it is proposed to define
the following mapping (also see Fig. 5.20):
v :=
1 if f b ≥ 0 ,0 else . (5.37)
Without aging, the update of the opinion about the candidate is described
by the following Equation (based on Equation 5.3):
(rAcnew , s
A
cnew)
rs = (rAcold + (v + 1)/2), s
A
cold + (1 − v)/2)rs (5.38)
For example, assume that the opinion of entity A about the candidate
C before the interaction was (rAcold , s
A
cold )
rs = (16, 8)rs, and the feedback for
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Figure 5.20: Deriving binary evidence from continuous feedback
the interaction is negative f b = −1. Then, the updated opinion after the
interaction is (rAcnew , s
A
cnew)
rs = (16, 9)rs.
5.4.2.2 Updating the Opinions about the Recommenders
The update of the opinions about the recommenders is performed according
to the accuracy of their recommendations. As there are multiple ways to
define the accuracy of a recommendation, two approaches are proposed.
Considering only the last interaction
In order to evaluate the accuracy of a recommendation, the first approach
considers only the outcome of the last interaction with the selected candidate.
Therefore, the average rating tBc of the recommendation of a recommender B
about the candidate C is compared with the feedback with which A rated
the interaction. If both have the “same tendency”, then the recommendation
is supposed to be accurate and the opinion of A about B as recommender is
updated positively; otherwise, there is a negative update.
This can be described more formally as follows: If the opinion of A about
entity B as recommender was oAB = (r
A
Bold
, sABold )
rs before the interaction and
the recommendation by B about the candidate C was oBc = (t
B
c , c
B
c )
HTI with
(cBc > 0), and A
′s feedback for the interaction with C is f b, the value of v is
calculated as:
v :=

1 if (2 ∗ tBc − 1) ∗ f b > 0 ,
−1 if (2 ∗ tBc − 1) ∗ f b < 0 ,
0 else .
(5.39)
The update of oAB is done using v in Equation 5.3 (with g = 1). For
example, if the average rating tBc of the recommendation is in ]0, 1] and the
interaction was positive ( f b > 0), then the recommendation is considered
to be accurate (v = 1), and the positive evidence of the opinion about the
recommender is increased by 1; the negative evidence is kept unchanged.
110 CHAPTER 5. TRUST MODEL: CERTAINTRUST
If the behavior of C as interactor depends on the initiator of the inter-
action, and C shows different interaction behavior towards B and A, the
recommendations of B will be misleading, and A will negatively update the
recommender trust for B. This is due to the fact that A is not capable of dis-
tinguishing between whether B intentionally provided misleading information
or C’s interaction behavior is interactor dependent.
Considering the direct evidence
The update function above might still be considered to be rather simplistic, as
a recommendation is considered to be accurate when it has the same tendency
as the last interaction. It does neither consider whether the recommendation
has the same tendency as the complete history the initiator has collected
about the candidate nor the certainty of the recommendation. This can be
overcome when considering the difference between the average rating tAcnew
of entity A’s direct evidence after the interaction and the average rating tBc
provided by B. The value of v is then calculated as:
v = −2· | tAcnew − tBc | +1 (5.40)
The update is computed as introduced in Section 5.2.2.1 using v and
w = cBc in Equation 5.3. Thus, the update also reflects the certainty of the
provided opinion.
Figure 5.21 shows the relation between the parameter v and the recom-
mendation provided for both approaches proposed above.
Figure 5.21: Determining the accuracy of a recommendation: Considering
only the last interaction (left); considering the direct evidence (right)
The difference between both update mechanisms can be shown when
continuing the example that has been introduced in Section 5.4.2.1. Before the
interaction the opinion of entity A about the candidate C was (rAcold , s
A
cold )
rs =
(16, 8)rs, and the feedback for the interaction is negative ( f b = −1). The
updated opinion after the interaction is (rAcnew , s
A
cnew)
rs = (16, 9)rs. Assume the
recommender B provided the recommendation (rBc , s
B
c )
rs = (16, 9)rs and the
trust of A in B in the context of providing recommendations is (rAB, s
A
B)
rs =
(6, 1)rs. If the opinion of the recommender is updated only based on the
outcome of the last interaction, then the update will be negative, i.e., the
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new opinion of A about B is given as (6, 2)rs. This seems counter-intuitive as
the recommendation provided by B about the behavior of C is equal to the
direct evidence of A. This is overcome by the second approach. Here, as the
direct evidence of A is equal to the recommendation provided by B, it holds
v = 1. This leads to a positive update of A’s trust in B as recommender.
5.4.3 Community-based Update of Dispositional Trust
As introduced in Section 5.2, the dispositional trust of an entity is supposed to
be a context-dependent parameter. The parameter can either be initialized
according to an entity’s preferences or it might be dynamically assessed
according to the behavior of the entities encountered in the considered
context.
In the following, a mechanism for assessing the base trust f that spec-
ifies the trust value of unknown entities is proposed. The weight w of the
dispositional trust, e.g., w = 1, is assumed to be static.
The basic idea of the proposed update mechanism is that as an entity’s
experience within an application context grows, it is reasonable that it
dynamically updates its initial expectation about the typical behavior of
entities within the context. As the entities that interact with each other
within a specific context may be referred to as a community, the approach is
referred to as community-based dispositional trust. The update mechanism is
applied to the base trust f C(I) of an entity within the context of interactions
and to the base trust f C(R) within the context of recommendations in a similar
manner.
The following shows how the community factor c f is derived in the
context of recommendations and interactions. The value of the community
factor can be used to replace the static value of the base trust f in the
considered context.
5.4.3.1 Updating the Dispositional Trust for Recommenders
The update mechanism for the community factor in the context of recom-
mendations is provided in pseudo code.
r = 0;
s = 0;
f o r ( Entity B: KnownRecommenders ){
v = tAB ;
r = r + v ;
s = s + (1 − v) ;
}
oc f = (r, s)r,s ;
c f C(R) = EBeta0.5,w,N(oc f ) ;
f C(R) = c f C(R)
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The term “KnownRecommenders” refers to all recommenders that are
known to entity A, i.e., the group of recommenders that provided recommen-
dations. The specification of the algorithm shows that the experience with
each recommender has limited influence on the community factor c f C(R), i.e.,
as it holds r + s = 1 per recommender. The parameter N is used to express
how many recommenders must contribute to the value of c f C(R) that the
value is supposed to be representative and no longer influenced by the prior.
5.4.3.2 Updating the Dispositional Trust for Interactors
The update mechanism for the interactors is similar. It is also given in pseudo
code.
r = 0;
s = 0;
f o r ( Entity c : known I n t e r a c t o r s ){
v = tAc · (1 − cAc · d) ;
r = r + v ;
s = s + (1 − v) ;
}
oc f = (r, s)r,s ;
c f C(I) = EBeta0.5,w,N(oc f ) ;
f C(I) = c f C(I)
The factor d is introduced to counterbalance the selection strategy. For
example, assume an entity chooses N = 20 and knows 20 entities that only
provided interactions with positive outcomes. As the entity would prefer to
only interact with those 20 entities, the community factor c f C(I) of this entity
would reach 1. This might not be representative for the typical behavior of
the entities in the community, as the selection of the interaction partner is
not random but strongly depends on the selection strategy. The factor d
reduces the positive influence of opinions with increasing certainty. Using
the proposed strategy to counterbalance the selection strategy (see forth line
in the pseudo code above), the value v depends on the values of t and c as
shown in Table 5.3. The table shows the relation only for the extreme values
of t and c.
HHHHHHt
c
0 1
0 0 0
1 1 v(d)
Table 5.3: Influence of the factor d on v for selected values of t and c using
v(d) = t · (1 − c · d)
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The value v(d) indicates that the value of v not only depends on the values
of t and c, but also on the choice of d ∈ [0; 1] as shown in Table 5.4. The
lower the value of d the higher is the positive influence of an interactor that
has a high average rating t and a high certainty c; using d = 0 is equivalent
to not counterbalancing the selection strategy.
d v(d)
1 0
1
2
1
2
1
4
3
4
0 1
Table 5.4: Influence of the factor d on v in case of t = c = 1 using
v(d) = t · (1 − c · d)
5.4.4 Summary
This section presented update mechanisms for the trust in the interactor,
the recommenders, and for the dispositional trust.
• The update of the trust in the interactor is carried out using the
feedback provided after an interaction for deriving binary evidence.
• The update of the trust in the recommenders is done based on the
accuracy of their recommendations. Here, two approaches have been
proposed. The first one evaluates the accuracy of the recommendation
only by considering the outcome of the past interaction. The second
one considers a recommendation to be accurate based on its similarity
to the initiator’s direct evidence. The evaluation in Section 6.1.5.2,
shows the comparison of both approaches. The approaches for deriving
evidence from the accuracy of a recommendation are similar to the
ones proposed in [BLB04,TPJL06].
• The approach for a community-based calculation of dispositional trust
is similar to the approach presented in [Jøs07,JLC08]. However, the
approaches differ as in the approach proposed in this thesis, the com-
munity factor is calculated based on the average rating, whereas
in [Jøs07, JLC08], the community base rate is calculated based on
the expectation values of the encountered entities. The reason for
calculating the community factor based on the average ratings of the
encountered entities is that the average ratings are not influenced when
the community factor is updated. This is considered to be a significant
advantage, as when calculating the community factor based on the
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expectation values (i.e., the trust values in the HTI), a change of the
community factor would result in a change of the expectation values.
Thus, the community factor and the expectation value would amplify
each other.
• The update mechanism of the dispositional trust for interactors has
additionally been extended in order to counterbalance the selection
strategy. As the initiator decides to select the best interaction partners,
the simple average of the average ratings of the known interactors
might not be representative for the behavior of unknown entities. The
evaluation of the impact of the property is shown in Section 6.1.5.2.
5.5 Conclusions
This section provided a new trust model that addresses the most important
as aspects regarding the representation, computation, establishment and
update of trust.
• The representational model provides means for deriving trust based
on evidence from past interactions and context-dependent parameters.
Especially, the Bayesian representation, which is the basis for a number
of trust models as described in Section 3.2.4.2, has been extended in
order to overcome limitations that are usually introduced with aging
(see Section 5.2.3.1). Furthermore, a new representational model, the
Human Trust Interface (HTI), provides for a simple set of parameters
and a graphical representation of trust. Along with the provided
mapping, the provided representations are major contributions as
they provide means for overcoming limitations of state-of-the-art trust
models, and they allow users and developers to think about trust in
the representation they prefer.
• The computational model provides means for robustly aggregating direct
evidence and recommendations. A major concept here is to derive
the trustworthiness of recommenders based on the accuracy of their
past recommendations. The proposed approach is especially robust
to Sybil attacks as it prefers direct evidence and recommendations by
more trusted recommenders over the recommendations by lower trusted
recommenders and limits the influence of a single recommender. Finally,
it provides a new approach for limiting the influence of recommenders
based on their ranking.
• The update mechanisms provided for deriving evidence about the trust
in the selected candidate, as well as in the recommenders, are based on
the feedback after an interaction. The mechanism for calculating the
base trust value based on the encountered entities provides a means to
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consider the number of encountered entities as well as counterbalancing
the effects of the selection strategy.
As the trust model allows for the interpretation of trust as probability,
it can easily be integrated in decision making. Therefore, beyond simply
choosing the best candidate available, the integration in utility based decision
making is possible. Thus, the proposed model complies with the design goals
that have been introduced at the end of the concept chapter in Section 4.4.
The major limitations of the proposed approach can be described as
follows. As interactions within an application context are assumed to be
homogenous, the presented model does not focus on interactions with different
values. In [JI02], it has been proposed to model interactions with different
values using different weights (see also Section 5.2.2.1), however, this needs
especially to be considered when choosing the parameters of aging and the
maximum number of expected evidence units in order to prevent unintended
effects. Furthermore, the proposed approach only considers a single feedback
value per interaction that describes the overall outcome. It does not propose
means for the integration of fine-grained ratings that refer to different aspects
of the interaction, e.g., in the context of information exchange, one might
think about rating aspects separately, like correctness of the information
and the time needed for providing the information. Finally, although the
model has been shown to cope with different kinds of attacks, the approach
is susceptible when trusted entities suddenly turn malicious. This is not a
shortcoming that is special to the proposed approach, but it is typical for
evidence based trust models. However, the introduction of aging prevents
long-term exploitation of previously established trust.
The evaluation of the trust model’s performance in a distributed environ-
ment and of the intuitivity of the HTI is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter shows the evaluation of the trust model that has been moti-
vated and introduced in the previous chapters. Note that the evaluation of
improvements regarding aging has already been presented in Section 5.2.7,
and the argumentation for the improved robustness to Sybil attacks has been
presented in Section 5.3.4. This chapter is organized as follows:
1. Section 6.1 shows the impact of the proposed trust model in a simulation
of an opportunistic network using real world user traces as a basis of
the mobility model.
2. Section 6.2 presents the results of a user study evaluating the usability
of the graphical representation in comparison with an Amazon-like stars
interface (see Section 3.2.1.2) and the Opinon Triangle (see Section
3.2.5.1).
3. Section 6.3 presents the results of a user study evaluating the application
of the trust model in an online movie recommendation platform.
6.1 Evaluation of CertainTrust in an Opportunis-
tic Network
The evaluation of the impact of the proposed trust model CertainTrust is
based on a scenario in which humans with mobile devices share music in an
opportunistic network as introduced at the beginning of Chapter 2 and in
Section 4.1. In this scenario, users with their mobile devices are referred to
as entities. As these entities move, they will meet other entities, and interact
with each other, e.g., they exchange music (mp3 files) or recommendations, in
a spontaneous manner. Due to different goals or motivations, the users will
show different behaviors when providing files to others. The goal of a typical
user is to interact only with trustworthy interactors, i.e., interactors from
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which they expect to receive a good file (correct file, no viruses, complete
song, and expected quality).
It is assumed that a user appreciates the support of a trust model, which
supports them with information about the trustworthiness of the available
candidates for an interaction, or is even capable of making decisions and
interacting on its own. This will be especially true, if it allows the quality of
a user’s interactions, i.e., the number of received good files, to increase.
After an interaction, the quality of the interaction is reported through
feedback. The determination of the feedback values does not necessarily
require user interaction. In some cases this could be done automatically, e.g.,
by scanning the mp3 file for viruses, checking the size, the bit rate, and noise.
6.1.1 Basic Types of Behavior, Population Mixes & Settings
According to the system model that has been introduced in Section 4.2 entities
may be recommenders or interactors. In both roles, an entity can be good (+)
or bad (-). A good interactor provides good interactions, leading to positive
feedback ( f b = 1), a bad interactor provides interactions leading to negative
feedback ( f b = −1). A good recommender provides recommendations that
reflect its real experience. The model for bad (lying) recommenders is derived
from [TPJL06]. Bad recommenders try to provide recommendations with a
maximum misleading expectation value, i.e., if EBetasimple(o
B
c ) is the expectation
value calculated by recommender B for interactor C based on its direct
evidence, the recommendation of B would be an opinion with the expectation
value 1 − EBetasimple(oBc ). This can be achieved by switching the positive and
negative evidence. Thus, four basic types of behaviors are identified, see
Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Basic entity behaviors
Combining these basic types of behaviors leads to 15 canonical population
mixes: h, m, s, w, hm, hs, hw, ms, mw, sw, hms, hsw, hmw, msw, and hmsw.
The percentage of entities with a specific behavior within a population is
set to be equal. For example, the population mix h contains only entities
with honest behavior; the population hm contains 50% entities with honest
behavior and 50% malicious, and so on.
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The assumption that the interaction behavior of an entity is stable, in
the sense that it is either only positive or only negative may be too simplistic.
Therefore, an additional parameter called stability y is introduced. This
parameter allows the adherence of an entity to its assigned behavior to be
described. In the case of stability y = 1 an entity totally adheres to its
assigned interaction behavior. In the case the stability of entity is set to 0.9
it adheres only in 90% of its interactions to the behavior it has been assigned,
in the other 10% it will do the opposite. Given the stability of an entity and
its assigned behavior, one can derive the probability with which an entity
provides interactions with positive outcomes. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the stability only influences the interaction behavior, the behavior in
the context of providing recommendations is assumed to be stable.
Finally, the evaluation is based on two different settings per population
mix. In the first setting, called the deterministic setting, the stability factor is
y = 1 for all entities. Thus, for each entity A in a population holds y = yA = 1.
In the second one, called the probabilistic setting, a randomly chosen stability
parameter yA is assigned to each entity A in the population. For each entity
A the parameter yA is randomly and uniformly distributed chosen from the
interval yA ∈ [0.5; 1].
For example, assuming the deterministic setting and the population hm
leads to a population in which 50% of all entities provide only good inter-
actions and 50% provide only bad interactions. Using the same population
but the probabilistic setting, the probabilities for good interactions over all
entities are uniformly distributed in [0; 1].
6.1.2 Simulation
As the goal of this thesis is to develop a trust model for ubiquitous computing,
the scenario of the evaluation comes from this field - to be more specific
from the field of opportunistic networks. In this scenario the possibility of
interactions depends on the spatial proximity of people. Therefore, it is
important to have realistic user traces, i.e., a realistic mobility model, as this
is a basic influence factor on the results of the simulation.
6.1.2.1 User Traces
The presented simulation is based on user traces which have been collected
in the Reality Mining project [EP06]. The data provides information about
97 users of mobile phones and their location. The latter is given as the ID of
the cell tower the mobile phones were connected to.
The data used for the simulation is only a subset of the complete data set.
It has been collected in a week in which a big number of users were connected
to a small number of cell towers. Thus, it is expected to have a big number
of possible interactions. Based on [Hei07], it is assumed that a group of users
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is in proximity to each other if the users are connected to the same cell tower
within a 15 minute time interval. For the evaluation, a so-called meeting
happens when six or more users are connected to the same cell tower in the
same time interval. This allows the trust model’s capabilities in selecting the
most trustworthy candidate from a set of candidates to be evaluated. The
set of candidates is determined randomly as half of the available entities, i.e.,
an initiator has at least 3 candidates for an interaction. In the restricted
data set, there are 68 distinct users (entities), which met each other in 556
meetings. In average an entity took part in 59.94 meetings, and met 46.76
distinct entities. The average number of entities per meeting is 7.33. In one
run of the simulation, the meetings of this week are consecutively repeated 3
times in a row, in order to evaluate the performance of the trust model over
a longer period.
The simulation is done for all 15 populations introduced in Section 6.1.1,
each in the deterministic (stability y = 1) and the probabilistic setting
(stability y ∈ [0.5; 1]). Each simulation was repeated 20 times per trust model
and population mix using the same seeds for the comparison of the different
models and baselines.
6.1.2.2 Meeting Procedure
A time interval in which a group of people meet is called a meeting. During a
meeting entities may interact with each other and provide recommendations to
others. Each meeting proceeds as follows: In each meeting each participating
entity has to interact with one candidate, i.e., each entity is the initiator
of one interaction. The candidates for an interaction are randomly chosen
from half of the entities which are part of the meeting, i.e., half of the
entities in the meeting can provide a specific mp3-file. If the trust model
includes recommendations, the initiator asks all entities that are part of the
meeting for providing recommendations about the candidates. Then, the
initiator evaluates the trustworthiness of the candidates, and selects the most
trustworthy one, i.e., the one with the greatest trust value. This setting was
chosen in contrast to a setting in which each entity has the choice whether to
interact or not, since the evaluation is to show the impact of the trust model
without the additional influence of a decision making component. After each
interaction, the initiator updates the opinions about its interaction partner
(selected candidate) and, in the case this is part of the model, opinions about
the recommenders.
6.1.3 Baselines and Models
The first baseline is the Random strategy. This strategy selects the partner
for the interaction randomly. Furthermore, it assigns a trustworthiness to
each entity that is randomly (and uniformly distributed) chosen from the
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interval [0; 1].
The Perfect strategy always selects the best candidate based on the behav-
ior (and stability) an entity has been assigned by the simulation environment.
In a way, this is similar to a “best possible” selection process that one could
apply for the selection of an interaction partner in a hypothetic world, in
which all entities have labels on their foreheads stating their behavior (and
the probability for providing a good interaction).
Furthermore, the evaluation compares the results of several variants
of CertainTrust in order to show the impact of different parameters and
features, and it compares the results of CertainTrust with variants of the Beta
Reputation System (see 3.2.4.2 and [JI02]). The trust models are denoted
and configured as follows:
1. There are different variants for configuring the proposed trust model
CertainTrust (CT). In the following the notation CT C is used to refer
to the trust model that uses the following parameters:
• Representational model:
– Dispositional trust:
∗ Base trust value f = 0.5
∗ Weight of dispositional trust w = 1
– Aging factor a = 1 (no aging - as the entities do not change
their behavior over time)
– maximum number of expected evidence units N = 20
• Computational model with improvements regarding the robustness
to Sybil attacks (as proposed in Section 5.3.4) using te = ts = 0.5
and NR = N
• Update mechanism: Simple update mechanism (considering only
the last interaction) for trust in recommenders as proposed in
Section 5.4.2.2
• Community-based update of the dispositional trust without a bias
(i.e., d = 0).
Whenever the evaluation compares variants of CT, the differences from
the configuration of CT C are explained and a notation is introduced.
2. Beta S : The Beta Reputation System was proposed in [JI02] (see also
Section 3.2.4.2 and Section 3.2.5). Since the goal of this thesis is to
provide a trust model for ubiquitous computing, a distributed variant
of this reputation system is used in which each entity is its own rep-
utation centre. The reputation centre stores only direct experience.
Yet, entities can exchange recommendations with all entities that are
part of the current meeting. The expectation value for an interaction
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partner is calculated using the consensus operator as proposed in [JI02]
for combining the direct experience with the available recommenda-
tions. This variant of the Beta Reputation System does not discount
recommendations.
3. Beta D : This variant of the Beta Reputation System differs from the
Beta S in the point that it discounts recommendations. The discounting
is done as proposed in [JI02]. In this approach the discounting uses
the trustworthiness of an entity in the context of interactions for the
discounting (weighting) of the provided recommendations.
4. Ext Beta: Ext Beta provides an extension by the author of this thesis
to the Beta Reputation System that has not been published before
(to the best of the author’s knowledge). The extension provides for
an evaluation of the trustworthiness of an entity in the context of
recommendations as proposed in Section 5.4.2.2, i.e., based on the
accuracy of its past recommendations. Then, the discounting operator
that has been proposed in [JI02] is used to weight the recommendation
of an entity according to its trustworthiness in the context of providing
recommendations. This variant is introduced to compare the effects
of weighting recommendations according to the trustworthiness of
the recommender’s behavior as interactor as proposed in [JI02] and
weighting recommendations according to the trustworthiness of the
recommender’s behavior as recommender (based on the accuracy of its
past recommendations) as proposed in this thesis.
6.1.4 Evaluation Metrics
For the evaluation, the following notation is introduced. The set of entities in
a population is denoted by P. The number of entities in the population P is
| P |. For an entity B ∈ P the characteristic probability for providing a good
interaction is denoted as pB. This probability can be derived from the behav-
ior of an entity and the stability factor that has been assigned to each entity
at the beginning of the simulation (as described in Section 6.1.1). There are
four types of different behaviors Behavior ∈ {honest,malicious, sel f ish,worst}.
For an entity A to whom behavior Behavior was assigned holds A ∈ Behavior,
e.g., for an entity A to whom the behavior “honest” was assigned holds
A ∈ honest. The evaluation is done using the following metrics (based
on [TPJL06,SVB06]):
1. In order to evaluate the performance of a trust model when estimating
the trustworthiness of an entity in the context of interactions, the first
metric measures the average error in estimating the trustworthiness.
For entity A the mean absolute error err(A) that entity A makes when
estimating pB using E(oAb ) for all entities B in the population P is
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defined as:
err(A) =
∑
B∈P | E(oAb ) − pB |
| P | (6.1)
For the calculation of E(oAb ) entity A may ask all entities in P for
recommendations. The average error in estimating the trustworthiness
avgerr is defined as:
avgerr =
∑
A∈P err(A)
| P | (6.2)
The average error should be close to 0.
2. The second metric allows one to measure the average reputation of
entities. The reputation R(A) of an entity A is defined as the average
of the expectation value calculated by each entity B in the population
P for entity A:
R(A) =
∑
B∈P E(oBa )
| P | (6.3)
Again, an entity may ask all entities in P for recommendations. As
the average reputation over all entities in the population depends on
the population mix, it is only calculated for the entities that have
been assigned the same type of behavior (Behavior), e.g., honest or
malicious.
The average reputation of entities of the same type of behavior is
defined as:
avgR(Behavior) =
∑
A∈Behavior R(A)
| A ∈ Behavior | (6.4)
3. The third metric provides information about the (perceived) quality
of interactions by an entity. Note that in the simulation the feedback,
which may be seen as the perceived quality of an interaction, is equal to
the outcome of the interaction. As it is assumed that positive outcome
always leads to positive feedback (+1) and negative outcome to negative
feedback (−1), the sum of the collected feedback indicates the average
quality of the interactions an entity has achieved in the simulation.
The accumulated sum of feedback (acc sum) is calculated for each entity
as sum of the feedback over its past interactions. For an entity A that
uses trust model model X and has had n interactions with the feedback
( f b(1), . . . , f b(n)) the accumulated sum of feedback acc sum(A,model X)
is calculated as:
acc sum(A,model X) =
n∑
i=1
f b(i) (6.5)
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This value strongly depends on the population mix. In a population
with stability y = 1 and only honest entities, there are only positive
interactions; in a population with only malicious entities, there are only
negative ones. Therefore, the average percentage of the accumulated sum
of feedback is introduced. It is defined as the portion of the accumulated
sum of feedback that has been achieved using the considered trust model
relative to the accumulated sum achieved using the Perfect selection
strategy:
avgacc sum(model X) =
∑
A∈P acc sum(A,model X)∑
A∈P acc sum(A, Per f ect strategy)
(6.6)
The closer the average percentage of the accumulated sum of feedback
is to 1.0 (assuming that 1.0 is its maximum value), the more positive
interactions an entity has had, and the quality of interactions that has
been achieved using the trust model model X is the closer to the result
that has been achieved by the Perfect selection strategy.
6.1.5 Results
The evaluation shows the impact of the parameters on the proposed model,
as well as the comparison to distributed variants of the Beta Reputation
System and two baselines, i.e., the Random strategy and the Perfect strategy.
Besides the first example that shows the evaluation of the reputation over
time in a selected population mix, the evaluation presents the results that
have been calculated at the end of the simulation for each population mix.
The evaluation of the trust models across different population mixes allows
one to evaluate whether the trust model is appropriate for a wide range of
populations with entities showing different behaviors or whether it may only
be applied to a few population mixes.
6.1.5.1 Average Reputation Evaluation over Time
The Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 show the evaluation of the reputation in the
population hmsw for different trust models and settings. In the deterministic
setting (stability y = 1) the true1 average reputation of honest and selfish
entities would be 1, for malicious and worst entities it would be 0. In the
probabilistic setting (stability y ∈ [0.5; 1]) the true average reputation of
honest and selfish entities would be 0.75 and for malicious and worst entities
it would be 0.25.
As one sees from Figure 6.2 the proposed trust model CT C is capable of
detecting the different behaviors of the entities in the context of interactions,
1The true average reputation refers to the average reputation that would have been
calculated based on the probabilities for providing interactions with positive outcomes that
have been assigned to each entity by the simulation environment.
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i.e., good interactors and bad interactors. This is also true for the variant
of the proposed model CT None (see Figure 6.3). In contrast to CT C the
variant CT None does not use the community-based update of the base trust
value f . It uses a static base trust value f = 0.5. Note that in both figures
the graphs of honest and selfish entities and of malicious and worst entities
are very similar, as they have the same behavior in the context of interactions.
Therefore, they are hardly distinguishable in the figures.
Figure 6.2: Reputation evaluation over time in population hmsw using CT C
Figure 6.3: Reputation evaluation over time in population hmsw using
CT None
Figure 6.4: Reputation evaluation over time in population hmsw using Beta S
In contrast, the reputation values calculated by Beta S and Beta D do
not allow for a clear distinction between entities with different behavior.
This can be explained as the population contains 50% entities providing
misleading recommendations and Beta S (see Figure 6.4) gives the same
weight to all recommendations.
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Figure 6.5: Reputation evaluation over time in population hmsw using
Beta D
The variant Beta D (see Figure 6.5) suffers from the fact that its dis-
counting mechanism is based on the assumption that an entity’s behavior in
the context of interactions is the same as in the context of recommendations.
The assumption does not hold in this population.
6.1.5.2 Evaluation of Variants of CertainTrust
In this section, the performance in estimating the trustworthiness of different
variants of CertainTrust is evaluated across the different population mixes
and settings.
Computational Model
Figure 6.6: Variants: Computational model - Populations are sorted
according to the percentage of good recommenders (the lines are only for ease
of reading)
Figure 6.6 shows the evaluation of the average error in estimating the
trustworthiness of an entity for the standard variant CT C and a variant
CT C S using the (“more robust”) variant of the computational model that
has been introduced in Section 5.3.3. CT C has advantages when the
percentage of accurate recommenders is 50% or less. This may be expected
as the computational model of CT C uses additional mechanisms for dealing
with misleading recommendations. In the probabilistic setting there are
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improvements in the range of 10% to 20% in the populations s, sw, and w. It
is especially worth to note that there is no decline that is similarly significant
in other populations.
Update Mechanism
Figure 6.7: Variants: Update function - Populations are sorted according to
the percentage of good recommenders (the lines are only for ease of reading)
Figure 6.7 shows the evaluation of the average error in estimating the
trustworthiness of an entity for the standard variant CT C and a variant
CT C E using the alternative approach (“considering the direct evidence”)
for the update of the trust in recommenders as proposed in Section 5.4.2.2.
The evaluation shows that the exchange of the update mechanism does
not lead to major differences. This may be due to the fact that entities try
to interact with the best entities, i.e., entities that provide interactions with
positive outcomes with a probability close to 1.
Maximum Number of Expected Evidence Units
Figure 6.8: Variants: Maximum number of expected evidence units -
Populations are sorted according to the percentage of good recommenders (the
lines are only for ease of reading)
Figure 6.8 shows the evaluation of the average error in estimating the
trustworthiness of an entity using different parameters for the maximum
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number of expected evidence units N. The standard variant CT C is equiva-
lent to CT C 20. The variant CT C 1 uses N = 1, CT C 5 uses N = 5, and
so on. The variant CT C MAX models N → ∞ by setting N = 2147483647
(which is equivalent to Integer.MAX VALUE in Java). As the simulation
does not consider aging, the choice of N → ∞ would be justified by the
representational model. However, as in the current implementation N is
assumed to be equivalent to NR, the usage of N = NR = 20 has been chosen
for the evaluation.
The evaluation shows that in the deterministic setting (stability =1)
smaller values of N have advantages over higher values. In the probabilistic
setting, it is the other way around as expected. Yet, it is interesting to note
that besides the two smallest values N = 1 and N = 5, the results of the
different variants are quite similar.
The comparison overall populations in both settings shows that the
average difference in the error in estimating the trustworthiness between
CT C 20 and CT C MAX is less than 1% - (average error CT C 20=10.37%
and CT C MAX=11.06%), which may be due to the limitation of N = NR of
the current implementation.
Community-based Update of Dispositional Trust Compared to
Static Value of f
Figure 6.9 shows the evaluation of the average error in estimating the trust-
worthiness of an entity for the standard variant CT C and a variant CT None
that does not update the dispositional trust based on the experienced be-
havior. Instead CT None uses a static value for the base trust value f = 0.5.
CT None S refers to the variant using a static value f = 0.5 and the compu-
tational model that was proposed in Section 5.3.3.
Figure 6.9: Variants: Community-based update of base trust f compared to
static value of f = 0.5 - Populations are sorted according to the percentage of
good recommenders (the lines are only for ease of reading)
The evaluation shows that the variant CT C has advantages in popula-
tions that provide mostly misleading recommendations (populations s, sw,
6.1 EVALUATION OF CERTAINTRUST IN AN OPPORTUNISTIC
NETWORK 129
and w). Furthermore, it has advantages the populations hs and h in which
interaction partners usually provide good interactions.
It is worth noting that the static value of f = 0.5 is the optimal choice
for the community factor in the populations hm, hmsw, hw, ms, and sw (see
“Expected Com Factor” in Figure 6.11).
Community-based Update of Dispositional Trust Using Different
Values d to Counterbalance the Selection Strategy
Figure 6.10 shows the evaluation of the average error in estimating the
trustworthiness of an entity for variants using different values for the factor
d that is introduced to counterbalance the selection strategy (see Section
5.4.3.2). The variants are referred to as CT C d, where CT C 0 is equal to
CT C.
Figure 6.10: Variants: Community-based update of base trust - Populations
are sorted according to the percentage of good recommenders (the lines are
only for ease of reading)
The evaluation shows that the most noticeable differences occur in the
populations s, hs, and h. In these populations, there are mostly entities
providing interactions with positive outcomes. As the mechanism that has
been proposed in order to counterbalance the selection strategy has its major
impact when an entity interacts repeatedly with a good interactor, this was
expected.
When comparing the other populations one sees that the different variants
CT C (CT C 0), CT C 1/4, and CT C 1/2 provide similar results. Only
the variant CT C 1 provides significantly worse results in the probabilistic
setting.
For a deeper analysis the average community factor that is calculated
by all entities is analyzed. The average community factor is equal to the
average base trust value (see Section 5.4.3). It is calculated as the average of
the community factor over all entities in the population.
Figure 6.11 shows the average community factor in the context of inter-
actions and Figure 6.12 shows the average community factor in the context
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of recommendations. The value “Expected Com factor” is the community
factor that is expected based on the knowledge of the population.
Figure 6.11 clearly shows the impact of the different variants on the
average community factor in the context of interactions. The variant CT C 1
obviously produces too negative values. Although the average community
factor that is calculated using CT C (CT C 0) is too positive in many
populations in the deterministic setting, it achieves good results in the
probabilistic setting. All in all, the community factor calculated by CT C 0
approximates the value “Expected Com factor” best.
Figure 6.11: Community factor in the context of interactions - Populations
are sorted according to the percentage of good interactors (the lines are only
for ease of reading)
Figure 6.12: Community factor in the context of recommendations -
Populations are sorted according to the percentage of good recommenders (the
lines are only for ease of reading)
Figure 6.12 shows the evaluation of the average community factor in the
context of recommendations across the different population. From the figure,
one sees that in the deterministic setting the expected community factor is
well approximated. In the probabilistic setting the difference between the
expected value and the calculated value is noticeable in most populations.
This is due to the fact that the behavior of the interactors is probabilistic
and the simple variant for the update of the trustworthiness of recommenders
(see Section 5.4.2.2) does not account for this. Although the recommenders
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in the population h and m provide accurate recommendations, there is a
difference in the calculated average community factor. This is probably
due to the fact that in the population h there are mostly good interaction
partners and accurate recommenders. Thus, there are many recommenders
that provide accurate recommendations for the selected interaction partner.
This leads to a high value of the community factor. In the population m
there are primarily bad interaction partners and accurate recommenders. As
recommenders provide accurate but bad recommendations about the entities
they know, the initiator usually selects an entity about which only little is
known. Thus, there is only little information that may be used in order to
update the trust in recommenders.
6.1.5.3 Comparison to Baselines and Other Models
The Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the comparison of the proposed approach
(CT C) compared to other models and baselines.
Comparison: Error in Estimating the Trustworthiness of an Entity
Figure 6.13: Average error in estimating the trustworthiness of an entity -
Populations are sorted according to the percentage of good recommenders (the
lines are only for ease of reading)
The results of the evaluation are presented in Figure 6.13. The results of
the Perfect selection strategy are not shown in the graph. As the Perfect
selection strategy knows the true value of the parameter that defines the
behavior of an entity, the error of estimating this parameter is 0.
The Random strategy estimates the trustworthiness of an entity randomly.
The evaluation shows that the estimation error is independent from the
population, but depends on the setting (either deterministic or probabilistic).
The results achieved by the Random strategy are usually worse than the
results by other strategies.
From the comparison of CT C and Beta S one can see that CT C achieves
considerable better performance than the Beta S whenever there are 33% or
more entities providing misleading recommendations, i.e., in the populations
132 CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
s, sw, w, hsw, msw, hmsw, hs, hw, ms, mw, hms, and hmw. Only in the
probabilistic setting in populations with only good recommenders Beta S
has slight advantages, i.e., in the populations h, hm, and m.
From the comparison of CT C and Beta D one can see, that CT C
out-performs in all populations and settings, although Beta D weights rec-
ommendations. The assumption that the trustworthiness of an entity as
interactor can be used to weight its provided recommendations does not
perform well. Even in populations where the assumption is true the results
of Beta D are worse than the ones produced by CT C.
In order to evaluate the impact of the concept of deriving the trustworthi-
ness of a recommender from the accuracy of its previous recommendations,
the Beta Reputation System has been extended (Ext Beta) with the update
mechanism for the trustworthiness of recommenders as proposed in Section
5.4.2.2. The results show that this extension clearly improves the performance
compared to Beta S and Beta D. Yet, the extension alone is not sufficient
for the achievement of the performance of CT C.
Table 6.1 shows average error in estimating the trustworthiness across all
populations.
Model Deterministic
setting
Probabilistic
setting
Average over
both settings
CT C 7.56% 13.19% 10.37%
Ext Beta 17.32% 17.95% 17.64%
Beta D 44.93% 22.99% 33.96%
Beta S 49.66% 25.59% 37.63%
Random 49.99% 33.14% 41.56%
Table 6.1: Average error in estimating the trustworthiness across all
populations
Comparison: Average Percentage of the Accumulated Sum of
Feedback
Figure 6.14 shows the results of the average percentage of the accumulated
sum at the end of each simulation (averaged over all runs) per population
and per setting. The populations m, w, and mw are not considered in the
figure, as in these populations the results of the Perfect selection strategy
were negative which would lead to a misleading interpretation.
The Perfect selection strategy achieves 100% in each population. The
results that are achieved by the Random strategy depend on the population
as expected. The results are usually worse than the results achieved by the
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Figure 6.14: Average percentage of the accumulated sum of feedback -
Populations are sorted according to the percentage of good interactors (the
lines are only for ease of reading)
other models, yet, the Random model serves as a baseline which shows the
results that are achieved by an entity that does not use any trust model.
Furthermore, one can see that CT C mostly outperforms Beta S and
Beta D. In the deterministic setting the results of Ext Beta are very similar
to the results of CT C, therefore it is hard to distinguish the graphs. In the
probabilistic setting CT C especially has advantages in the populations msw
and sw.
All in all, CT C achieves positive results in all populations and settings.
It is worth noting that CT C achieves 89% of the results of the Perfect
selection strategy, when taking the average of the 24 populations (12 per
setting). The worst result of CT C (61%) is in the population sw in the
probabilistic setting; considering that all entities in this population try to
provide misleading recommendations this is a good result.
The Tables 6.2 show the average accumulated sum of feedback for the
selected populations.
Model Deterministic
setting
Probabilistic
setting
Average over
both settings
CT C 96.98% 81.97% 89.48%
Ext Beta 96.97% 76.79% 86.88%
Beta D 77.10% 69.03% 73.07%
Beta S 49.44% 38.34% 43.89%
Random 30.00 21.05% 25.52%
Table 6.2: Average percentage of the accumulated sum of feedback for the
selected populations, i.e., all populations exclusive the populations w, mw, and
m
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6.1.6 Summary
In contrast to the simulations in [QHC06, TPJL06, JI02], the presented
simulation evaluates the results of different trust models over a wide set of
populations and uses a mobility model for the movement of entities. The
population mixes are derived from the classification of the basic types of
behaviors. As all kinds of combinations are considered the results present a
good overview of the performance of the considered models. The mobility
model, which determines when entities are in proximity and may interact,
is based on real world user traces. This is especially important as the
developed trust model is to support collaboration in opportunistic networks
and ubiquitous computing applications.
• The results of the average percentage of the accumulated sum of
feedback (see Figure 6.13) show that the proposed trust model achieves
good results in all considered populations. Compared to the perfect
selection strategy CT C is capable of achieving more than 75% of the
results reached by the Perfect selection strategy in 22 of 24 populations
and 89% in average.
• The comparison of CT C to Beta S and Beta D shows that CT C
outperforms in most population mixes. This is especially important as
a user will evaluate not the trust models itself, but the improvement
of the quality of her interactions. The results for average error in
estimating the trustworthiness across all populations and both setting
are given by CT C 10.37%, Beta D 33.96%, and Beta 37.63% (see
Table 6.1). The results for the average percentage of the accumulated
sum of feedback across all populations, but m, w, and mw are given
by CT C 89.48%, Beta D 73.07%, and Beta S 43.89% (see Table 6.2).
The reason for the improved overall quality of interactions can be seen
in the smaller error in the estimated trustworthiness (see Figure 6.14)
for most of the populations.
• The extension of the Beta Reputation System that has been introduced
by the author of this thesis in Ext Beta shows that significant improve-
ments can be achieved when weighting recommendations according
to the trustworthiness of its recommender in the context of providing
recommendations, as opposed to not weighting recommendations or
using the trustworthiness of an entity in the context of interactions.
• The results indicate that using the community-based update of the
base trust value f and the extension of the computational trust model
improve the results when estimating the trustworthiness of interactors.
The extension of the update mechanism as proposed in Section 5.4.2.2
and the adaption of the update mechanism for base trust value f in
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order to counterbalance the selection strategy did not lead to significant
improvements.
All in all, the evaluation supports the claim that the proposed trust model
improves the quality of interactions especially in the presence of misleading
recommendations. Thus, the results show the robustness of the proposed
approach with respect to different populations and varying stability of the
users’ interaction behaviors.
136 CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
6.2 Evaluation of the Usability of the HTI
As introduced in the previous chapters, it is important that a trust model
that is to support users in their decision making provides a representation
which is appropriate for integration in an intuitive graphical representation.
Trust models that have only been developed for use by software agents,
e.g., [BLB04,QHC06,TPJL06], usually do not consider this aspect. In this
section, the usability of the graphical representation of CertainTrust (CT)
- called Human Trust Interface (HTI) - that has been proposed in Section
5.2.4 is evaluated. The evaluation has been carried out in the form of a
user study comparing the HTI with a graphical representation that has been
proposed for “subjective logic” (SL) [Jøs01], called “Opinion Triangle” (see
also Section 3.2.5), and “Stars interface”, that mimics the rating interface
used by Amazon [Ama09].
Although the “Stars interface” does not come from the domain of trust
models in the closer sense (see the definition of trust 4.2.4), it comes from a
related domain - online recommender systems - which also deals with repre-
senting recommendations based on previously collected ratings. In contrast
to trust models that are currently under research where the computation
of a trust value seems more important than an intuitive representation for
users, an intuitive representation of the ratings of offered products is vital
for selling platforms. Therefore, a comparison to the “Stars interface” seems
to be a good choice.
The user study has been based on the same scenario as the simulation in
Section 6.1. The scenario that has been presented to the participants of the
user study has already been introduced at the beginning of Chapter 2.
In the following sections, first, the evaluated representations are briefly
presented. Second, the procedure and the design of the user study are
explained. Third, the results are shown, and discussed (fourth). Finally,
there is a summary of this section.
6.2.1 Evaluated Representations
This section briefly introduces the necessary details of each representation.
Figure 6.15 shows the three representations that have been compared in the
user study.
6.2.1.1 CertainTrust - Human Trust Interface
The details of the graphical representation of the Human Trust Interface
(HTI) have already been introduced in Section 5.2.4. In the user study, the
base trust value is assumed to have moderate value, i.e., f = 0.5; and the
maximum number of expected evidence units has been set to N = 20. The
relation between the numbers of collected positive and negative evidence units
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Figure 6.15: Representations evaluated in the user study: Each
representation shows the opinion about the trustworthiness of 2 interactors
based on the same number of evidence units
and the formula for the certainty parameter that was used when the user
study was conducted is presented in [Rie07]; it can be roughly approximated
using w = 4. Figure 6.16 shows an example of an opinion about an entity A
that is based mostly positive evidence with a high certainty value.
Figure 6.16: Example: CertainTrust - HTI
6.2.1.2 Subjective Logic (SL) - Opinion Triangle
The second representation uses a triple of parameters to represent opinions
about the trustworthiness of an interactor (b, d, u) (b = belief, d = disbelief,
u = uncertainty) - assuming atomicity a = 0.5 (see Section 3.2.5.1). The
relation between these parameters and the collected evidence can be explained
as follows:
• uncertainty: depends on the number of collected evidence units
– uncertainty = 0: infinite number of evidence units collected.
– uncertainty = 1: not any collected evidence.
• belief: increases with the relative frequency of collected positive evi-
dence:
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– belief = 1: infinite number of evidence units collected, which have
all been positive
– belief = 0: not any positive evidence collected (only negative once,
if any)
• disbelief: increases with the relative frequency of collected negative
evidence:
– disbelief = 1: infinite number of evidence units collected, which
all have been negative
– disbelief = 0: not any negative evidence collected (only positive
once, if any)
The axes for belief, disbelief, and uncertainty are indicated by the corre-
sponding labels at the end of each axis (see Figure 6.17). The interpretation
of the opinion represented by the point A in Figure 6.17 is similar to the
one explained in the example presented with CertainTrust in Figure 6.16.
This interface does not integrate a representation of the expectation value in
contrast to the interface of CertainTrust.
Figure 6.17: Example: Opinion Triangle (SL)
6.2.1.3 Stars
The interface “Stars” represents the average number of positive ratings
of interactions as stars in the range of one to five stars (in half steps).
Additionally, the interface shows the number evidence which contributed to
the rating. For an example and the interpretation of the stars see Figure
6.18 and Figure 6.19. In the example, the decimal places of Figure 6.18 may
originate from weighted evidence from recommendations.
A difference to the representations introduced before is that this interface
does not integrate both values (stars and number of evidence units) to a
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Figure 6.18: Example: Stars interface
single value or point, but leaves the interpretation up to the user. This
makes it also harder to manipulate opinions, as both parameters have to be
manipulated separately. This representation does not provide a means to
derive a trust (or expectation value) that integrates both parameters.
Figure 6.19: Interpretation of the stars interface - taken from Amazon
(www.amazon.com)
6.2.2 User Study
As pointed out above, the user study is to evaluate how intuitive users can
interact with those representations. Therefore, the experiment was conducted
with three conditions (CT, SL, Stars) corresponding to the three interfaces
described above.
The experiment is to provide insight into how well the interfaces support
the user in making a decision on the trustworthiness of a potential interaction
partner. Furthermore, it will be evaluated whether and how often the decision
that would automatically be taken by CertainTrust matches the decisions
the users took. A good prediction of the user’s choice would allow for the
automation of the interaction process in cases as presented in the scenario.
This study did not evaluate how the interfaces perform with regard to
manipulating opinions. The Stars interface was included as a baseline as it
is already widely used in internet sites on the web.
The hypotheses for the experiment were as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The users will be faster in the CT Interface than in the
Opinion Triangle (from Subjective Logic) to decide on the trustworthiness
of interaction partners. In the Stars interface, the user were to be faster, as
they were used to this interface.
Hypothesis 2: The participants’ decisions in the Stars and SL interface
will be the same as the decisions suggested by CertainTrust.
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6.2.2.1 Design
The experiment used a within-subject factorial design, with the interface
type as primary factor. Each participant completed a series of eight tasks
with each interface. The task was to pick one of two potential interaction
partners which were displayed in the same interface. The same eight pairs
in the same order were used for all conditions; however carry over effects
have not been expected and evaluated, as the representations were supposed
to be sufficiently distinctive. In order to counterbalance learning effects in
the general setup the order of interfaces between subjects was varied. The
within subject design does account for variability between subjects.
The study was conducted as an online survey, so that participants could
take part remotely to prevent experimenter effects.
6.2.2.2 Participants
Thirty two subjects took part in the study. All but one did have prior
experience with online shopping. 4 females and 27 males completed the study
(one participant did not reveal the gender). They were in the age range of 21
to 40 years. Participants were not paid for taking part in the study.
6.2.2.3 Procedure
Participants were presented the scenario that is described at the beginning
of Chapter 2. Afterwards, they answered a questionnaire regarding their
opinion about the relationship between trust and evidence.
The procedure for the experiment was as follows. The interface of the
first condition was explained to the subjects. They were then sequentially
presented with the 8 pairs of potential interaction partners (named A and
B) using the same trust representation. The users were to select the best
interaction partner from each pair. The time they took to decide between the
two marked by a click on a button and the interaction partner they preferred
was logged for analysis.
The same was done for the other two conditions, so that every user judged
on every pair of interaction partners three times, once in every interface. In
Figure 6.16 there is an example how the same example (setting) is presented
using different interfaces.
The evaluation was done using only 6 of 8 settings, as the number of
evidence units presented in the three interfaces was identical for those (for
the numbers see Table 6.3).
6.2.3 Results
Hypothesis 1: For the analysis of the first hypothesis the time the users took
for their decisions was aggregated over the 6 settings per model (CT, SL,
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Table 6.3: Number of evidence units per interaction partner and setting
Stars). The mean times (in ms) per model are given in ascending order:
44635.094 (CT), 46486.250 (Stars), and 74324.250 (SL). The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test indicated that the data is normally distributed. For the further
analysis one-way repeated measures ANOVA was done: Mauchly’s test
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 24.0,
p < .01, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser
estimates of sphericity ( = .645). The results show that the choice of the
representation has significantly affected the time a user needs to select an
interaction partner, F(1.3, 40.0), p < .01, ω = 0.56. Using the benchmarks for
effect size this represents a strong effect. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed
that the mean time of the participants was significantly higher than when
using the Opinion Triangle of Subjective Logic as in both other interfaces.
For details see Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Pairwise comparisons (time in milliseconds)
Hypothesis 2: As the selected interaction partner in the experiment
leads to nominal, non-parametric data - a participant either selected to
interact with A or B - the frequencies of the selection of A and B have been
counted. Figure 6.20 shows the corresponding the percentages. One sees that
the majority of the participants has selected the same interaction partner
independently of the model. Furthermore, the interaction partner which
has been selected by the majority of the users was in all settings the one
which would have been autonomously selected by CertainTrust. Thus, this
hypothesis is considered to be true.
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Figure 6.20: Percentage of participants selecting interaction partner A per
setting and per model (the lines are only for ease of reading)
For a further analysis, whether the representation has an effect on the
choice of the interaction partner, the percentage of participants which have
chosen the same interaction partner as the one proposed by CertainTrust
per setting and per model was calculated. The results show that there are
not any significant differences (p>.05) between the participants choices in
the different models. The mean values are: .943 (CT), .891 (SL), and .927
(Stars); the confidence intervals are given in Figure 6.21.
Figure 6.21: Mean values: Average percentage of participants selecting the
same interaction partner as proposed by CT
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6.2.4 Discussion
6.2.4.1 Effects of the Representation
From the results, one can learn that the representation has a significant
effect on the time the participants needed to select an interaction partner.
Although, it was expected that most participants are faster in the Stars
interface as they were supposed to be used to this representation (all but
one had experience with online shopping), the participants were slightly,
non-significantly slower than in the HTI. In both interfaces the participants
were significantly faster than in the Opinion Triangle. There may be two
reasons to explain these effects. First, users are not used to interpreting
triangular representations with three axes, as orthogonal two axis layouts are
more common in everyday life. On the website on Subjective Logic (http://
sky.fit.qut.edu.au/ josang/sl/demo/BV.html), one can find the statement
that the Opinion Triangle is a more mathematical representation. That page
offers further representations for opinions, but as to the author’s knowledge
the details have neither been evaluated nor published, it has been decided to
use the representation which is usually used as graphical representation of
opinions for Subjective Logic. Second, the HTI tries to support the user with
a green-yellow-red color gradient and is capable of integrating the average
rating and the certainty in one graphical representation as opposed to the
Stars interface.
The answers given by the participants on the questions at the end of the
experiment also indicated that they felt comfortable with the interface of
CertainTrust (small sample from the questions):
Question A: Which interface would you prefer in the described scenario:
(CT 68.8%, SL 3.1%, Stars 28.1%)
Question B: The color gradient supported your decision for an interaction
partner. Do you agree? The mean value of the answers on a scale from 0
(strongly disagree), 1 (disagree), 2 (slightly disagree), 3 (slightly agree), 4
(agree), 5 (strongly agree) is 3.81.
Question C: Can you imagine using the Human Trust Interface without
the labels after a short time of familiarization? mean value (scale as above):
3.19.
6.2.4.2 Rationality of the Choices
At this point, it has still to be discussed, whether the decisions of the
participants were rational or not. The definition of the ”best choice” is not
trivial, as the choice is influenced at least by the relative frequency of positive
interactions, as well as the total number of evidence units, and the risk which
is associated with an interaction.
In settings 1, 4, and 5 the decision goes along with the relative frequency
of positive and negative interactions and the amount of collected evidence.
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The more interesting cases are the settings 2, 3, and 6. For the exact numbers
of evidence units see Table 6.3.
In setting 2, there are two candidates for the interaction having the same
of ratio of positive to total evidence, but the opinion about B is based on
more evidence. Using the Stars interface (3 stars for both) all users decided
to interact with B - which is the candidate about whom more information
is available. In both remaining interfaces, a small number of participants
selected the candidate about whom less information is available. In both cases,
the expected trustworthiness calculated by CertainTrust is 0.5. Although in
this case, the expectation values are identical, the selection algorithm favors
the one with the higher number of evidence units; thus, going along with the
majority of the participants.
In setting 3, there is candidate A about whom one has very little, but
very positive information (mean: 0.96) information; and candidate B about
whom one has a higher amount of information, mostly positive (mean: 0.82).
In all three interfaces the majority of the participants selected user A. In the
face that interactions are associated with a certain risk and a little amount
of evidence may be quite misleading, therefore this choice is considered to be
rational.
In setting 6, there are six participants who selected candidate A in the
Stars interface, while in the other interfaces only one (CT) or two (SL)
participants selected A. In short, about candidate A, there is very little
information available (similar amount of positive and negative evidence),
while about candidate B, there is more information available, which is mostly
negative. In this case, one might say that the participants made a better
choice in the CertainTrust and Subjective Logic interface, than in the Stars
interface.
At last, one can ask, if there is a number of maximum expected evidence
units, which allows to interpret the average rating as representative expec-
tation for future interactions. At the beginning of the experiment, after
the participants were given the scenario and before they were introduced to
the different representations, the following statement was presented to the
participants: ”Having collected a certain number of evidence units, you are
able to properly estimate the trustworthiness of your interaction partner.”
Most users agreed (all, but 5). On a scale from 0 to 5 (as above) the mean
was 3.41. For the mp3-exchange the majority of users expected 6-10 pieces
of evidence, for buying an mp3-player (used, 10 EUR) the majority expected
21-50 pieces of evidence.
6.2.5 Summary
In this section, the usability of the graphical representation of the HTI has
been evaluated. The results may be summarized as follows:
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• In the HTI the participants have been significantly faster than in the
Opinion Triangle when selecting an interaction partner.
• Comparing the HTI and “Stars interface”, the performance of the
participants is similar in both interfaces. The participants have been
slightly, non-significantly faster in the HTI than “Stars interface”.
• In all representations, the users selected the candidate that would have
been preferred by the selection strategy proposed in Section 5.4.1.
Thus, the results of the user study support the hypothesis that the
graphical representation of the HTI is appropriate for human users.
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6.3 Integration of CertainTrust in an Online Movie
Recommendation Application
In order to evaluate whether users feel comfortable with the concept of a
trust model, the trust model has been additionally evaluated in an online
movie recommendation application.
6.3.1 Description of the Application
The application, called “trust-aided online recommendation platform for
movies” (TORP) [Win08], has been developed and evaluated in a Master
thesis. It allows users to recieve personalized recommendations for movies
based on their social network.
TORP is basically a web application - for screenshots see Figures 6.22
(Registration and login), 6.23 (Social network and rated movies), 6.24 (Ac-
tively recommended movies and directly rated movies), and 6.25 (Rating
of a movie). Users can register at TORP using a freely chosen nickname.
After the registration a user can start adding other users as friends to their
social network. Furthermore, a user can rate movies and their friends. The
movies are rated according to the user’s personal preference; friends are rated
according to their expected trustworthiness in the context of providing good
recommendations for movies. Both ratings are presented and manipulated in
the graphical representation provided by the Human Trust Interface (HTI)
(see Section 5.2.4). Thus, the user can provide a rating that includes a
statement about the certainty of this rating2.
The application provides two mechanisms for providing personalized
movie recommendations.
• The active mechanism provides users with a personalized list of the best
movies based on weighted recommendations derived from the social
network. In this list a user will only find movies they have not rated
themselves.
• The passive mechanism calculates a personalized rating for any movie
a user wants to get a personalized rating for.
In order to overcome the bootstrapping problem - at the beginning a user
might have a very small network and look for movies no one in their social
networks has rated before - the Internet Movie Data base (www.imdb.com)
is integrated. The IMDb is added to each user social network as a virtual
friend.
Furthermore, TORP incorporates an update mechanism for the trust-
worthiness of one’s friends. Each time a user rates a movie that a friend
2The relation between the collected number of evidence units and certainty was the
same as used for the user study in the Section 6.2.1.1.
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has rated before, the trustworthiness of the friend is updated according
to the similarity of the ratings. This update mechanism is also applied to
personalized the rating of the trustworthiness of the IMDb.
The application is similar to FilmTrust [Gol05], yet, in the presented
approach the ratings are presented in a two-dimensional layout - including
the certainty of a rating - and the trustworthiness of friends is automatically
updated as described above.
Figure 6.22: Screenshots of TROP: Registration and login
6.3.2 User Study
The section briefly presents the design and the result of the user study that
was carried out after developing the application.
6.3.2.1 Participants and Design
In the user study with 26 participants, mostly students of computer science,
it has been evaluated whether the users felt comfortable with this application.
In order to overcome the lack of real users, a set of artificially created
predefined users was added to TORP prior to the study. The preferences
of the predefined users were associated to different genres of movies, e.g.,
comedy or action. A list with the predefined users and their preferences was
given to the participants of the user study.
In the experiment, the users had to create their own account for TORP
and build a social network from a set of predefined users. Afterwards, the
participants could rate movies and adjust the ratings of the users they
previously added to their social network according to their preferences. They
were told especially to look at how the new rating of their friend changes
when providing ratings on movies.
After the experiment, the participants had to fill out a questionnaire.
The questions focused on the overall usability of the application, as well as
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Figure 6.23: Screenshots of TROP: Social network and rated movies
on the aspects relevant to the trust model.
6.3.2.2 Results
The results of the user study supported that the users feel comfortable
with two-dimensional interface of the HTI (see below questions A - D).
Furthermore, the results of the user study support that the users like the
idea of receiving personalized recommendations based on their social network
and they feel comfortable with the integrated update mechanism for the
trustworthiness of recommenders (see below questions E - I).
• Question A: I felt comfortable with the interpretation of the two-
dimensional interface. Do you agree? The mean value of the answers
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (slightly disagree),
4 (slightly agree), 5 (agree), 6 (strongly agree) is 5.04.
• Question B: I felt comfortable using the two-dimensional interface to
provide ratings on my friends. Do you agree? The mean value of the
answers is (scale as above): 4.58
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Figure 6.24: Screenshots of TROP: Actively recommended movies and
directly rated movies
• Question C: I felt comfortable using the two-dimensional interface in
order to provide ratings on movies. Do you agree? The mean value of
the answers is (scale as above): 5.27
• Question D: I felt comfortable with the possibility of providing and
receiving ratings in the two-dimensional interface. Do you agree? The
mean value of the answers is (scale as above): 4.92
• Question E: I would like to use recommendations by friends in addition
to other internet-based sources of movie ratings, like IMDb. Do you
agree? The mean value of the answers is (scale as above): 5
• Question F: I think it is reasonable to rate friends according to their
preferences of movies. Do you agree? The mean value of the answers
is (scale as above): 4.62
• Question G: I think it is reasonable to automatically update the ratings
of my friends. Do you agree? The mean value of the answers is (scale
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Figure 6.25: Screenshots of TROP: Rating of a movie
as above): 5.19
• Question H: The quality of the recommended ratings increased after
having rated some movies. Do you agree? The mean value of the
answers is (scale as above): 5.04
• Question I: I would like to use this application on another domain, e.g.,
recommendation of clips on YouTube (www.youtube.com). Do you
agree? The mean value of the answers is (scale as above): 4.88
6.3.3 Summary
The section may be summarized by following statements:
• This section introduced an application of CertainTrust as part of a
trust-aided online recommendation platform for movies. The details of
the application can be found in [Win08].
• The results of the conducted user study support the argument that the
users feel comfortable when using the graphical representation of the
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HTI in the context of movie recommendation application. Furthermore,
the results encourage the integration social networks together with
means that allow the trustworthiness of users in this network to be
rated.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter evaluated the performance of the proposed trust model in an
opportunistic network scenario. Furthermore, the usability of the proposed
graphical representation for users has been evaluated.
• The results of the simulated opportunistic network in Section 6.1 clearly
show the positive impact of the proposed trust model. In order to show
that the trust model may be applied over a wide set of applications in
which the typical user behavior may differ, the simulation presents the
results over a canonical set of 15 populations that are derived from the
system model which has been proposed in Section 4.2.
– The results of the simulation support that assess the trustworthi-
ness of a recommender based on the accuracy of its past recom-
mendations leads to an improvement of the performance of the
trust model.
– The results shows that the dynamic community-based re-evaluation
of the base trust may lead to improvements in the model’s perfor-
mance.
– The overall performance regarding the two introduced measures
show that the proposed trust model has not only a superior per-
formance when compared to a state-of-the-art approach, but also
that the model performs well when compared to the introduced
Perfect selection strategy.
∗ The results for the average error in estimating the trustwor-
thiness across all populations and both settings are given by
CT C 10.37%, Beta D 33.96%, and Beta S 37.63% (see Table
6.1).
∗ The results for the average percentage of the accumulated sum
of feedback across all populations, but m, w, and mw are
given by CT C 89.48%, Beta D 73.07%, and Beta S 43.89%
(see Table 6.2).
• The user studies that have been performed support the claim that the
proposed graphical representation allows for an intuitive interpretation
by human users.
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– It has be shown that users are significantly faster when selecting
an interaction partner in the HTI than in the Opinion Triangle.
– In the provided examples, the majority of users selected the
interaction partner that would have been preferred by the selection
strategy proposed in Section 5.4.1.
• The integration of CertainTrust in an online movie recommendation
platform (TORP) and evaluation of TORP have shown that users feel
comfortable with the integration of the trust model in a social network
in the context of movie recommendations. Furthermore, users provided
positive feedback on the graphical representation of the HTI.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Outlook
Having presented and evaluated the proposed trust model, this chapter
summarizes the main contributions and findings of the thesis and presents
an outlook with issues that may be addressed in future work.
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, a new distributed trust model has been provided. The require-
ments for the trust model have been inspired by the ideas of unmanaged
ubiquitous computing environments. The trust model supports users in
finding trustworthy interaction partners, which is a fundamental requirement
for successful collaboration not only in ubiquitous computing but also in open
service market places and on Web 2.0 platforms. The trust model supports
users as it allows the decision making to be delegated to an autonomous
software component or the collected trust information to be presented in an
appropriate representation to the user.
Representational Model and Update Mechanisms
• In the presented approach trust is interpreted as a subjective probability.
The trust model extends Bayesian trust models in order to improve
the integration of the context-dependent parameters. The dispositional
trust of users can be directly mapped to the prior knowledge using
the parameters base trust f and weight w. The maximum number of
expected evidence units N is introduced to allow for the definition of a
number of evidence units that is expected to be sufficient in order to
consider the collected evidence as representative for the behavior of an
entity.
• The introduction of the parameter N has been shown to be especially
helpful when aging of evidence is introduced. Choosing the parameter
N depending on the aging factor a as proposed (N = 11−a), the approach
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combines the features that the trust value can reach the complete range
of values in [0; 1] and the trust value moves back to the base trust
value in absence of evidence.
• In order to support human users, a new representational model of
trust, called Human Trust Interface (HTI), has been developed. It is
based on a simple set of parameters and provides an intuitive graphical
representation. The HTI is considered to be especially helpful when
users want to control trust values, intervene in the decision making
process, or adjust trust values according to their “real world” experience.
• The evaluation of the HTI in two user studies supports the intuitiveness
of the HTI and that the users feel comfortable with the graphical
representation.
• The provided mapping makes both representations, the Bayesian repre-
sentation and the HTI, interchangeable. As the calculated trust value
or expectation value is independent from the choice of the represen-
tational model, the developers and users of trust models can benefit
from the advantages of both representations. Furthermore, a mapping
to the belief representation of “subjective logic” is provided.
• Regarding evidence based trust establishment, two update mechanisms
for deriving a recommender’s trustworthiness based on the accuracy
of the recommender’s past recommendations have been provided. Fur-
thermore, the model supports the derivation of the base trust value
from the typical behavior of the entities that have been met within a
certain context.
Computational model
Beyond the advances in the representational trust model, an extended com-
putational model is proposed.
• The computational model is based on the two operators called consensus
and discounting, and it provides new features for exogenous filtering of
recommendations:
– It excludes recommenders that are known to provide mostly bad
recommendations.
– It considers the recommendations by the best recommenders first.
– It considers only recommendations until the number of evidence
units that is calculated from the direct evidence and the recom-
mendations considered so far is below a certain threshold.
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– Recommendations are weighted by the trustworthiness of its rec-
ommender and by the rank of the recommender.
• It has been shown that those steps together allow the robustness of the
trust model to increase regarding Sybil attacks for two reasons. First,
in the presence of sufficient direct evidence or well-known good recom-
menders, recommendations by other recommenders are not considered
at all. Second, in the absence of sufficient direct evidence or good
recommenders, the impact of a Sybil attack is limited by the trust-
worthiness of the Sybils in the context of providing recommendations.
This is particularly achieved by considering the rank of a recommender.
• Furthermore, the robustness of the trust model has been evaluated in
the simulation of an opportunistic network scenario. The evaluation
shows the performance of the trust model over a large set of populations
that have canonically been derived from the proposed system model.
The results from the comparison to a state-of-the-art approach as well
as from a comparison to the introduced perfect selection strategy show
that the proposed model reaches good results regarding the estimation
of the trustworthiness of an entity and regarding the average quality of
interactions.
As the evaluation of the representational model as well as the evaluation
of the computational model has been shown to lead to improvements in
comparison to the state-of-the-art, the concepts that have been presented
and evaluated in this thesis are considered to be valuable and significant
contributions in field of evidence based trust models.
7.2 Outlook
Beyond the issues that have been evaluated in the focus of this thesis, there
are still numerous aspects for further research.
As a next step it could be evaluated how the proposed extensions of
the Bayesian trust models can be applied in Dirichlet based trust models
that allow multinomial ratings [JH07]. It would be especially interesting to
transfer the concepts that have been proposed for aging and the introduction
of the maximum number of expected evidence units.
A further extension of the current work could be the evaluation of
the proposed approach in utility based decision making, which has been
introduced in Section 2.3. Hereby, the assessment of the utility of non-
monetary interactions and the evaluation of the risk attitude of users in
different application contexts seems to be challenging.
More generally, the evaluation of the performance of the different trust
models in further scenarios is interesting. Beyond ubiquitous computing, the
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integration of trust models in other domains as open service market places
and Web 2.0 applications seems to be promising in order to evaluate the trust
models with real users and real attacks. Hereby, one can also analyze the
typical interaction patterns between entities in different domains, e.g., how
often entities interact with each other, what kinds of attacks occur most, and
how often entities change their pseudonyms. This would be especially helpful
as currently much evaluation is done based on simulations. An analysis
of real world data would also be important in order to further evaluate a
rational choice of the values of the trust model’s parameters.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to evaluate strategies that support
the evaluation of the trustworthiness of groups of entities. This may be
reasonable in a case when a group of entities, e.g., the web services of one
company, offer the same quality of service, but there is only little experience
with a single service. This also leads to approaches that try to transfer
trust between different application contexts. For example, how can the
trustworthiness of a service provider in the context of hotel reservations be
transferred to the context of car reservations or online banking.
Moreover, it should be investigated how evidence based approaches can be
extended to application fields in which direct feedback can only be expected
in the case that an interaction partner does not meet its obligations. For
example, when assessing the trustworthiness of a service provider regarding
the enforcement of the advertised privacy policies, users may hardly give
positive feedback, as they simply do not know whether the service provider
keeps their data secretly. However, users can provide negative feedback when
they find out that their data has been misused. This lack of positive feedback
is not reflected in the current approach.
Finally, the integration of evidence-based trust management and policy-
based trust management is an obvious challenge. Here, it would be interesting
to develop approaches which support the evaluation of the trustworthiness of
certificates using evidence based models and approaches that are capable of
assessing the trustworthiness of entities based on certificates and evidence.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proof for EBetaf ,w,N = E
HTI
f ,w,N
This proof is referred to Section 5.2.6.
EBetaf ,w,N =
r + r0
r + s + r0 + s0
=
r + 2 · f · w · (1 − r+sN )
r + s + 2 · f · w · (1 − r+sN ) + 2 · (1 − f ) · w · (1 − r+sN )
=
r · N + 2 · f · w · (N − (r + s))
(r + s) · N + 2 · f · w · (N − (r + s)) + 2 · (1 − f ) · w · (N − (r + s))
=
r · N + 2 · f · w · (N − (r + s))
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
=
r · N
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
+
2 · f · w · (N − (r + s))
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
=
r · N · (r + s)
[(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))] · (r + s)
+
(
2 · w · (N − (r + s)) + N · (r + s)
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
− N · (r + s)
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
)
· f
=
r
r + s
· (r + s) · N
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
+
(
1 − (r + s) · N
(r + s) · N + 2 · w · (N − (r + s))
)
· f
= t · c + (1 − c) · f
= EHTIf ,w,N 
(A.1)
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A.2 Proof for EBeta0.5,1,∞ = E
Beta
S imple
This proof is referred to Section 5.2.6.2.
Assumption: The values of r and s are fixed and finite.
EBeta0.5,1,∞ = limN→∞
r + r0
r + s + r0 + s0
= lim
N→∞
r + 2 · f · w · (1 − r+sN )
r + s + 2 · f · w · (1 − r+sN ) + 2 · (1 − f ) · w · (1 − r+sN )
= lim
N→∞
r + 2 · f · w · (1 − r+sN )
r + s + 2 · w · (1 − r+sN )
=
r + 2 · f · w · (1 − limN→∞ r+sN )
r + s + 2 · w · (1 − limN→∞ r+sN )
=
r + 2 · f · w
r + s + 2 · w
=
r + 1
r + s + 2
= EBetaS imple 
(A.2)
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